United Nations S/2001/568

Security Council

Distr.: General
7 June 2001
English
Original: Arabic

Identical letters dated 6 June 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government and with reference to the letter dated 29 May 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations concerning alleged Iraqi violations of Saudi Arabia's land boundaries (S/2001/547), I should like to inform you that the Saudi letter consists of pure fabrication and to convey to you hereunder the actual facts of the situation.

1. The Saudi letter claims that on 23 May 2001 an Iraqi patrol entered Saudi territory and fired on personnel of the Saudi Frontier Force, that a number of Saudi soldiers were wounded and that an Iraqi soldier was also wounded and later died. This assertion is untrue. What actually happened was that on 24 May 2001 the Iraqi soldier Taqi Abd al-Amir was walking with a colleague near the boundary pillar when elements of the Saudi Frontier Force ambushed them and opened fire on them. Private Taqi Abd al-Amir was hit in the leg and lightly wounded, and the Saudi troops took him into Saudi territory. They later announced that he had died, although his wound had been slight, when they should have informed the International Committee of the Red Cross of his situation and endeavoured to save his life.

2. The Saudi letter claims that there were 10 cases of violations by Iraq in the period from 19 March to 21 April 2001. After checking, the Iraqi Border Guard Force affirmed that the assertions made in the Saudi letter are untrue, and it has not been established that any of the violations alleged by the Saudi authorities actually took place.

3. On the other hand, at 1855 hours on 25 March 2000 a Saudi patrol consisting of three vehicles fired 10 rounds from inside Saudi territory at an Iraqi border observation post, and Iraq informed the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States of this violation at the time it occurred.

4. The Saudi letter states that the alleged cases of gunfire represent "flagrant violations of resolutions that have the force of international law and of international conventions and covenants". At the same time, it seeks to ignore the fact that the real breach of international law and of international conventions and covenants is being committed by the Saudi authorities on a daily basis when they shelter, fund and provide bases and logistic support for the United States warplanes that, together with all the other United States and British warplanes stationed in Kuwait and in the Arabian Gulf, engage in constant aggression against Iraq with 10 to 20 attacks a day

01-40324 (E) 080601 080601

in which they bomb Iraqi civilian installations and economic infrastructure and destroy crops and livestock. In these attacks, 416 Iraqi citizens have been killed and more than 1,000 have been wounded. The policy of double standards being pursued by the Saudi authorities in accordance with American logic is no longer concealed from anyone, and the facts concerning the identity of the aggressor and the victim of aggression have become clear to one and all.

5. The timing of the submission of the Saudi letter and the timing of the circulation to the media of the vanities it contains expose the hostile intentions of the Saudi authorities, and thus also of the United States of America and the United Kingdom, as well as their premeditated intention to create a false impression that there is a tense situation on the Iraq-Saudi Arabia border so as to facilitate acceptance of the United States and British scheme to strengthen the embargo imposed on Iraq on the pretext of so-called smart sanctions and in order to create excuses for continued aggression against the country.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohammed A. **Al-Douri**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations A/55/984–S/2001/569

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
7 June 2001
English
Original: Russian

General Assembly
Fifty-fifth session
Agenda items 156 and 164

Security Council
Fifty-sixth year

Consideration of effective measures to enhance the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives

Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Letter dated 6 June 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On 8 May 2001, a letter from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations was circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 156 and 164, and as a document of the Security Council.

I should like to draw your attention to certain details of this letter, especially since the Permanent Representative of Turkey ventured to refer to my country in it in a very unambiguous context inadmissible within the walls of the United Nations.

In the letter of the Permanent Representative of Turkey, an attempt is made to link official Yerevan to certain individual acts of desperation that took place from 1973 to 1981 and were aimed at drawing the attention of the world community to the Turkish Governments denial of the fact of the Genocide of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire from 1915 to 1923. The complete absurdity of any link between Armenia and these acts lies in the fact that, during this period, Armenia, as a part of the Soviet Union, was deprived of independent statehood and could not in any way have had any connection to the aforementioned events or have influenced them in any manner.

Since it seems entirely unlikely that the Permanent Representative of Turkey is unfamiliar with these historical facts, it is abundantly clear that this is a deliberate falsification and juggling of the historical and political realities. Following the logic of the Permanent Representative of Turkey, one would have to conclude that official Ankara was behind the attempt on the life of the Pope committed in 1981 by Ali Agca, a member of the Turkish ultra-nationalist terrorist organization Grey Wolves, whose political wing is part of the current government coalition.

I think it is necessary to point out that, for us, the Turkish side's motives for such inappropriate actions are perfectly clear. It is well known that, over the past

01-40302 (E) 120601 120601

year, the process of achieving international recognition of the Genocide of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire from 1915 to 1923 has appreciably gained momentum. Since it is not in a position to disprove with the help of historical data the irrefutable fact of the Genocide, which led to the systematic annihilation of more than one and a half million Armenians, the Turkish Government has instead unleashed a campaign aimed at discrediting Armenia and the Armenian diaspora. Such actions on the part of Ankara are nothing other than an attempt to revive the medieval practice of blaming for the violence the very victims of the violence, in the hope that the endless repetition of the lie will make it true.

It is not surprising that the target of the Turkish authorities was precisely one of the oldest Armenian parties with a history dating back more than a century: the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, Dashnaktsutyun, which has been an active and consistent campaigner for the recognition of the Genocide of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire from 1915 to 1923. The hatred of the Turkish authorities for the Dashnaktsutyun party goes back to the beginning of the twentieth century, when the party fought actively against the Ottoman policy of State terrorism and genocide pursued against the Armenian people and other nationalities living in the territory of the Ottoman Empire.

After gaining independence in 1991, the Republic of Armenia became a party to the basic international instruments condemning terrorism and has repeatedly condemned terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. The official position of Armenia is that terror in no way furthers the re-establishment of historical truth with respect to the Genocide of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire.

I should like to take this opportunity to reaffirm once again Armenia's position, which consists in the total condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations.

We wish to reiterate, taking full responsibility, that the reference to Armenia in the letter from the Permanent Representative of Turkey circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under the agenda items on international terrorism, and of the Security Council is nothing other than provocation aimed at discrediting the just struggle of the Armenian people for the recognition of the Genocide of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire from 1915 to 1923.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 156 and 164, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Movses **Abelian**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2001/570

Security Council

Distr.: General
7 June 2001

Original: English

Letter dated 5 June 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Following the recent tour of the Security Council in the Great Lakes region, in particular the meeting between the Political Committee for the Implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, which my country had the honour and the privilege to chair, and the Security Council, headed by the Ambassador of France, H.E Mr. Jean-David Levitte, on 22 May 2001, I have the honour to transmit to you the joint communiqué signed by both the Political Committee and the Security Council.

On instructions from my Government, I would be grateful if the present letter and its annex* could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Dr. Anastase **Gasana**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* For text of communiqué, see S/2001/521/Add.1, annex II.

01-40333 (E) 080601

United Nations S/2001/571

Security Council

Distr.: General
7 June 2001

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 19 of Security Council resolution 1305 (2000) of 21 June 2000, by which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) for a further 12 months until 21 June 2001. It details the Mission's progress since my report of 30 November 2000 (S/2000/1137) and reviews activities conducted jointly by UNMIBH and other parts of the United Nations system in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

2. The Mission continues to be led by my Special Representative and Coordinator of United Nations Operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Jacques Paul Klein. The Mission's International Police Task Force (IPTF) is led by Commissioner Vincent Coeurderoy. As a result of the difficulties faced by police-contributing countries in meeting the requirements of all peacekeeping missions, the IPTF strength has remained below the authorized number of 2,057; the current strength is 1,798 (see annex).

II. Activities of the Mission

3. The Mission's internal mandate implementation plan is the comprehensive strategic framework (see S/2000/529, para. 34 and S/PV.4154 and Corr.1, p. 6) through which the Mission aims to complete its core mandate by 31 December 2002. The plan comprises six core programmes, corresponding to the sub-headings in this chapter, which incorporate 57 individual projects and sub-projects. Starting in January 2001, each UNMIBH department and region developed a six-month plan with specific timelines and benchmarks to implement the mandate implementation plan. Through this process, the Mission has achieved a new standard of unity of purpose and dynamism, and has established an efficient mechanism for internal resource management. As projects are completed, UNMIBH has redeployed its resources to other ongoing or new projects. The overall mandate completion target is predicated on maintaining the IPTF strength at 1,850 until July 2002, as recommended by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions to the General Assembly (see A/55/874/Add.5).

Police reform

4. The core programme of police reform aims to ensure that all law enforcement personnel meet international standards of personal integrity and professional competence. The individual projects are designed to weed out police personnel who are war or economic criminals, or who occupy housing illegally, and to ensure that each police officer is adequately trained, including in human rights.

5. Registration of all police personnel (including prison staff employed by Ministries of Justice, court police, the State Border Service and local Interpol) was completed in May 2001. Of the 24,007 law enforcement personnel entered in the UNMIBH Law Enforcement Personnel Registry, over 9,300 have been granted provisional authorization to exercise police powers and have been issued UNMIBH identification cards. Some 1,600 personnel have been refused provisional authorization, in most cases because they have been identified as administrative personnel, while

01-40388 (E) 120601

others lacked the necessary qualifications or had criminal records. Nineteen police officers had their authorization withdrawn ("de-authorized") for professional misconduct or for human rights violations. The remainder are still undergoing background checks. In the final phase of this programme, with the assistance of other organizations, UNMIBH will conduct detailed background checks on senior and mid-level police managers, and on officers whose preliminary background information warrants further investigation. This core programme will be completed in late 2002 when every law enforcement official will have been appropriately vetted prior to receiving UNMIBH final certification.

6. An estimated 40 per cent of all police officers are displaced persons living on someone else's property. Resolution of their housing status is one criterion for UNMIBH final certification, in accordance with the nationwide Property Legislation Implementation Plan. In the past year, 1,129 police personnel have regularized their housing status. Three police officers have been "de-authorized" for refusing to vacate illegal residences and nine illegally housed police stations have been moved. However, comprehensive remedies are particularly difficult to find as the low and irregular salaries received by the officers severely limit their ability to rent private accommodation. UNMIBH has repeatedly requested the Office of the High Representative to take measures to bring police salaries to a level that will enable police officers to rent private housing, and to insist that police personnel are given priority in the allocation of alternative municipal accommodation. Meanwhile, UNMIBH field staff have been helping police personnel, on a case-by-case basis, to repossess their own property, qualify for reconstruction assistance or find other legal accommodation.

7. UNMIBH police training programmes are nearing conclusion. Four of the five compulsory courses (human dignity, transitional training, traffic awareness and basic management) will be completed by July 2001. The community policing programme has been completed in 60 per cent of the Federation and 88 per cent of Republika Srpska. Specialized training of 3,023 local police in surveillance, intelligence, critical evidence response, vice and prostitution, forensics, auto crime, economic crime, advanced management training, and drug awareness has been concluded. Hazardous materials training is ongoing. The Federation and Republika Srpska Anti-Terrorist Units are fully trained and the 22 support units will complete training by June 2001. Tactical support unit training remains to be finished only in Republika Srpska and the Brčko District. Training and exercises to improve inter-entity police cooperation are ongoing.

8. UNMIBH has enhanced its capacity to monitor and, where necessary, sanction local police performance. In February 2001, the Mission issued a new policy comprising two mechanisms: (a) "performance reports", which record minor acts of inadequate performance that can be remedied through training or other supportive measures; and (b) "non-compliance reports", which record serious lapses of duty or violations of the law and oblige police officials to initiate internal disciplinary measures and to place the officer concerned under intensive IPTF scrutiny. Officers issued with more than one non-compliance report are automatically considered for de-authorization. All cases of previously issued non-compliance reports are being reviewed by the IPTF Commissioner with a view to taking action against those officers with a history of obstruction or violations.

9. The application of these mechanisms, together with timely action by the Office of the High Representative against police officials outside the purview of UNMIBH (such as Ministers and administrative staff), are essential tools to improve police performance. In February 2001, the Bratunac Police Chief and Chief Criminal Investigator were de-authorized and several police received non-compliance reports after repeated failures to respond adequately to serious crimes against Bosniac returnees. Following mob violence in Mostar and Grude during a search of the Herzegovacka Bank on 6 April, six police chiefs were de-authorized for signing a statement renouncing the authority of the Federation. The Minister of the Interior of Croatia and three senior administrative officials were ultimately also removed by the High Representative. Failure by the police to maintain public order during stone laying ceremonies for new mosques in Trebinje and Banja Luka in early May resulted in the removal of the Chief of the Public Security Centre of Trebinje and the issuance of a non-compliance report to the town's Chief of Crime Investigation. In Banja Luka, five police officers were suspended, the government accepted the resignations of the Minister of the Interior and the Chief of the Public Security

Centre and, regrettably, dismissed the dedicated Deputy Minister of the Interior, without whose intervention security arrangements would have been even more ineffective. UNMIBH is monitoring local police investigations to prepare for criminal prosecution of the perpetrators of the violence, particularly since serious charges are expected after the tragic death of one Bosniac as a result of injuries sustained during the violent demonstration in Banja Luka.

10. In all cases of mob violence, the need for well-trained and competently led police support units was evident. In the past eight months, UNMIBH has taken the lead in establishing and training these support units, but equipment and vehicles are required to make them effective and present at all locations. More generally, UNMIBH will use all means at its disposal, including assistance in the preparation of security plans and close monitoring of their implementation, supervision of the investigative follow-up of incidents and measures against non-cooperative police, to address ethnically-motivated and return-related crimes, which are expected to increase over the summer with the projected increase in minority returns.

11. The positive effects of proactive police work in sensitive circumstances was demonstrated in April in connection with the arbitration of the inter-entity boundary line in the Sarajevo suburb of Dobrinja. As a result of the arbitration, several apartment blocks inhabited by Bosnian Serbs, which since the end of the war had been part of Republika Srpska, were placed under the administration of the Federation. Thorough security planning by UNMIBH with the cantonal police on the Federation side and the concerned Public Security Centre in Republika Srpska, combined with close cooperation with the multinational stabilization force (SFOR), led to a smooth handover of responsibilities despite demonstrations by Bosnian Serbs and statements of strong dissatisfaction by leaders of Republika Srpska.

12. An objective assessment of police performance in the past six months would conclude that security planning and coordination has improved, as demonstrated during the sensitive Dobrinja arbitration award. However, investigation of incidents of return-related violence is still too often lethargic and inadequate, particularly in Eastern Republika Srpska, and operational capacity and political will are severely deficient when dealing with violent demonstrations, such as riots in Mostar, Banja Luka and Trebinje. In view of the likelihood of a "hot summer" resulting from the criminal actions of extremist elements opposed to increased minority returns and the reconstruction of historic religious sites, my Special Representative is engaging intensively with political, religious and community leaders and police officials to seek a substantial improvement in their mutual cooperation as an essential element in improving police performance.

13. However, there are three endemic problems that seriously impair police performance but are outside the mandate of UNMIBH. First, it is unreasonable to believe that a clean and effective police force can be established when the majority of police officers, especially in Republika Srpska, are paid an irregular wage that is not sufficient for daily life. Secondly, it is equally unrealistic to assume that under such conditions the officers will be able to resolve their housing status or that large numbers of minority police will be willing to redeploy across entity lines. Thirdly, when local police do perform their work efficiently, the lack of efficient and impartial judicial follow-up is a disincentive to police professionalism and the major reason why known ethnic extremists and criminals remain at large to commit repeat offences. All these problems are aggravated by the continuing political interference in professional police work.

14. Until these fundamental issues are addressed, local police will not be able to substitute for a continued robust international security presence mandated, staffed and equipped to maintain overall security and provide specific protection to international personnel and property. As the international community takes more robust actions against illegal parallel structures, organized crime and ethnic extremism, the requirement for security is likely to grow, rather than diminish. Recent attacks on international personnel, such as during the violent demonstrations in Banja Luka and Trebinje, have once again demonstrated that any review of the presence or mission of SFOR, and of the role of specialist forces such as the SFOR "multinational specialized units", must take full account of the security requirements of United Nations and other international personnel. The need for close coordination between all those involved in security-related matters, particularly SFOR and UNMIBH, whose tasks occupy different ends of the

same public security spectrum, is more important than ever.

Police restructuring

15. The aim of police restructuring is to rationalize the size, structure and resources of the police forces according to international standards and to ensure that their ethnic composition reflects that of the communities in which they serve. To address the organizational capacity of law enforcement institutions, a comprehensive IPTF co-location project entitled "Manage the Managers" was launched in February 2001. Under the project, in addition to co-locating with the crime departments, IPTF monitors are also being co-located in the legal, personnel, finance and budget departments, permitting, for example, a comparison of ministry payrolls with the Law Enforcement Registry, an evaluation of human resources and budget management, as well as the monitoring of internal disciplinary procedures. The project is under way in eight Federation cantons and is being extended to the public security centres in Republika Srpska. The success of the project will depend to a considerable extent on the quality and experience of IPTF staff.

16. The UNMIBH police commissioner project remains an essential institutional initiative for creating an apolitical police service, shielded from direct political interference from the ministries by functioning under a single chain of command led by an experienced police professional, designated "Police Commissioner" or "Director of Police". As a result of political interference and manipulation by political parties, the pilot project launched in Canton 9 (Sarajevo) had to be suspended in February 2001 pending revisions to the Law on Internal Affairs to depoliticize selection procedures. In three other cantons, necessary legislative amendments are being prepared. At the Federation level, strong representations to the Minister of the Interior by UNMIBH, with the support of the Office of the High Representative, resulted in the designation of a highly capable Bosnian Croat as the Interim Director of the Federation Ministry of the Interior on 20 March 2001. However, certain Bosniac political leaders, who reject the possibility of a Croat being Director of Police, have recently threatened IPTF personnel, including the Commissioner, and have sought to undermine and remove the Interim Director and his (also Bosnian-Croat) Deputy Minister, who have made considerable strides in reintegrating Bosniac and Croat officers and reorganizing the Ministry. UNMIBH deems this form of political interference and attempted intimidation totally unacceptable and has urged the Minister of the Interior not to give in to the pressure while UNMIBH redoubles its efforts to complete the police commissioner projects. In Republika Srpska, regrettably, despite several promises by the authorities, including the Prime Minister, no progress has been made in establishing a Director of Police in that entity. The UNMIBH policy of removing the Federation's intelligence services from police premises is yielding positive results, with completion having already been achieved in five cantons. It is anticipated that the policy will have been fully implemented in the remaining cantons by July 2001.

17. The proportion of minorities in local police forces remains unacceptably low: 5.7 per cent of a targeted 28 per cent in the Federation and 2.2 per cent of a targeted 20 per cent in Republika Srpska. Representation of females of all ethnicities is also unacceptably low, with an average of 3 per cent in both entities, compared to the European standard of 10 per cent. Although there is no shortage of potential candidates for minority police positions, the key disincentives are low police salaries, particularly in Republika Srpska, lack of prioritization for housing assistance and political obstruction in some areas. Additional donor assistance is urgently required to meet the agreed minority representation targets.

18. Almost all minority officers are in place owing to the efforts of the Mission's minority recruitment projects, comprising cadet entry through the two police academies, voluntary redeployment of serving officers across entity lines and retraining of officers from the pre-war service willing to return to an area where they now belong to an ethnic minority. Since the initiation of the projects in 1999, the police academies have graduated or currently enrol over 830 minority cadets. The first four rounds of the Mission's voluntary redeployment programme have resulted in the transfer of 54 minority police officers. Thirty-four members of minorities have completed refresher classes for former police officers. Another course is currently in progress, with 14 minority officers in training in Banja Luka. Interest in this training remains very high. In 2001, the goal is to recruit between 700 and 750 minority police officers through all the above-mentioned programmes. Capacity to train larger numbers of minority officers

will increase once the reconstruction of the two academies has been completed, later in 2001.

Cooperation between the police and the criminal justice system

19. Until there are effective and professional judicial institutions, police reform will remain an incomplete endeavour. On 1 December 2000, the UNMIBH judicial system assessment programme was dissolved and its functions were subsumed into the Independent Judicial Commission established within the Office of the High Representative, which has been given the mandate for judicial reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina. UNMIBH retained a small Criminal Justice Advisory Unit that has good cooperation with the Independent Judicial Commission through the provision of information on the suitability of sitting judges and prosecutors, and in planning police training to implement the upcoming reform of the Criminal Procedure Code.

20. The primary task of the Criminal Justice Advisory Unit is to support IPTF by advising on criminal procedure and the criminal justice process, advising on the structure and functioning of the judiciary, acting as liaison between IPTF and judicial officials and the courts and encouraging cooperation between the police, prosecutors and the courts. One major project has as its goal the improvement of the quality of police crime reports by using selected prosecutors to train key local police officers, under the guiding principle that a police force that conducts proper investigations and submits professional crime reports to the judiciary encourages transparency, thus shifting the pressure to judges and prosecutors who have tended to delay or undermine sensitive cases and thwart the rule of law. The project has been enthusiastically welcomed by authorities in Republika Srpska and in several cantons. In order to diminish the further proliferation of violent acts, it is essential to create a positive synergy between the work of the local police and local courts. In areas of Eastern Republika Srpska, where the rate of unresolved return-related incidents is high, special importance is attached to generating good cooperation between local law enforcement and local judiciary bodies.

21. Progress is at last being made, albeit slowly, in the establishment of a court police service as a multi-ethnic Federation police force. Court police are successfully operating in the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and in three cantons, where their presence has already contributed to increased evictions of illegal occupants. In addition, in Canton 7 (Herzegovina-Neretva), the recruitment and selection process has started, and in the Brcko District plans are under way to assign court police duties to local police. A similar solution is being sought in Republika Srpska, where there are no legal provisions for a separate court police and where such a programme would be an additional financial burden on an already financially strapped government. Included in the development of the court police project are mechanisms for the protection of judges and witnesses and evidence in high profile cases. These are important safeguards, especially as police operations and trials against organized crime and corruption continue to be carried out successfully and domestic courts have begun to try war crimes cases, as in Mostar.

State Border Service and inter-police force cooperation

22. The State Border Service has made appreciable progress towards becoming a viable multi-ethnic State-level law enforcement institution that underscores State sovereignty and identity, reduces illegal migration and trafficking, and contributes to enhanced revenue collection through anti-smuggling measures. From an initial level of 376 personnel deployed at four border crossings in 2000, the Service comprises over 1,180 personnel (39 per cent Bosniacs, 31 per cent Serbs, 30 per cent Croats; of whom 8 per cent are females) deployed across 62 per cent of the 1,666-kilometre border. In April 2001, job advertisements were placed to bring the first-phase units up to strength and to recruit additional units for deployment by July.

23. In early 2001, the funding gap to implement the State Border Service deployment plan for the year was some KM 46 million (approximately US$ 23 million). To bridge this gap, UNMIBH secured the agreement of the Office of the High Representative to re-balance the State budget to provide an additional KM 10 million (approximately US$ 5 million) for the Service. In cooperation with the Directors of the Service, UNMIBH reviewed and reduced the personnel

requirements, salaries and allowances of the Service, resulting in a saving of KM 10 million (approximately $5 million) per year. Successful representations were made to bilateral and regional donors, including Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the European Commission, which generously agreed to provide training, equipment and budgetary support. The recently announced initiative of the European Union to help Bosnia and Herzegovina combat illegal migration by the provision of technical experts is also welcome.

24. Units of the Border Service are increasingly arresting smugglers and confiscating contraband, including drugs and cigarettes, but their full effectiveness is hindered by a lack of material resources. For example, the unit in Trebinje (where over 90 per cent of illegal truck seizures took place in 2000) has 190 kilometres of border to control with 110 officers, but only has three vehicles and six radios, while pistols have to be shared. If the Border Service is to be effective in protecting state borders, combating illegal migration, smuggling and organized crime, and the well-armed perpetrators of such criminal activities, additional support is required, particularly for salaries and equipment. The deficit for 2001 now stands at KM 5.4 million (approximately $2.7 million) for salaries and operating costs and KM 6 million (approximately $3 million) for equipment. For 2002, the deficit is expected to be about KM 35 million (approximately $17.5 million).

25. The establishment of the State Border Service has highlighted the seriousness of illegal migration to European destinations. During 2000, according to updated figures, of the 35,159 nationals who arrived at the Sarajevo and Tuzla airports from 12 specifically identified foreign countries, only 6,603 departed, thus leaving 28,556 persons (26,783 of them from two countries alone) unaccounted for. These figures do not include illegal land entries or the 5,361 attempted illegal entrants returned by Croatia to Bosnia and Herzegovina; it is estimated that the figures in fact represent only about half of the actual total. This year some progress has been made. The introduction of a visa regime for Iranian passport holders had an immediate impact on the scale of the problem, raising the possibility that the figures for 2001 could be half those for 2000. Nonetheless, large numbers of illegal migrants continue to enter. As of 24 May 2001, some 6,754 people (5,826 from one specific State only), including those readmitted from Croatia, were unaccounted for. Consideration should be given to further initiatives, including additional visa regimes, the introduction of a landing card and the adoption of necessary by-laws.

26. Major strides have been made in fostering cooperation between the different police forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina and on a regional level. In March 2001, under the auspices of the UNMIBH-chaired Ministerial Consultative Meeting on Police Matters (MCMPM), all domestic police organizations (State Border Service, Republika Srpska and Federation Ministries of the Interior, Cantonal Ministries of the Interior and the District of Brčko Police Services) signed a Cooperative Law Enforcement Arrangement for a Border Police Academy in Suhodol, outside Sarajevo. Operations at Suhodol have now begun (see also para. 40).

27. Consistent with the aims of Working Table III of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern and the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, UNMIBH concluded, through MCMPM, a regional Cooperative Law Enforcement Arrangement Combating Illegal Migration and Organized Crime, which provides for regular meetings of a Committee of Ministers of the Interior and a Regional Task Force. On 14 May 2001, a document formalizing the Arrangement was signed by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Republic of Croatia, the Bosnia and Herzegovina entities and the Director of the State Border Service. Hungary has indicated its interest to join the Arrangement. The Ministry of Interior of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has also requested UNMIBH to facilitate its use of the State Border Service training centre for its own anticipated new Border Service. In June, the offices of the Bosnia and Herzegovina National Central Bureau of Interpol will be opened in Sarajevo. This modernized facility will considerably strengthen local capacity to combat international crime.

28. These arrangements are intended to assist coordination in the fight against cross-border trafficking and organized crime. Working through the UNMIBH Joint Entity Task Force, UNMIBH has been able to increase the frequency of police activities to uncover victims of trafficking, such as "Operation Makro", carried out in March 2001, in which over 530 police officers raided 39 brothels and bars throughout the country. Operation Makro as well as others in 2001,

have succeeded in identifying 78 victims of human trafficking. They have been repatriated with the assistance of the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Local authorities have been generally reluctant to prosecute bar owners and traffickers. No such cases have yet been successfully prosecuted anywhere in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Police and public awareness

29. The public awareness campaign on rights and obligations of police and citizens is ongoing and will run throughout 2001-2002. The "Your Police-Serving You" campaign, launched nationwide on 26 March 2001 is helping to increase public awareness of the fundamental principles of democratic policing, such as protection, accountability and non-discrimination, focusing on areas where the police come most frequently into contact with the public, including traffic, domestic violence, return and detention situations. Each police organization has been encouraged to develop its own public relations programme. The majority of local police stations now hold "open house" days where members of the public, particularly schoolchildren, visit and tour stations with police officers. In early June 2001 a further multi-ethnic police recruitment campaign was launched, this time aimed at increasing the per cent age of female applicants to the police academies.

Participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations

30. Members of the Bosnia and Herzegovina police contingent are serving with distinction with the United Nations Transitional Assistance Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). It will be recalled that UNMIBH has been instrumental in developing the peacekeeping capability of the police forces. The Foreign Ministry of Bosnia and Herzegovina has recently created a working group to further develop local competence to handle all necessary logistics and administrative support to the country's national contingents participating in peacekeeping missions.

31. The deployment of nine military observers from Bosnia and Herzegovina to the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) is ongoing. The military observers will be trained on a bilateral basis by Poland and Austria, as well as in-country by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations Training Unit. Discussions on a possible multi-ethnic company-sized light transport composite unit for United Nations peacekeeping operations continue to be stalled mainly because of objections by Republika Srpska at the military level. Nonetheless, in cooperation with SFOR, UNMIBH is identifying possible in-country training facilities for such a unit.

III. Joint activities of the United Nations system

32. According to the results of a re-registration exercise supported by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and carried out throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina at the end of 2000, a total of 518,252 persons have registered and applied for displaced person status in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Of these, 231,732 have applied in Republika Srpska, 263,375 in the Federation and 23,145 in the Brčko District. Compared with the numbers of displaced persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996 (when approximately 845,000 were registered), the current figures indicate that significant progress has been made with regard to returns, increasingly so during recent months.

33. That the return of displaced persons and refugees has continued in significant numbers is testament to the improved security conditions and decreased political resistance. UNHCR registered 22,296 minority returns during the first four months of 2001, which represents an increase of almost 100 per cent over the same period in 2000. The fact that 25 per cent of the 254,333 individual property claims have been resolved and 50 per cent have been decided upon represents an important benchmark in the implementation of the property legislation. As repossessions of pre-war homes and returns to these homes take place, however, it is becoming increasingly apparent that many of the conditions necessary for sustaining such returns have not been met, including issues connected with education, employment, provision of social services and the free practice of religion.

34. Monitoring the work of local police during evictions of illegal occupants and taking measures to prevent disgruntled evictees from looting the properties they leave remain important contributions by UNMIBH

to the returns process. During the reporting period, no evictions have been cancelled owing to inaction by the local police, and police performance during evictions has been relatively good.

35. The newly created Mine Action Coordination Centre (MACC), operated by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Office of the High Representative, provides crucial coordination and oversight for all demining activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, there is a dire need for increased donor support so that the Centre may continue to function throughout the current demining season. Recent pledges from Canada, Sweden and the United States to the UNDP Trust Fund, which finances the Centre, will ensure continuous operations until August, but resources are needed urgently through the end of the year. The long-term intention is to accelerate the transfer of financial responsibility to the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but in the interim donor support will remain crucial.

36. The United Nations development agencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina, together with UNHCR, the World Bank and IOM, with inputs from UNMIBH, have prepared a common country study outlining the recovery and development challenges confronting the country. The study forms the basis for internal discussions on more effective ways of ensuring impact of the involved agencies and enhancing dialogue with national and international counterparts on development challenges and the need for broader national development strategies.

37. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has completed its work on the harmonization of the literature curricula in schools to ensure that all children have access to their rich common literary heritage. In the area of cultural heritage, UNESCO will shortly begin the restoration of the "Crooked Bridge" and other historical facilities in Mostar and hold a training course in stone restoration. In May 2001, following the violent demonstration in connection with the laying of cornerstones for mosques in Banja Luka and Trebinje, the three members of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina wrote to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General requesting the increased involvement of the United Nations, and of UNESCO in particular, in dialogue and cooperation between religious communities related to the reconstruction of religious, historical and cultural sites.

38. The UNAIDS Theme Group, comprising the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), UNESCO, UNDP, the World Health Organization, the World Bank and international non-governmental organizations, has been reconstituted. Working and technical groups are being created in cooperation with local authorities and the recently appointed coordinators of the HIV/AIDS entity. As a part of the Young People's Health and Development initiative, UNICEF has supported the work of local non-governmental organizations working on HIV/AIDS prevention covering about 100,000 children. A plan of action being prepared by UNICEF will include the active involvement of the youth networks in Bosnia and Herzegovina. UNICEF has also supported the Ministry for Human Rights in finalizing the initial report of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, the treaty body of the Convention, the first such report by the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina in response to international human rights treaties. In preparation for the special session of the United Nations General Assembly on children in September 2001, UNICEF has reached an agreement with the entity governments for the creation of a State plan of action for children for the coming decade.

39. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has continued to provide input to the human rights training of IPTF monitors although the training itself is now conducted on site. OHCHR continues to liaise with the human rights department and the Joint Task Force of UNMIBH, particularly in relation to the trafficking of persons and domestic violence.

IV. Trust funds

40. The Trust Fund for the Restoration of Essential Public Services in Sarajevo, which was established in 1994, has received contributions totalling $20.8 million. In addition interest income of $3.1 million has been utilized to finance projects. From an aggregate income of $23.9 million, projects totalling approximately $22.5 million have been implemented or approved for implementation in the fields of energy, water, sanitation, communications, public transport, health and education, leaving a balance of $1.4 million. Recently approved projects include several for particularly devastated regions outside of Sarajevo, primarily to restore war-damaged infrastructure such as

schools, hospitals, roads and electrical generation and street lighting, water supply and sewerage systems by the end of 2002. The total cost of these projects is estimated at $2.8 million. Of this amount, the Srebrenica area, to the rehabilitation and regeneration of which the international community has attached particularly high priority through the development of an action plan, has benefited from the largest allocation of $1.6 million. Funds are directed to the repair of schools, hospitals, roads electrical networks and street lighting. The Police Trust Fund is also supporting the recently begun construction of one of two model police stations in Srebrenica. In addition, a Border Police Academy is under construction in Suhodol and classes have already started in one section of the building (see also para. 26).

41. The Trust Fund for the Police Assistance Programme in Bosnia and Herzegovina currently has a balance of approximately $1 million, which is sufficient to provide only a minimal amount of essential equipment to a few local police stations and the State Border Service. This is despite recent contributions from the Governments of the United States ($1.9 million), the Netherlands ($1 million) and Italy ($155,000), which were used to meet the urgent needs of the Border Service. To complete critical elements in the IPTF police programme and the local police assistance programme, in particular the strengthening of the State Border Service, it is estimated that contributions of $47 million are required. In addressing this funding shortfall, UNMIBH representatives have been active in soliciting contributions. My Special Representative is deeply concerned that the lack of funding will affect critical areas of the work of UNMIBH and prevent the Mission to achieve its targets by the end of 2002.

V. Financial aspects

42. In my report on the financing of UNMIBH (A/55/752), which is currently before the General Assembly, the budget for the maintenance of the Mission for the period from 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2002 amounts to $143.5 million. In its related report (A/55/874/Add.5), the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions proposed an appropriation of $140 million. Therefore, should the Security Council extend the mandate of UNMIBH for a further 12-month period, as recommended in paragraph 53 below, the cost of the extension would be limited to that amount.

43. As at 15 May 2001, unpaid assessed contributions to the special account for UNMIBH amounted to $69.8 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at the same date amounted to $2,415 million.

VI. Observations

44. In a war-torn region whose stabilization and recovery depends on resolving the challenges of ethnic reconciliation, democratic institution-building, reconstruction and economic reform as well as the full implementation of human rights for all citizens, Bosnia and Herzegovina is a vital test case. If peace implementation fails there after nearly six years of intensive international effort, the consequences throughout the region and possibly beyond will be profoundly adverse and even dangerous. The international community cannot afford to lessen its resolve or its commitment to Bosnia and Herzegovina; the consequences for the people of the region and for international peace and security could be incalculable.

45. A fundamental source of instability in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the region as a whole is the belief among some that State borders and democratic institutions can and will be changed if sufficient obstruction and violence can be mustered to weaken international determination and presence. Would-be partitionists need to understand that the global trend is towards larger, not smaller, economic and political spaces, in which citizens' and group rights are guaranteed and protected through democratic institutions and the rule of law, not through ethnic cleansing or marginalization, or the creation of non-viable para-States. The path to a better future is through cooperation and compromise, not through sectarianism and separation.

46. Recent political changes are beginning to have a positive impact. The new democratic Governments in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the Republic of Croatia and in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia have each pledged, and begun to act upon, commitments to constructive bilateral and regional relations based on mutual respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State. These developments are to be welcomed and encouraged as a baseline investment in

the stability and recovery of the region. But other measures are essential, including renouncing and ceasing political and other support to ultra-nationalist groups, and taking robust measures to combat cross-border smuggling, organized crime and money laundering. The trilateral arrangement on combating illegal migration and organized crime, brokered by UNMIBH, and the establishment of an Interpol office are positive steps in this regard.

47. Within Bosnia and Herzegovina, while nationalist fires may not be fully extinguished, the fundamental desire of individual citizens to build a better future, inside Europe, is undeniable. In recent months, progress to this end has been obstructed, violently in some instances, by attempts to establish a Croat "self-government" in parts of Herzegovina, regardless of the wishes of the majority of the citizens and of the existence of substantial Croat communities with different political views both there and in other parts of the country. The people of Bosnia and Herzegovina should engage fully in constructing their society together and not repeat the tragedy of the past by again following ultra-nationalist leaders into an historical cul-de-sac.

48. Clearly, the legitimate political, legal and cultural rights of all citizens must be guaranteed. It should be recalled that the Dayton Accords not only ended the war but also established a constitutional framework for the peaceful and democratic resolution of disputes. It is regrettable that decisions of the Constitutional Court on the equality of citizens throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina have not yet been implemented and agreement has not been reached on a permanent Law on Elections. Progress in these areas is an essential step towards developing a national political consensus and joining European institutions. I urge all those concerned to assist in speeding up these vital processes.

49. Despite the difficult political environment, UNMIBH continues to make measurable progress in the implementation of its mission to assist the parties in establishing the foundations for effective, democratic, multi-ethnic and sustainable law enforcement agencies. Strong proactive measures by UNMIBH were successful in minimizing the negative impact of Croat "self rule" on police structures. Cases of individual police misconduct or other unsatisfactory performance are being identified and addressed. In some areas, such as the establishment of the State Border Service and the development of domestic and external police cooperation, progress has been very rapid. In other areas, including police vetting, minority recruitment and the court police, progress is being made incrementally through highly resource-intensive projects. But there remain essential areas, such as the police commissioner project, where the mission has faced serious political obstruction.

50. The continued presence of indicted war criminals in Bosnia and Herzegovina impedes the speed of peace implementation by undermining the establishment of the rule of law, inhibiting inter-ethnic reconciliation, preventing families of the victims from reaching psychological closure and holding back the political future of the country. As long as war criminals remain above the law, citizens do not have confidence in the political neutrality and professionalism of the local police and judiciary. I call on the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina and on neighbouring States, as well as all others concerned, to cooperate fully with the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. The apprehension of indicted war criminals by SFOR deserves strong support.

51. I welcome the steps taken by the international community to begin to help the people of Srebrenica overcome their tragic past and to enable displaced Serbs living there to return to their homes. UNMIBH played a catalytic role in the development of the Srebrenica Action Plan, which is a comprehensive blueprint for addressing the many problems of the area. The agreement of donors to release $1.6 million from the United Nations Sarajevo Trust Fund to essential infrastructure projects in Srebrenica is a tangible contribution to the improvement of the area. I also welcome the progress in implementation of the High Representative's decision to establish a permanent burial site at Potocari for the victims of the 1995 massacre. Over the coming months, the financial needs for these two initiatives will be substantial. I urge the international community to contribute generously.

52. Establishment of the rule of law is a fundamental precondition for self-sustaining peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The role of UNMIBH in police reform and restructuring is key to that endeavour. Within the confines of its mandate, the Mission continues to make measurable progress towards its goal of completing the core mandate by December 2002. Meeting this target depends on the provision by international donors of the necessary financial resources to complete the

establishment of the State Border Service, to provide a basic level of equipment to the police forces and to assist minority police in housing reconstruction. I appeal to Member States to contribute generously to the priority projects of UNMIBH and to the Trust Fund for the Police Assistance Programme in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

53. Recent events in Bosnia and Herzegovina have amply demonstrated the importance of the role the international community plays and will continue to play in the country. Increasing the efficiency and cohesion of the efforts of various international actors on the ground, especially in the forthcoming period when many new priorities and challenges will emerge, including in the broader region of the former Yugoslavia, is an essential precondition for the success of our common endeavour. I welcome the current informal discussions on how to further increase this efficiency while enhancing coordination and interaction between various international agencies on the basis of their respective mandates and legitimacy. In view of the progress achieved so far by UNMIBH and its planning for implementing its core tasks by December 2002, I recommend to the Security Council an extension of the current mandate of UNMIBH at an authorized strength of 1,850 police officers for a further 12-month period.

54. In conclusion, I should like to express my gratitude to the women and men of UNMIBH for their persistent dedication to the promotion of peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The energetic leadership of my Special Representative, Mr. Jacques Paul Klein, and of the IPTF Commissioner, General Vincent Coeurderoy, provide the inspiration for this important United Nations mission and is much appreciated.

Annex

Composition of the International Police Task Force as at 31 May 2001

Argentina	20
Austria	39
Bangladesh	25
Bulgaria	44
Canada	14
China	5
Chile	6
Czech Republic	6
Denmark	30
Egypt	48
Estonia	1
Fiji	15
Finland	11
France	104
Germany	154
Ghana	130
Greece	11
Hungary	13
Iceland	4
India	102
Indonesia	28
Ireland	34
Italy	21
Jordan	159
Kenya	7
Malaysia	42
Nepal	18
Netherlands	55
Norway	15
Pakistan	135
Poland	50
Portugal	40
Romania	18
Russian Federation	30
Senegal	11
Spain	2
Sweden	29
Switzerland	11
Thailand	5
Tunisia	2
Turkey	30
Ukraine	37
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	79
United States of America	148
Vanuatu	10
Total	**1 798**

United Nations S/2001/571/Corr.1

Security Council

Distr.: General
18 June 2001

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Corrigendum

Paragraph 9 should read

9. The application of these mechanisms, together with timely action by the Office of the High Representative against police officials outside the purview of UNMIBH (such as Ministers and administrative staff), are essential tools to improve police performance. In February 2001, the Bratunac Police Chief and Chief Criminal Investigator were "de-authorized" and several police received non-compliance reports after repeated failures to adequately respond to serious crimes against Bosniac returnees. Following mob violence in Mostar and Grude during a search of the Herzegovacka Bank on 6 April, six police chiefs were "de-authorized" for signing a statement renouncing the authority of the Federation. The Croat Minister of Interior and three senior administrative officials were ultimately also removed by the High Representative. Police failure to maintain public order during stone laying ceremonies for new mosques in Trebinje and Banja Luka in early May resulted in the removal of the Trebinje Public Security Centre Chief and the issuance of a non-compliance report to the town's Chief of Crime Investigation. In Banja Luka, five police officers were suspended, the government accepted the resignations of the Minister of Interior and the Chief of the Public Security Centre and, regrettably, dismissed the dedicated Deputy Minister of Interior, without whose intervention security arrangements would have been even more ineffective. UNMIBH is monitoring local police investigations to prepare for criminal prosecution of the perpetrators of the violence, particularly since serious charges are expected after the tragic death of one Bosniac as a result of injuries sustained during the violent demonstration in Banja Luka.

01-41571 (E) 180601

United Nations S/2001/572

Security Council

Distr.: General
8 June 2001

Original: English

Eighth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

I. Introduction

1. In its resolution 1332 (2000) of 14 December 2000, the Security Council decided to extend the mandate of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) until 15 June 2001.

2. By its resolution 1341 (2001) of 22 February 2001, the Security Council demanded that the parties to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (S/1999/815, annex) implement fully the Kampala plan and the Harare sub-plans for disengagement and redeployment of forces without reservations in the 14-day period stipulated in the Harare Agreement, starting from 15 March 2001. In the same resolution, the Security Council urged the parties to the Lusaka Agreement to prepare and adopt, not later than 15 May 2001, in close liaison with MONUC, a precise plan and schedule, which, in accordance with the Lusaka Agreement, would lead to the completion of the orderly withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Council also urged the parties to the conflict, in close liaison with MONUC, to prepare, also by 15 May, prioritized plans for the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation or resettlement of all armed groups referred to in annex A, chapter 9.1, of the Lusaka Agreement.

3. The present report is submitted in accordance with the above resolutions and reflects developments since the Secretary-General's seventh report on MONUC of 17 April 2001 (S/2001/373).

II. Political developments

4. At my request, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, visited the Democratic Republic of the Congo immediately after the Council's consideration of my seventh report (S/2001/373) in mid-April. While in Kinshasa, during his meetings with President Kabila and senior government officials, the Under-Secretary-General received unequivocal assurances of the commitment of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the Lusaka peace process. During his meetings with Jean-Pierre Bemba, Chairman of the Front de libération du Congo (FLC), in Gbadolite, and with the President of the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RCD), Mr. Adolphe Onusumba, in Goma, Mr. Guéhenno emphasized the importance of the disengagement process in the implementation of the Lusaka Agreement and urged greater cooperation with MONUC. During his visit, which also took him to Kisangani, Kananga and Kalemie, the Under-Secretary-General defined the objectives of United Nations involvement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and called upon all parties to re-establish a climate of trust and mutual confidence in order to enhance cooperation and achieve sustainable peace.

5. In mid-April, President Kabila restructured the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo through new ministerial appointments. At the swearing-in ceremony for the new cabinet on 23 April, the President cautioned the new ministers to guard against corruption and respect the rule of law,

01-40212 (E) 080601

principles that would help to create the conditions required for favourable consideration for economic assistance from international financial institutions.

6. In a note verbale dated 3 May 2001 addressed to me, the Permanent Mission of Uganda to the United Nations forwarded a statement by President Museveni concerning the report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2001/357). In his statement, President Museveni stated that Ugandan forces would shortly be withdrawn from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and advised that his Government was also considering withdrawing from the Lusaka peace process. In my response, I appealed to President Museveni not to abandon the process, which offered the best hope for stability in the region. In a letter dated 8 May 2001 addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2001/461), the Chargé d'affaires of the Permanent Mission of Uganda to the United Nations announced that Uganda would completely withdraw its forces from 10 locations (Basankusu, Dongo, Gemena, Gbadolite, Lisala, Bafwasende, Isiro, Butembo, Beni and Kanyabayonga) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and would continue to examine the wisdom of maintaining a presence in Buta and Bunia. He further stated that a presence would be maintained on the western slopes of the Ruwenzori mountains until Uganda's security interests had been addressed in accordance with the Lusaka Agreement. Although the letter stated that the Government of Uganda had decided that Uganda would remain a party to the Lusaka Agreement, it advised that the Government reserved the right to withdraw unilaterally from the Agreement if it continued to be dissatisfied with the apparent lack of political will to implement it.

7. In an encouraging sign of rapprochement, President Kagame of Rwanda travelled to Harare on 7 May for talks with President Mugabe. The two Presidents discussed efforts to accelerate implementation of the Lusaka Agreement and the security concerns of Rwanda.

8. On 8 May, President Obasanjo of Nigeria met with President Kabila in Kinshasa before continuing to Kigali for talks with President Kagame on the prospects for peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes region.

9. On 17 May, the day of the arrival in Kinshasa of the Security Council mission to the Great Lakes region, President Kabila repealed Decree Law No. 194, which had restricted the activities of political parties, and announced new measures governing the organization and functioning of political parties. The announcement has been seen as a significant step towards re-energizing the political environment and raising hopes for a broader political dialogue.

10. On 19 May, President Kabila hosted a mini-summit in Kinshasa, attended by President dos Santos of Angola, President Mugabe and President Nujoma of Namibia. At the conclusion, the allies issued a communiqué in which, inter alia, they reiterated their firm commitment to the Lusaka Agreement and called upon the United Nations to deploy an "appropriate and adequate peacekeeping force", taking into account the demands of the peace process. The communiqué also accused Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi of committing "genocide" in the eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

11. A meeting of the Central Organ of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution at the level of Heads of State and Government was held at Lomé on 19 May. The summit issued a communiqué expressing satisfaction at the new disposition of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the other parties to the Lusaka Agreement.

12. At a press briefing on 24 May, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo announced the conclusions of the Commission of Inquiry into the assassination of the late President, Laurent-Desiré Kabila. Although an assassin was named, the Commission reportedly implicated the Governments of Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda and RCD in a wider coup attempt. The allegation was strongly rejected by the three Governments concerned and by the rebel movement.

13. On 4 June, the Minister for National Security of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mwenze Kongolo, visited Kampala to deliver a personal message from President Kabila to President Museveni. This follows a visit to Kinshasa in April by the Ugandan Minister for Foreign Affairs, Eriya Kategaya, and has heightened expectations that the two Heads of State will meet in the near future.

Inter-Congolese dialogue

14. Following intensive consultations by Sir Ketumile Masire, the neutral facilitator, representatives of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the rebel movements agreed in Lusaka, on 4 May, on a set of fundamental principles to serve as the framework for the inter-Congolese dialogue.

15. In response to a call by Jean-Pierre Bemba, the Chairman of FLC, a number of civil society groups, principal political parties and the FLC and RCD rebel movements formed a grouping called "Union des forces congolaises pour le respect integral de l'Accord de Lusaka et la tenue du dialogue intercongolais" (UFAD). The formation of the group represents the first establishment of formal relations between civil and political groups based on Government-held territory and the rebel movement in the eastern provinces.

16. The neutral facilitator, Sir Ketumile Masire, announced to the Political Committee on 21 May that a preparatory meeting to the dialogue would take place on 16 July. The purpose of the meeting will be to decide upon the agenda, date and venue of the dialogue, as well as the criteria for participation. The preparatory meeting will be preceded by a visit to all 11 provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo by two of the facilitator's senior associates, Mohamed El Hacen Ould Lebat, the head of Sir Ketumile's office in Kinshasa, and Archibald Mogwe.

17. The new political climate has facilitated the return of exiled political opponents, including Etienne Tshisekedi, the head of the Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social (UPDS), and Arthur Z'Ahidi Ngoma, a founding member of the RCD rebel movement. Both politicians have indicated their wish to become more involved in the forthcoming political negotiations.

Security Council mission

18. Between 15 and 26 May, the Security Council visited the Great Lakes region for consultations with the Heads of State of South Africa, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Burundi, the United Republic of Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda, as well as the neutral facilitator for the inter-Congolese dialogue, Sir Ketumile Masire, and the facilitator for the Arusha peace process, Nelson Mandela. The Security Council also met with Jean-Pierre Bemba of FLC and Azarias Ruberwa of RCD, as well as representatives of religious groups, opposition political parties and civil society in Kinshasa. The report of the Security Council mission was issued on 29 May (S/2001/521).

III. Military developments

19. The military situation between the parties has remained generally calm, with significant ceasefire violations reported only around Bolomba in Equateur Province early in May. The Forces armées congolaises (FAC) alleged that FLC troops had attacked one of their patrols and laid mines in the Bolomba area on 11 May. Subsequently, FLC alleged that their positions had come under mortar fire from FAC on 22 May. Since then, the situation has remained relatively quiet.

20. RCD has reported numerous incidents involving attacks by the non-signatory armed groups, including the Congolese Mayi-Mayi militias, on both their forces and the local civilian population in the eastern provinces.

21. On 28 May, MONUC received reports that an attempted coup d'état by military elements in Bangui had been put down by the Government. However, shooting continued in the Central African capital for several days thereafter, amid further reports of the involvement of troops of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and units of FLC acting in support of the Government. The situation now appears to be calm.

Deployment of the Mission

22. As at 8 June 2001, MONUC had a total of 2,366 military personnel, including 497 liaison officers and military observers. Within the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in addition to Kinshasa, liaison officers are deployed with the headquarters of the rebel movements (Bunia, Gbadolite and Goma) and a further 24 liaison officers are stationed in the capitals of surrounding countries, including 17 officers as planning support to the Joint Military Commission. Military observer teams are positioned in 22 locations: Basankusu, Befale, Boende, Bolomba, Dubie, Gemena, Ikela, Isiro, Kabalo, Kabinda, Kalemie, Kananga, Kindu, Kisangani, Lisala, Makanza, Manano, Mbandaka,

Moba, Pepa and Pweto, and at Nchelenge in northern Zambia. In addition, MONUC has formed 28 teams of military observers to verify the disengagement of forces (see paras. 30-37 below).

23. All four sector headquarters are now operational, with the deployment of infantry guard units from Uruguay (at Kalemie starting 29 March); Senegal (at Kananga starting 4 April and at Mbandaka starting 27 April); Morocco (at Kisangani starting 20 April and at Goma starting 10 May); and in Kinshasa itself, with the deployment of 220 Tunisian troops on 20 May. The Government of South Africa, starting on 5 April, deployed one aero-medical evacuation unit, an airfield crash/rescue unit and six aircraft cargo-handling teams. Finally, Uruguay completed the deployment of a riverine unit of 176 personnel on 4 June (see annex to the present report).

24. By resolution 1325 (2000), of 31 October 2000, the Security Council expressed its willingness to incorporate a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations and urged the Secretary-General to ensure that, where appropriate, peacekeeping operations included a gender component. The resolution also called on all actors to include a gender perspective when negotiating and implementing peace agreements. Under the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement or reintegration plan, the Mission will undertake a number of activities relating to female combatants or females accompanying ex-combatants to demobilization sites, together with relevant organizations involved in the process.

Cooperation of the parties

25. The parties have continued to provide satisfactory security for MONUC civilian and military personnel. The most serious threat to the security of United Nations personnel deployed in the field stems from lawlessness and the actions of armed groups. On 26 April, six personnel of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were murdered in Jitso and 26 foreign nationals were kidnapped near Butembo on 18 May. In many parts of the country, particularly in the east and the north, insecurity is general.

26. MONUC has enjoyed good cooperation with the Government and its allies on both the political and the military level, though it is still awaiting a formal response to its request for authorization to operate a radio station. Cooperation with RPA and UPDF military commanders has also been satisfactory, apart from some instances of withholding information by RPA.

27. However, MONUC has continued to encounter difficulties and delays from RCD on a wide range of issues. A major concern is the procurement of goods and services; in particular, fuel and rations contracts cannot be executed due to RCD objections to their award to international companies rather than local suppliers. A similar attitude has been adopted by RCD regarding the exoneration from taxes on goods imported by international suppliers. In addition, RCD objects to some contractors on the grounds that they supposedly have corporate links with countries allied to the Government. RCD has also created obstacles for the occupancy of sites already identified in Kisangani, the presence of MONUC troops at airports and ports and the delivery of fuel bladders at Kalemie airport.

28. Permission to establish refuelling facilities at Kalemie and Manono was not given by RCD until 20 April and the Kalemie facility only became operational on 14 May. MONUC has also reported a withholding of information concerning RCD dispositions at Anzi, Bishimike, Kindu and Lusambo.

29. MONUC has also recently encountered persistent non-cooperation from FLC. Unreasonable delays were imposed on MONUC deployments to Basankusu, Emate-Loa, Bolomba and Befale, and thereafter the freedom of movement of observers deployed in these locations has been restricted. On 10 May, MONUC observers dispatched to verify the FLC position at Imese were detained on the grounds that the local commander had not received any written clearance for their visit; only after lengthy negotiations and contacts with the FLC Chairman were the observers and their helicopter released. On 22 May, MONUC observers in Basankusu were prevented from reaching the airport by FLC soldiers who refused to provide any reason. FLC has yet to allow MONUC to verify any of its positions. MONUC has also been the target of disinformation campaigns mounted by both RCD and FLC. The media campaign against MONUC was at its most inflammatory at the time of the arrival of the Moroccan contingent in Kisangani on 20 April and the deployment of military observers to Basankusu on 22 May.

Disengagement of forces

30. As indicated in my report of 17 April (S/2001/373, paras. 32-37), MONUC initiated the verification process with its monitoring teams based in Kalemie (sector 4). Verification subsequently began in the other three sectors in accordance with the Harare disengagement sub-plans, which calls for the parties to disengage their forces from the confrontation line and to withdraw them to new defensive positions specified in the disengagement sub-plans. MONUC was then to verify that disengagement had indeed taken place and to monitor the parties' movements thereafter to ensure that they continued to comply with the plan.

31. Following the deployment of United Nations infantry guard units in each of the four sectors, MONUC established verification and monitoring teams to supervise the movements of the forces pursuant to the disengagement plan. The level of cooperation from the parties varied from time to time and from location to location, but was generally satisfactory. MONUC also encountered serious logistical difficulties, in some cases requiring the establishment of forward refuelling bases because of the remote location of some of the new defensive positions.

32. Disengagement and verification are now almost complete in three of the four sectors. As at 4 June, 69 of the designated 96 redeployment positions had been visited and the disengagement of forces in those areas had been verified. In two locations north-west of Kabinda, FAC forces had not withdrawn to the stipulated positions. MONUC has since received assurances from allied task force headquarters that they will do so. In the Ikela area, one FAC battalion and one Zimbabwean engineer battalion still remain and to the north of the town there is a separation of only 1 kilometre between an FAC company and RCD forces. The allied Task Force Commander has repeatedly assured the MONUC Force Commander that allied forces will shortly withdraw from Ikela to positions designated in the Harare sub-plans. Preliminary observations by MONUC appear to indicate that this is indeed the case.

33. The one area where disengagement has been unsatisfactory so far is sector 1, in Equateur Province, where the rebel forces are controlled by Jean-Pierre Bemba, the leader of FLC. Mr. Bemba has repeatedly expressed reluctance to disengage his forces, many of which are more than 100 kilometres in advance of the new defensive positions they are supposed to withdraw to in accordance with the disengagement plan. In explanation of his reluctance to disengage, the FLC leader has cited fears for the safety of the civilian populations in the areas to be evacuated by his troops, owing in part to the possibility of reprisals from government forces as well as the reported presence of Interahamwe militia in the vicinity.

34. On 12 April, my Special Representative offered to deploy additional observers in the disengagement zone to provide reassurance to all parties and Mr. Bemba agreed to begin disengagement of his forces. After initial difficulties in inserting the observer teams, MONUC succeeded in deploying observers to Basankusu on 23 April, to Makanza on 7 May, to Bolomba on 15 May and to Befale on 16 May.

35. During the meetings of the Joint Military Commission and the Political Committee on 17 and 21 May, the FLC delegate continued to raise concerns over the civilian population and sought to link FLC disengagement to the deployment of MONUC civil affairs personnel in areas to be vacated by rebel forces. After being informed that MONUC humanitarian and human rights officers would be deployed during the week beginning 28 May, the FLC delegate agreed that his movement would disengage to agreed positions with effect from 1 June. This commitment was reiterated by Mr. Bemba during his meeting with the Security Council mission in Kampala on 25 May.

36. Starting on 31 May, MONUC reported initial movements of FLC forces back from the confrontation lines at Bolomba and Befale. MONUC observers have thus far been unable to verify the disengagement in Bolomba, as they are deployed on the FAC side and the area between them and FLC is mined and inaccessible. However, the MONUC team in Befale confirmed the FLC disengagement, reporting that trucks with soldiers and troops on foot had been observed moving to the north. The FLC Commander in Befale informed the team that his troops were moving to an area 15 kilometres to the north along the Basankusu-Befale axis. However, there is no indication that FLC forces are disengaging from Emate.

37. MONUC has also been working with the parties to secure the withdrawal of Ugandan troops and equipment from Bafwasende. RCD has refused to permit them transit via the airport at Kisangani and

MONUC has been pursuing the possibility of an exit either by road or through Isiro.

Withdrawal of foreign forces

38. Over the period from 23 May to 1 June, MONUC military observers monitored the withdrawal of UPDF troops and equipment from Isiro. On 26 May, MONUC observers monitored the start of Ugandan troop withdrawals from Gemena. A request has also been made for MONUC to monitor the withdrawal of a UPDF battalion from Dongo, beginning 3 June.

39. While MONUC observers reported that three Zimbabwean battalions were withdrawn from frontline positions over the period from 3 April to 1 May, there has been no information on whether these units were repatriated to Zimbabwe. Officials in Harare and at the allied task force headquarters in Kinshasa have advised that there may be some intention to reduce Zimbabwean force levels in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but no formal notification or details have been made available.

Armed groups

40. The security situation in the eastern provinces remains highly volatile. RCD allege that armed groups have continued to launch numerous attacks in the Kivus and insist that Kinshasa is persisting in providing support for the armed groups. On 29 May, RCD announced that its forces had captured the airfield of Kilembwe in South Kivu which it alleged had been used by FAC to resupply former Rwandan Army forces (ex-FAR) and Interahamwe militias.

41. In a statement issued on 29 May, the RCD secretary-general accused the Government of seeking to transfer the war to the eastern regions, alleging a sharp increase in the number of attacks by armed groups since President Joseph Kabila assumed office. He stressed that RCD would not be satisfied with a "fake" ceasefire agreement on the front line while armed groups continued to attack in the Kivus and northern Katanga. The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has denied that the Government was providing assistance to armed groups in the Kivus, observing that the Mayi-Mayi should be distinguished from the armed groups since they were Congolese citizens fighting against "forces of aggression".

42. During the meeting of the Political Committee on 21 May, an envoy from the Government of Burundi reported that a large-scale eastward movement of rebels of the Front pour la défense de la démocratie (FDD) had taken place over the past two and a half months. He alleged that FDD rebels based in the Democratic Republic of the Congo were being encouraged to leave that country and almost one third of the total number had returned to Burundi where they were responsible for the recent upsurge in violence in and around Bujumbura. The envoy alleged also that large numbers of FDD rebels had crossed into the United Republic of Tanzania from where they pose a potential threat to the stability of Burundi.

43. MONUC has received reports indicating that the Government has taken measures to canton several hundred Rwandan nationals who may have been serving in or alongside the FAC and allied forces. MONUC has not yet received any formal notification of this exercise or a request to assist in the repatriation or resettlement of those cantoned.

Situation in Kisangani

44. Rwanda and Uganda have continued to maintain their forces at a distance of some 100 kilometres from the centre of Kisangani. However, RCD military elements have remained in the city, with its leaders maintaining that security concerns do not allow them to withdraw their forces before the arrival of United Nations troops in sufficient numbers. RCD provides the civil administration, including the police force, for the city.

45. The arrival of the first contingent of Moroccan troops in Kisangani on 20 April was greeted with a rapturous welcome from the local population. The contingent and the MONUC sector headquarters are now well established in the city. During the meeting of the Political Committee with the Security Council mission on 22 May, the Security Council mission strongly called on RCD to demilitarize Kisangani pursuant to resolution 1304 (2000).

Planning for the withdrawal of foreign forces and for the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation or resettlement of armed groups

46. In accordance with resolution 1341 (2001), the Joint Military Commission, in close collaboration with MONUC, has been developing plans for both the total withdrawal of all foreign forces from the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and for the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation or resettlement of the armed groups identified in the Lusaka Agreement. The initial efforts of the Joint Military Commission and the Political Committee in this respect are described in my report of 17 April (S/2001/373, paras. 43-49). The Joint Military Commission and the Political Committee continued to meet during April and May to strengthen and refine these drafts.

47. The two draft plans were discussed in great detail during the meeting of the Political Committee with the Security Council mission on 22 May. An account of that discussion, and the text of the plans, including the proposed timetable for the withdrawal of foreign forces, appear in the report of the Security Council mission (S/2001/521 and Add.1).

48. At their meeting with the Political Committee, members of the Security Council mission insisted that the parties should provide the necessary detailed information concerning the numbers, locations, assembly areas, withdrawal routes and timetables in order to allow the United Nations to make its own plans to assist the parties and to monitor the withdrawal of foreign forces. The Security Council mission also made it clear that the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation or resettlement of armed groups should be carried out against the background of close cooperation between Presidents Kabila and Kagame. Its terms should be strictly adhered to, and United Nations assistance would be provided taking into consideration the level of commitment shown by the parties in their compliance with the plan. The first essential element was for the parties to provide the required information, including the numbers, locations and armaments of the various armed groups, and the proposed sites of their demobilization areas. The Security Council mission cautioned strongly that the Council expected to see steady, consistent progress and strict adherence to all agreements and timetables, that momentum must be maintained and that violations would not be tolerated.

49. On the basis of the information to be provided, MONUC would have to draw up plans and modalities for the assistance to be provided by the United Nations. This could not be done before MONUC's mandate expired on 15 June unless the information was available in New York by 1 June. Only then would it be possible to use it as the basis for the recommendations in the report of the Secretary-General.

50. In the event, as at 8 June, only Uganda and Angola have provided information on the numbers, dispositions and armaments of their forces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in respect of the plan for the withdrawal of foreign forces. Further progress in developing the concept into a detailed plan suitable for approval by the parties and subsequent implementation cannot be made until Namibia, Rwanda and Zimbabwe provide information on their particular forces.

Co-location of the Joint Military Commission with the Mission

51. MONUC continued to cooperate closely with the Joint Military Commission and maintained a team of liaison and planning officers in Lusaka for that purpose. During the reporting period, the four regional Joint Military Commissions have co-located with the MONUC sector headquarters in Kalemie, Kananga, Kisangani and Mbandaka, enabling members of the regional Joint Military Commissions to be actively involved in the verification of the disengagement and redeployment of forces. At the request of the Chairman of the Joint Military Commission, MONUC facilitated a visit by the Commission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo from 29 May through 2 June.

52. The Joint Military Commission dispatched an assessment team to Kinshasa from 20 to 26 April to assess the physical security requirements for its delegates in Kinshasa. The team also travelled to Brazzaville to investigate with the authorities of the Republic of Congo the possibility of temporarily housing some Commission delegates in that city.

53. Upon the recommendation of the Security Council mission to the Great Lakes region in May 2001, the Council has called on the Political

Committee to direct the Joint Military Commission to co-locate with MONUC in Kinshasa forthwith, or, alternatively, to show what further contribution to the process the Commission could make in its current situation.

IV. Humanitarian aspects

54. In the worst attack on humanitarian aid workers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in years, six ICRC workers were brutally hacked and shot to death on 26 April while on a humanitarian assessment mission some 60 kilometres north of Bunia. The dead included four citizens of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, one of whom was a woman, and two international staff, a man and a woman. During past months, many international workers in Bunia have received threatening letters from one of the ethnic groups in the area and MONUC withdrew one of its humanitarian officers for security reasons in April.

55. During the reporting period the number of refugees from the Democratic Republic of the Congo in neighbouring countries stood at over 338,450 individuals, according to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The majority of the refugees are in the United Republic of Tanzania (114,436), the Republic of Congo (83,680) and Zambia (56,000). The total estimated number of refugees in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remained the same, with over 329,000 individuals. Angolan refugees, numbering 179,580, mainly settled in the Bas-Congo, Bandundu and Katanga provinces, and the 74,300 Sudanese refugees, settled in the north-eastern part of Orientale Province, constitute the majority of the refugee groups.

56. In a recent recalculation of the numbers of displaced persons by province around the country, benefiting from the gradual opening up of areas where access had hitherto proved very difficult, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has reported a total of 2,041,000 individuals. The highest numbers were found in the eastern provinces: North Kivu (620,000), South Kivu (373,000), Katanga (354,000), Orientale (220,000) and Maniema (132,000). The next highest concentration was in north-western Congo, where Equateur Province had an estimated 171,000 displaced persons. Other provinces with displaced persons included Kasai Orientale (114,000), Kasai Occidental (29,000) and Kinshasa (28,000).

57. Some 16 million people in the Democratic of the Congo are estimated to have critical food needs as a result of prolonged displacement, the rupture of traditional sources of supply due to war and the alarming increase in prices. Children were hardest hit by malnutrition, especially in the capital, Kinshasa, and the other major urban centres. The tangible decline in the agricultural production, the scarcity of hard currency necessary for consecutive food imports and the weakened purchasing power of the population at large have all contributed to a significant and lasting food deficit. In spite of the shortages, agricultural production in many parts of the country is still considerable; the supplies, however, do not reach the traditional markets in the present security situation.

58. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), in close cooperation with my Special Representative, has advocated that the Government and rebel groups agree to establish humanitarian corridors, which would allow a resumption of food and other trade between Kinshasa and the eastern and northern provinces. Equateur Province is a traditional food supplier for Kinshasa's market and the rupture of commercial exchanges between the capital's market and its supplier due to the hostilities has resulted in hardship for both farmers in Equateur Province and consumers in Kinshasa.

59. The public health situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to be a cause for grave concern. Some 37 per cent of the population remains without access to essential medical facilities and less than 47 per cent has access to safe drinking water. Recent Government statistics indicate that 2 million people are infected with the AIDS virus, twice as many as in 1999. The eastern provinces have the highest rates, with the number of people infected having increased fivefold (from 4 to 22 per cent) over the past two years in towns such as Goma, Bukavu and Beni.

60. A mortality study released by the International Rescue Committee on 8 May estimates that, since the outbreak of fighting in August 1998, some 2.5 million deaths have occurred in the civilian population of the area in excess of the number that could have been expected without the war. The latest survey updated and expanded a study conducted in 2000, which estimated that 1,700,000 "excess" civilian deaths had occurred in the first 22 months of conflict. Like the 2000 study, the current report indicates that the overwhelming majority of deaths were related to disease and malnutrition —

by-products of a war that has ravaged the country's health-care system and economy. Persistent fighting and insecurity have driven hundreds of thousands of people into forests and jungles where they have had no access to food, medicine or shelter. War-affected areas, in turn, have been inaccessible to aid organizations because of insecurity.

61. Both studies found a proportionately smaller number of deaths — 350,000 in 33 months — directly attributable to violence. Even so, according to the study director, one in eight households surveyed have experienced the violent death of a family member during this period. Among the most disturbing findings is the disproportionate effect of the war on young children. The proportion of children below the age of two was shockingly lower than would have normally been expected. In two of the districts surveyed, Moba and Kalemie, an estimated 75 per cent of children born during the conflict have died or are expected to die before their second birthday.

62. During his recent visit to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Kenzo Oshima, called for the international donor community to increase its assistance in the coming months so that relief agencies could expand their capacity on the ground and increase the resources available to tackle the country's "massive humanitarian deficit". Mr. Oshima said that with the disengagement of combatant forces and the deployment of MONUC observers in frontline areas, access to vulnerable populations was improving and some civilians, such as those in Kabinda, a former frontline town, were already feeling the effects of the peace process. Mr. Oshima identified the need for special programmes to address the specific problems of child soldiers, violence against women, issues related to displaced women and children and psychosocial problems among war-affected populations. The Under-Secretary-General also said that, whenever conditions allowed, there would be a need to develop resettlement programmes for internally displaced persons and refugees to support the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process. Donors were urged to recognize that increased support for humanitarian and rehabilitation efforts at an early stage could yield real peace dividends. In addition, the Mission should take advantage of strong local networks of women's non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civic groups that have a grass-roots focus to undertake and implement many of the humanitarian activities that will be needed as adjuncts to its own programmes.

63. At the suggestion of MONUC, the establishment of a "peace boat" operation on the Congo River is nearing realization with the support of other United Nations humanitarian organizations. The departure of the first boat from Kinshasa to Equateur Province, carrying a cargo of goods and supplies for the population of that region, is foreseen during the month of July. The double objective of the operation is to encourage the relaunching of traffic on the river to permit the revival of economic activities in the region. The same boat will then proceed to Kisangani, which has suffered deeply owing to the lack of river traffic during the last three years of conflict. To establish these projects, MONUC is involved in facilitating agreement between the parties concerned (the Government, FLC and RCD) with regard to administrative, security and logistic details.

V. Human rights

Government-controlled territory

64. As indicated in paragraph 9 above, the Government has repealed Decree Law No. 194, which restricted the activities of political parties, and has established a new law dealing with the right to freedom of political opinion and association and participation in public affairs and elections. The impact of this new law on the liberalizing of the political climate has yet to be assessed. The Government, under a general amnesty, released over 700 detainees from prison, including political opponents and journalists, as well as eight individuals who had been detained in connection with the assassination of President Kabila. Five child soldiers sentenced to death by the Court of Military Order in Matadi, Bas-Congo, have also been released. The office of the human rights NGO, African Association for the Defence of Human Rights in Congo/Kinshasa (ASADHO), which was shut down three years ago, has been reopened.

65. However, some human rights abuses have continued, including arbitrary arrests and extortion. Restrictions on fundamental rights to freedom of expression and personal security have persisted. Members of human rights groups and newspapers have been detained for speaking out against human rights

abuses or for taking positions considered hostile to the Government. There are also disturbing reports indicating that detention centres only recently shut down by the new President are reappearing.

Territory controlled by the Front de libération du Congo

66. The killings of the six ICRC personnel in the vicinity of Bunia in April comes against a backdrop of ethnic massacres between the Lendu and Hema, which has claimed several thousand lives in the past year. In solidarity with the ICRC, all United Nations agencies have suspended their activities in the region until the culprits are apprehended and dealt with in accordance with the laws in force. A joint military investigative team from both FLC and UPDF has been set up to find the killers and bring them to justice. Following these killings, fresh fighting broke out between the Hema-Bagerere and the Lendu, around the Fataki and Djugu areas. Mediation efforts and human rights education initiatives are under way with the active participation of MONUC human rights officers and other humanitarian agencies.

Territory controlled by Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie

67. In the eastern provinces, reports have been received of ethnic tensions and attacks by armed rebel groups and their allies; recent massacres of women and the rape of women and adolescent girls; the plundering or burning of villages and attacks on the civilian population; widespread banditry; and looting by armed groups and unpaid soldiers.

68. In South Kivu, unverified accounts have been received reporting that, on 23 April, armed men descended on Ilangi and murdered seven pregnant women who were waiting to deliver their babies at a health centre. Their bodies were thrown into the Ulindi River. These acts are reported to be a frequent practice used against persons suspected of favouring the opposing side. Six humanitarian agents, four women and two men of a Burundian/Dutch NGO, Memisa, were kidnapped on 11 May by members of FDD.

69. In northern Katanga, clashes between the armed groups and rebel forces and their allies have aggravated the insecurity of the region. The fields and fertile areas are occupied by the armed groups (ex-FAR, Interahamwe, FDD, Mayi-Mayi), while the towns and cities are occupied by RCD forces. As a result, the civilian population has been taken hostage by opposing camps with their freedom of movement severely restricted. Recently 12 women were reportedly kidnapped by the Mayi-Mayi, who subsequently killed 10 of them. On the night of 7 May, the villages of Kassama and Mwenge, north-west of Pweto, were reportedly attacked and robbed by 10 members of the Interahamwe who were said to be in FAC military uniform.

70. Nevertheless, civil society and human rights groups in the rebel-held provinces maintain their rights to free expression and association and continue to express criticism of RCD and its Rwandan allies. In addition to dozens of human rights associations, there are numerous development and humanitarian non-governmental groups, activist churches and independent journalists. Members of these groups regularly face physical assault, arbitrary arrest and detention at the hands of the authorities for their activities.

VI. Child protection

71. The situation with regard to the utilization of children as combatants remains a grave concern. MONUC has continued to report regular sighting of child soldiers throughout the Democratic Republic of the Congo. There are also growing concerns that the rebel movements in the eastern provinces may be increasing their recruitment of children in order to compensate for the disengagement and withdrawals of UPDF and RPA military units.

72. My Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, Olara Otunnu, arrived in Kinshasa on 24 May for a 10-day visit. He met with President Kabila and members of his Government, including the Ministers for Foreign Affairs, Defence, Human Rights, Social Affairs and Family, as well as with the commissioner for relations with MONUC. In the course of the discussion, President Kabila advised Mr. Otunnu that he had already issued a written order to the army not to enrol any more children and that his Government had ratified the Optional Protocol of the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflicts. Mr. Otunnu met also with the heads of United Nations agencies,

child protection officers from MONUC, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), UNHCR, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), international humanitarian NGOs and civil society representatives, as well as with Adolphe Onusumba, President of RCD, and Jean-Pierre Bemba, leader of FLC.

73. During meetings in Kinshasa, Goma, Bukavu, Bunia and Kisangani, Mr. Otunnu advocated for the needs of all war-affected children, including displaced, refugee, malnourished and traumatized children, those who no longer have access to schools and health services, girls victimized by rape and child soldiers. For child soldiers specifically, Mr. Otunnu advocated the cessation of the recruitment, training and utilization of children as combatants, including the establishment of a monitoring system to ensure no further recruitment; access to military camps for joint military and civilian teams in order to undertake a survey of child soldiers to facilitate the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization reintegration, repatriation or resettlement programme; improved access to the affected population, in particular children, by the humanitarian agencies; improvement in overall security to allow the free movement of populations throughout the country; and reinforcement of the judiciary system to put an end to impunity.

74. As I mentioned in my seventh report (S/2001/373), a team of civilian and military enumerators visited government-controlled military camps in the provinces of Kasai Occidental, Katanga, Bas-Congo and Kinshasa to meet with child combatants and to prepare a preliminary profile of child soldiers in FAC. This exercise experienced some difficulties due to a communications breakdown between the military high command and the commandants of military units of the camps visited. The Ministry of Defence has since decided to organize an awareness seminar for the army, which will also facilitate the implementation of a comprehensive survey of child soldiers. As a result of UNICEF advocacy with the Ministries of Defence and of Human Rights, President Kabila has agreed to open this awareness-raising seminar and has requested the Ministry of Defence and UNICEF to organize it as soon as possible.

75. In my seventh report, I pointed out that UNICEF and ICRC were working closely together for the family reunification of the children from Beni, Butembo and Bunia who had been transported to Uganda by UPDF. The children are still at camp Kyankwanzi, Uganda, with their care supported by UNICEF. However, as a result of the recent murder of six ICRC staff, this key partner for the reunification has suspended its operations in the Ituri district. UNICEF has entered into an agreement with a local NGO, SOS Grand Lacs, to continue the process of family tracing so that reunification can be undertaken soon. However, under the current security conditions in Ituri Province, maximum caution must be exercised.

VII. Economic regeneration

76. In my previous reports on MONUC, I have alluded to the urgent need to alleviate the suffering of the Congolese people and improve the disastrous economic situation of the country. I believe that members of the Security Council share the view that it is imperative that the return to peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo should be accompanied by an economic revival. I have therefore asked my Special Representative to monitor efforts aimed at regenerating the economic life of the country and assist such efforts and related initiatives whenever possible.

77. Following advice from both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, the Government suspended the exclusive diamond-trading licence granted in 2000 to a foreign company and announced measures to liberalize the diamond trade.

78. Another important initiative being taken by the Government concerns renovation of the two power stations at the Inga dam, the largest electricity-generating facility in sub-Saharan Africa. The hydroelectric plant is currently operating at about 20 per cent capacity and only about 7 per cent of the Congolese population has access to electricity. Negotiations are being conducted for foreign investment of approximately $1 billion to renovate the facility.

79. In a move marking the resumption of development assistance from the European Union, on 4 May the European Commissioner for Development announced the disbursement of 120 million euros to finance poverty alleviation and the promotion of human rights. The Commissioner paid tribute to recent positive measures taken by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and confirmed the

will of the European Union to support the peace and reconciliation process. Both the IMF and World Bank have emphasized their willingness to support the Government and are providing advice on measures aimed at controlling inflation, corruption and the establishment of an efficient audit system. On 26 May, the Government announced the decision to liberalize the exchange rate for the Congolese franc, thereby eliminating the wide disparity between the official and market rates. Other measures included the removal of price controls over fuel products, a decision that addressed one of the underlying causes of fuel shortages in Kinshasa.

80. Recognizing that the reopening of the riverine network will have important benefits, not merely for trade and freedom of movement but also for confidence-building and strengthening national unity, MONUC has been working towards reopening of the Congo River by negotiating with the parties for the restoration of river traffic between Kinshasa, Mbandaka and Kisangani. During his visit to the Democratic Republic of the Congo in April, Mr. Guéhenno proposed the establishment of a Congo River Basin Commission, to be chaired by MONUC with the participation of all Congolese parties, the Governments of the Central African Republic and the Republic of Congo and United Nations specialized agencies. During its visit to Mbandaka on 20 May, the Security Council mission to the region declared the Congo River open for navigation, and the first barge carrying fuel for MONUC left Kinshasa en route to Kisangani via Mbandaka with a MONUC riverine escort. The deployment of MONUC will also contribute to the reopening of the road network and development in the areas where the force is deployed. In conjunction with potential donors, work is under way to prepare numerous small local quick-impact rehabilitation projects.

VIII. Financial aspects

81. My revised budget for MONUC for the current financial period ending 30 June 2001 amounts to $273.1 million and reflects additional resource requirements arising from the Mission's updated concept of operations endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 1341 (2001). The Fifth Committee of the General Assembly has already considered the revised budget and recommended to the Assembly its approval. With regard to the 2001-2002 financial period, commencing on 1 July 2001, the Fifth Committee has recommended that the Assembly appropriate for MONUC an initial amount of $200 million covering the period from 1 July to 31 December 2001, pending submission of my proposed budget for the Mission for the full 2001-2002 period during the main part of the Assembly's fifty-sixth session. The Assembly action on the Fifth Committee's recommendations is expected shortly.

82. Therefore, should the Security Council approve my recommendations in respect of MONUC set out below, the Mission's initial resource requirements for the 2001-2002 financial period would be met from within the appropriation of $200 million to be granted to me by the Assembly.

83. As of 31 May 2001, unpaid assessed contributions to the MONUC special account amounted to $32.7 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at that date amounted to $2,320.2 million.

IX. Next steps

84. The steps taken so far by the Joint Military Commission and the Political Committee to comply with the requirement in resolution 1341 (2001) to produce plans for the orderly withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and for the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation or resettlement of the armed groups identified in the Lusaka Agreement are described in paragraphs 45 to 49 above. Considerable additional work is required before the plans can serve as a suitable basis for a MONUC mandate in an eventual third phase of deployment. As noted in paragraph 49, most of the parties have so far failed to provide the detailed information requested by the Security Council mission during its meeting with the Political Committee in Lusaka on 22 May. Several more weeks, at least, may be required before precise operational plans and detailed sub-plans suitable for implementation can be finalized and adopted.

85. It would clearly be precipitous to enter a third phase of MONUC deployment before the completion of the disengagement and verification phase, and without the benefit of realistic and approved plans. Nevertheless, the momentum generated by the

disengagement of forces and the withdrawals of foreign forces must not be lost. Nor must the parties be permitted to view their new defensive positions as permanent. The Secretariat has therefore updated MONUC's concept of operations to ensure that the Mission has the necessary resources both to complete the current phase and to prepare itself for the complex and varied tasks within the next phase.

86. The revised concept, which was finalized during a visit of planners from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to MONUC in April, envisages an initial stage during which MONUC would prepare for the transition to phase III. During this stage, the Mission would continue to monitor the presence of forces in the new defensive positions, as well as any further withdrawals of foreign contingents. For logistical and supply reasons, this would require the establishment of helicopter refuelling facilities at Manono, Ilebo, Boende and Basankusu, as well as the deployment of about 200 armed military personnel to protect equipment, facilities and supplies located at each of those four locations. Eight additional military observer teams would also need to be deployed for that purpose, as well as a 75-person military police unit.

87. MONUC will continue to monitor the new defensive positions and to verify any withdrawals of foreign military units from the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. An increase of 30 four-person military observer teams is estimated to be required for this task. MONUC may have to establish a mission forward headquarters in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Preliminary estimates call for up to 100 military observers to provide the staff. In addition, MONUC could be called upon to monitor the early demobilization and demilitarization of armed groups serving within FAC or allied forces. If so, an estimated 40 additional military observers would be required, for a total of 260 military observers over and above the present complement.

88. The importance of the demilitarization of Kisangani, in accordance with resolution 1304 (2000), and the role that the city could play in the economic and political regeneration of the country are obvious. Accordingly, an expansion of MONUC's presence in Kisangani is envisaged in preparation for this role. This would take the form of civilian personnel, including political, humanitarian, human rights, child protection and public information staff. Additional military observer teams, which would be tasked to assist RCD in completing its plans for withdrawal from the city and monitoring their implementation, would also be deployed. Another important function of all military and civilian units in the city would be to gather and analyse information in preparation for the initiation of the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation or resettlement programme in a subsequent stage of operations. In particular, it would be necessary to gather as much information as possible about the situation in the Kivus. An increase in the size of the United Nations armed security unit will also be required. This would entail a commensurate increase in the strength of the military and civilian logistical support units in Kisangani.

89. A considerable expansion of MONUC's civilian presence is envisaged at the other three sector headquarters at Kalemie, Kananga and Mbandaka, making them integrated operational centres from where the full range of Mission activities can be conducted. Civilian officers would be deployed wherever there is a MONUC military presence. Political officers will also be deployed at some of the regional capitals. To enable MONUC to maintain proper records of minefields and conduct mine awareness campaigns for military observers and the civilian population of affected areas, a mine action centre will be established in MONUC headquarters, with subsidiary cells in each sector headquarters.

90. In determining mine action priorities, a gender perspective should be incorporated at every stage. This includes the design of mine awareness campaigns, the designation of priority areas for the removal of mines and unexploded ordnance, rehabilitation and prosthetic assistance for victims and the collection and analysis of data on victims.

91. There is also a significant gender aspect to other activities of MONUC. Women, girls and children have been among the principal victims and targets of the fighting, and have suffered disproportionately from the indirect effects of the conflict.

92. Female fighters are expected to be among those to be disarmed and demobilized. Furthermore, many of the male fighters will be accompanied by dependants, who will have to be accommodated in suitable conditions. The longer-term reintegration and/or resettlement of women accompanying the fighters will also pose its own particular challenges. The special

situation of women will need to be taken into account in dealing with humanitarian, human rights and child protection issues, as well as in developing the content of public information programmes. Accordingly, MONUC should be sensitized to these concerns through the provision of the necessary guidance and advice by a specialized unit created for that purpose.

93. The problem of assuring effective civilian administration, including the security and safety of the civilian population, in the areas to be evacuated by foreign forces remains a matter of concern. There is no question but that the parties to the Lusaka Agreement are primarily responsible for the security of Congolese civilians. Accordingly, in drawing up their plans for the orderly withdrawal of foreign forces, the Governments concerned should take this requirement fully into account.

94. The Congolese parties are also responsible for the safety of civilians in the areas under their de facto control. Until such time as longer-term arrangements are established, it is envisaged that the de facto authorities in place will continue to provide the administration and ensure the maintenance of law and order in the areas to be evacuated.

95. MONUC's role in these matters will therefore be very restricted, not least because of its small size and limited deployment. The deployment of civilian personnel, including human rights, child protection and civil affairs officers, will enable MONUC to monitor to some extent the development of the situation. These efforts will need to be reinforced through the eventual deployment of a civilian police component in the mission.

96. An initial survey indicates that Congolese police structures have survived throughout the country. However, the status of police officers working in the rebel-controlled areas may need to be clarified. Although these officers had been members of the Congolese national police before the outbreak of the conflict, they may not be acceptable to the Government unless a political arrangement is agreed upon to re-establish an integrated Congolese national police.

97. Many police officers are aware that a vacuum in the security situation will follow the withdrawal of the foreign forces. Although the local police are willing to accept the responsibility for maintaining law and order, years of neglect in terms of training, resources and equipment will make it exceedingly difficult for them to fulfil their responsibilities. In addition, insufficient and irregular salaries, which have made corruption commonplace, compounded by allegations of physical abuse, has led to mistrust of the police on the part of the local population.

98. It is therefore envisaged, for the first time, to deploy the nucleus of a Civilian Police component within MONUC, initially to be attached to the headquarters. This small unit, under an interim police commissioner, would conduct a more in-depth assessment of the policing institution, its needs and capabilities. The ultimate role of this component would be to prepare recommendations for an eventual expanded MONUC Civilian Police component wherever MONUC military personnel are deployed and to advise and assist the local authorities in the discharge of their responsibility to ensure the security of the population.

99. MONUC will also actively support the opening up of the internal waterway system, including through the deployment of the Uruguayan riverine unit as well as a second riverine unit of about 200 men to be deployed subsequently. Not only will the reopening of the rivers stimulate trade and facilitate the movement of persons and goods, it will also significantly reduce the operating costs of MONUC, which must at present transport all goods and personnel by air, at considerable expense. The importance of the economic dimension would also require the recruitment by MONUC of appropriate civilian personnel.

100. MONUC will also need to be strengthened through the addition of an integrated civilian/military planning section to coordinate support to the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation or resettlement of the armed groups. This will enable MONUC to assist the Joint Military Commission with the further development of its draft plans and will strengthen the links already established with those humanitarian and development agencies able to contribute to the process. In view of repeated indications that MONUC may be called upon to assist with the repatriation or resettlement of former combatants cantoned in government camps (see para. 41 above), the necessary military and civilian support staff will need to be deployed accordingly as part of the transition to phase III.

101. As indicated in my sixth report (S/2001/128), MONUC will establish a public information capability

to enable it to explain and clarify United Nations intentions and activities. The primary vehicle for broadcasting MONUC's messages would be radio. It is therefore envisaged that a radio studio and FM transmitter will be set up in Kinshasa, with transmitters in Goma, Kisangani, Kalemie, Kananga and Mbandaka. Programming would cover the activities of MONUC, the peace process, the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation or resettlement programme and, as appropriate, the inter-Congolese dialogue.

102. Human rights protection officers must be sensitive to the particular situation of the vulnerable groups and can benefit from the knowledge and experience of local human rights and other organizations. Future implementation of the programme for the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation or resettlement of the armed groups will also add substantially to the work of the civilian sections. To strengthen further the civilian component of MONUC, it is my intention to appoint a Deputy Special Representative with specific responsibility for coordination within the Mission, as well as between MONUC and other United Nations agencies and donors operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

103. Given the scale of the country, the degraded communications infrastructure and the difficulties of access and mobility beyond major towns, the revised concept of operations provides for a progressive substantive build-up of capabilities in terms of personnel, logistics and equipment in order to position MONUC to respond in a timely and effective manner once the parties begin the processes of withdrawal of all foreign troops and the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation or resettlement of the armed groups. The advance strengthening of MONUC logistic support capabilities to support the current and foreseen future deployment is of paramount importance. It will also be necessary to expand the Mission's medical capabilities, including the provision of medical evacuation by air.

104. The revised concept envisages an increase of up to 2,500 military personnel over the figure of some 3,000 authorized for the current mandate of MONUC, thus remaining within the force level of 5,537 approved by the Security Council in its resolution 1291 (2000) of 24 February 2000.

X. Observations and conclusions

105. I note with great interest, and am in substantial agreement with, the assessment of the Security Council mission that visited the Great Lakes region from 15 to 26 May. In particular, I share the same cautious optimism about the immediate future of the Lusaka peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. I also feel the same sense of foreboding with respect to the precarious situation in Burundi, which is closely linked to the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

106. It is gratifying to note that the parties in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continue to adhere to the ceasefire. However, reports of the eastward movement of armed groups elements and their recent incursions into Rwanda, Burundi and the United Republic of Tanzania are particularly disturbing. There is speculation that the armed groups are moving out of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in order to evade participation in the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation or resettlement programme, for which the parties and MONUC will now intensify their planning. However, there can be no lasting peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo without a comprehensive settlement of the situation in Burundi. Accordingly, I take this opportunity to add my voice to that of the Security Council mission to the region in urging the Heads of State of the countries concerned to continue jointly to seek ways to remove their differences and reinforce areas of cooperation. In that sense, I am heartened by the recent visit of President Kagame to Harare to meet with President Mugabe, and by indications that President Kabila and President Museveni may soon be ready to meet. It would be particularly important for President Kabila and President Kagame to remain in close touch, especially over the question of armed group activity in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In this connection, any influence the regional Heads of State can bring to bear on the armed groups, including the Burundian groups, to refrain from violence, can only be helpful.

107. I welcome the Government's continuing cooperation with MONUC and call on the rebel movements to extend the same level of cooperation. The substantial compliance of the parties with the Harare disengagement plan, as monitored and verified by MONUC military observers, is also a matter for

encouragement. I note the reluctance of FLC to disengage its forces in Equateur Province. Though Mr. Bemba has taken some initial steps to fulfil the undertaking he made to the Security Council mission on 25 May to pull back on 1 June, his disengagement is by no means complete. MONUC will continue to monitor FLC disengagement until it is fully accomplished. MONUC will also dispatch military observers and civilian personnel as necessary to monitor any indications that the civilian population may be at risk once his forces have withdrawn. The Government also has a particular responsibility to cooperate in this respect by continuing to ensure the necessary discipline in its armed forces in Equateur Province and elsewhere.

108. The plans drawn up by the Joint Military Commission and the Political Committee, in consultation with MONUC, for the total withdrawal of all foreign forces from the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation or resettlement of armed groups do not constitute a sufficient basis for further action by the United Nations at this point. Without significant additional detailed information, the Secretariat cannot draw up, nor can I recommend to the Security Council, specific adjustments to the mandate and the force structure of MONUC. I align myself with the strong request of the Security Council mission to the parties to provide, as soon as possible, the detailed information required.

109. Nevertheless, though incomplete, the substantial progress made in the disengagement of forces — phase II of MONUC deployment — demands an appropriate follow-up. It is also necessary to build on the initial work done in elaborating plans for the withdrawal of foreign forces and the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation or resettlement of armed groups. I therefore recommend to the Security Council that it authorize a transition to the third phase of MONUC deployment. During this transitional phase, the Mission would perform the tasks set out in paragraphs 84 to 104 above. I would not at this stage request an increase in the authorized military strength of 5,537 officers and men.

110. That said, I would recall the breadth of the new tasks likely to face MONUC in an eventual third phase, as outlined in my seventh report (S/2001/373, paras. 93-110). The transitional stage that MONUC is about to enter will lead, if the parties continue to honour their commitments, to the full range of activities, with their associated problems and risks, envisaged for the third phase. That is likely to require a significantly larger force.

111. Even for this transitional stage, partly in order to prepare in good time for an eventual third phase, it will be necessary to expand considerably the civilian components of MONUC, including a new civilian police component, as well as its logistical capabilities, as outlined in paragraphs 88-104 above. It should be recognized that MONUC and the United Nations will be engaged in the Democratic Republic of the Congo for some considerable time to come. It would therefore be prudent to plan for the longer term and to begin now to provide the Mission with the resources it will need. To that end, I recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of MONUC for a period of 12 months, until 15 June 2002. In doing so, the Council will be signalling its commitment to the peace process and to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with a view to stabilizing the situation in the subregion. In the context of the reporting obligations required of me by the Council, I would expect to revert during that period with recommendations for full entry into phase III when I consider the time to be ripe.

112. The announcement by Sir Ketumile Masire, the neutral facilitator of the inter-Congolese dialogue, that a preparatory meeting for the dialogue is to begin on 16 July, is to be welcomed. MONUC will continue to support the facilitator and looks forward to further developments in the conduct of the dialogue. The repeal, on 17 May, of Decree Law No. 194 banning political party activity is also a welcome step forward in this respect.

113. The announcement by the Security Council mission, during its visit to Mbandaka on 20 May, of the reopening of the Congo River, is of more than symbolic importance. Together with the proposed creation of a Congo River Basin Commission, which was proposed in April, it points the way to a revitalization of trade along the country's main artery, the inland waterway system. The recent deployment at Mbandaka of the Uruguayan river unit will also contribute significantly to this process. The benefits to the city of Kinshasa, which has seen its food supplies dwindle as river traffic has been blocked by insecurity, should also soon be apparent. MONUC intends to make increasing use of the river to supply its contingents,

thus easing its heavy dependence on expensive air transportation.

114. Finally, I wish to express my deep appreciation to my Special Representative, Kamel Morjane, to the MONUC Force Commander, Major-General Mountaga Diallo, and to all the women and men of MONUC, both civilian and military, for their continuing efforts, often under very difficult conditions, to help restore peace to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Annex

United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: as at 8 June 2001

	Military observers	*Staff officers*	*Troops*	*Total*
Algeria	13			13
Bangladesh	9	7		16
Benin	18	2		20
Belgium		5		5
Bolivia		1		1
Burkina Faso	10			10
Canada	1	5		6
China	10			10
Czech Republic	5	1		6
Denmark	1	1		2
Egypt	25	1		26
France	1	2	3	6
Ghana	6			6
India	18	2		20
Indonesia	2	3		5
Italy		1		1
Jordan	22	6		28
Kenya	14	12		26
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	1			1
Malawi	17			17
Malaysia	7	11		18
Mali	1			1
Morocco		4	614	618
Mozambique	2			2
Nepal	13	1		14
Niger	12	1		13
Nigeria	21	1		22
Pakistan	16	15		31
Paraguay	10			10
Peru	4			4
Poland	1			1
Romania	17			17
Russian Federation	14			14
Senegal	12	15	539	566
South Africa	1	7	88	96

	Military observers	*Staff officers*	*Troops*	*Total*
South Africa	1	7	88	96
Sweden	2			2
Switzerland		1		1
Tunisia	19	4	220	243
Ukraine	9			9
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland		5		5
United Republic of Tanzania				
Uruguay	24	15	405	444
Zambia	5	5		10
Total	**363**	**134**	**1 869**	**2 366**

Map No. 4121 Rev. 9 UNITED NATIONS
June 2001

Department of Public Information
Cartographic Section

United Nations S/2001/573

Security Council

Distr.: General
8 June 2001

Original: English

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 1318 (2000) of 7 September 2000 and 1327 (2000) of 13 November 2000 and the statements by its President of 3 May 1994 (S/PRST/1994/22) and 28 March 1996 (S/PRST/1996/13), and all other relevant statements by its President,

Recalling also the statement of its President of 31 January 2001 (S/PRST/2001/3),

Taking into consideration the views expressed at its debate on the subject "Strengthening cooperation with troop-contributing countries" at its 4257th meeting on 16 January 2001,

Reaffirming its commitment to the Purposes of the Charter of the United Nations as set out in Article 1, paragraphs 1 to 4, of the Charter, and to the Principles of the Charter as set out in Article 2, paragraphs 1 to 7, of the Charter, including its commitment to the principles of the political independence, sovereign equality and territorial integrity of all States, and to respect for the sovereignty of all States,

Reaffirming its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security, *reiterating* its commitment to enhance the capacity of the United Nations in this area, and *emphasizing* its willingness to take all necessary steps within its competence to that end,

Recalling the relevant recommendations in the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (S/2000/809), and *reaffirming* its support for all efforts to strengthen the efficiency and effectiveness of United Nations peacekeeping operations,

Stressing the need to ensure the safety and security of peacekeepers and other United Nations and associated personnel, including humanitarian personnel,

Stressing the need to improve the relationship between the Security Council, the troop-contributing countries and the Secretariat to foster a spirit of partnership, cooperation, confidence and mutual trust,

Recognizing the need to strengthen cooperation with troop-contributing countries, as part of a series of measures to ensure more coherent and integrated

01-40936 (E) 130601

concepts of operations and to enhance managerial efficiency and operational effectiveness of United Nations peacekeeping operations,

Noting that relevant provisions contained in the annexes to the present resolution pertain also to strengthening cooperation with countries contributing civilian police and other personnel,

1. *Agrees* to adopt the decisions and recommendations contained in the annexes to the present resolution;

2. *Requests* its Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations to continue its work on strengthening the capacity of the United Nations to establish and support efficient and effective peacekeeping operations;

3. *Undertakes* to follow closely the implementation of the agreed measures for cooperation with troop-contributing countries, and requests its Working Group for Peacekeeping Operations to assess within six months of the adoption of this resolution the efficiency and effectiveness of the agreed measures, consider their further improvement taking into account the proposals of the troop-contributing countries and to report to the Council on these matters;

4. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Annex I

A

Statement of principles on cooperation with troop-contributing countries

The Security Council

1. *Recognizes* that its partnership with troop-contributing countries can be strengthened by the assumption by Member States, in particular those with the greatest capacity and means to do so, of their shared responsibility to provide personnel, assistance and facilities to the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security;

2. *Encourages* Member States to take steps to bridge the commitment gap with regard to personnel and equipment for specific United Nations peacekeeping operations;

3. *Emphasizes* the importance of troop-contributing countries taking the necessary and appropriate steps to ensure the capability of their peacekeepers to fulfil the missions' mandate, and *underlines* the importance of bilateral and international cooperation in this regard, including in the area of training, logistics and equipment;

4. *Underlines* the importance of ensuring that national contingents participating in United Nations peacekeeping operations receive effective and appropriate support from the Secretariat, including in the area of training, logistics and equipment;

5. *Stresses* the need to ensure that the Secretariat is given sufficient human and financial resources to fulfil these tasks, and that these resources be used efficiently and effectively;

6. *Underlines* that consultations between the Security Council, the Secretariat and troop-contributing countries should enhance the ability of the

Security Council to make appropriate, effective and timely decisions in fulfilling its responsibilities;

7. *Underlines also* the need to maintain a comprehensive approach to improving the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations from their conception, including in preparing contingency plans for volatile situations, and promoting cohesive exit strategies;

B
Operational issues

1. *Encourages* international cooperation and support for peacekeeping training, including the establishment of regional peacekeeping training centres, and *stresses* the need for technical support from the Secretary-General to such centres;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to include information on his consultations with troop-contributing countries in his regular reports to the Security Council on individual peacekeeping operations, and *undertakes* to take account of the views expressed in these consultations and in its meetings with troop-contributing countries when taking decisions on such operations;

3. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to convene assessments meetings with interested delegations, in particular troop-contributing countries, at appropriate stages of each peacekeeping operation as a part of his efforts to draw the lessons that can be learned, which should be taken into account in the conduct and planning of current and future operations;

4. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to take into account in the conduct of peacekeeping operations and in the regular lessons-learned process, the operational experiences of national contingents while in the field or following departure;

5. *Undertakes* to inform troop-contributing countries fully of the terms of reference of missions of the Security Council involving peacekeeping operations and subsequently of the conclusions of the missions;

6. *Expresses* its view that the conduct of reconnaissance visits to the mission area by countries committing troops can be highly valuable in preparing for effective participation in peacekeeping operations, and *encourages* support for such visits;

7. *Urges* the Secretary-General to take further steps to implement the proposal of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations to create integrated mission task forces, and to pursue other related capabilities to improve United Nations planning and support capacities;

8. *Stresses* the need to improve the information and the analysis capacity of the United Nations Secretariat, with a view to improving the quality of advice to the Secretary-General, the Security Council and the troop-contributing countries;

9. *Stresses also* that the Secretariat's advice to the Security Council and the troop-contributing countries should include a range of recommendations for action on the basis of an objective assessment of the situation on the ground, rather than what Member States are presumed to be willing to support;

10. *Underlines* the importance of an effective mission-specific public information and communications capacity within peacekeeping operations, in particular through campaigns to improve awareness of the objectives and scope of the mission within the local population in the mission area;

11. *Stresses* the need for an effective public information programme to generate international public support for United Nations peacekeeping operations, and *stresses* also in this regard the need for special programmes, in particular in troop-contributing countries, to project the contribution of peacekeepers;

12. *Underlines* in this regard the need for an effective public information capacity within the United Nations, and *takes note* in this regard of the proposals made by the Secretary-General to strengthen Secretariat planning and support for public information in peacekeeping operations (S/2000/1081);

C
Other mechanisms

1. *Undertakes* to continue to consider the possibility of using the Military Staff Committee as one of the means of enhancing United Nations peacekeeping operations;

2. *Expresses* its belief that Groups of Friends of the Secretary-General, as well as other informal mechanisms which might include troop-contributing countries, Security Council members, donors and the countries in the region, can play a useful role in increasing the coherence and effectiveness of United Nations action, and *stresses* that they should conduct their work in close cooperation with the Security Council;

D
Follow-up

1. *Expresses* its intention to assess within six months the efficiency and effectiveness of its meetings with troop-contributing countries, with a view to the possibility of further improvement to the current system, including through the consideration of specific proposals of troop-contributing countries for new mechanisms;

2. *Decides* to strengthen cooperation with the troop-contributing countries in addition to and on the basis of the principles and provisions contained in the resolution and the present annex by improving and expanding existing consultation mechanisms as elaborated in annex II, with a view to ensuring proper reflection of the views and concerns of troop-contributing countries.

Annex II

Format, procedures and documentation of meetings with the troop-contributing countries

The consultations with troop-contributing countries will take place in the following formats:

A. Public or private meetings of the Security Council with the participation of troop-contributing countries;

B. Consultation meetings with the troop-contributing countries;

C. Meetings between the Secretariat and troop-contributing countries;

A

Public or private meetings of the Security Council

1. The Security Council will hold public or private meetings with the participation of troop-contributing countries, including at their request, and without prejudice to the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, in order to ensure a full and high-level consideration of issues of critical importance to a specific peacekeeping operation;

2. Such meetings may be held, in particular, when the Secretary-General has identified potential troop-contributing countries for a new or ongoing peacekeeping operation, when considering a change in, or renewal or completion of a peacekeeping mandate, or when there is a rapid deterioration in the situation on the ground, including when it threatens the safety and security of United Nations peacekeepers;

B

Consultation meetings with the troop-contributing countries

1. Consultation meetings with troop-contributing countries will continue as the principal means of consultation, and will continue to be convened and chaired by the President of the Security Council;

2. Such consultation meetings may be convened, including at the request of troop-contributing countries, as appropriate at different stages of peacekeeping operations, including:

(a) Mission planning, including the development of the concept of operations and the elaboration of the mandate of a new operation;

(b) Any change in the mandate, in particular the broadening or narrowing of the scope of the mission, the introduction of new or additional functions or components, or a change in the authorization to use force;

(c) The renewal of a mandate;

(d) Significant or serious political, military or humanitarian developments;

(e) A rapid deterioration of the security situation on the ground;

(f) The termination, withdrawal or scaling down in size of the operation, including the transition from peacekeeping to post-conflict peace-building;

(g) Before and after Council missions to a specific peacekeeping operation;

3. The following parties will be invited to these meetings:

(a) Countries contributing troops, military observers or civilian police to the peacekeeping operation;

(b) Prospective troop-contributing countries as identified by the Secretary-General;

(c) Relevant United Nations bodies and agencies, when they have specific contributions to make to the issue under discussion;

(d) Other bodies and agencies, as observers, as appropriate;

(e) Countries that make special contributions, such as other civilian personnel, contributions to trust funds, logistics, equipment and facilities and other contributions, as appropriate;

(f) The host country/countries, as observers, as appropriate;

(g) The representative of a regional or subregional organization or arrangement, contributing troops as appropriate;

(h) Regional organizations, as observers when not contributing troops, as appropriate;

4. Such consultation meetings will, as appropriate, include consideration of:

(a) Preparations for the establishment of a peacekeeping mandate by the Security Council;

(b) Operational issues, including the concept of operations, mission planning, authorization to use force, the chain of command, force structure, the unity and cohesion of the force, training and equipment, risk assessment and deployment;

(c) Significant concerns of or recommendations by the Secretary-General, as set out in his report, a briefing note from the Secretariat or the Secretariat's oral briefing;

(d) The specific concerns of troop-contributing countries, including those communicated to the President of the Security Council;

(e) Progress in the accomplishment of the mission's tasks in different areas or mission components;

5. The following measures will be ensured to improve the quality and effectiveness of such consultations:

(a) An informal paper setting out the agenda, including issues to be covered and drawing attention to relevant background documentation, will be circulated by the President of the Security Council to the participants when inviting them to attend these meetings;

(b) The Secretary-General should ensure, within the constraints of the Security Council's programme of work, that reports requested by the Security Council on specific peacekeeping operations are issued in good time to allow the timely holding of meetings with troop-contributing countries before discussion among Security Council members;

(c) The Secretariat should also make fact sheets available to all participants at the beginning of these meetings;

(d) The Secretary-General should ensure, where possible, that briefings are given by senior personnel working with the mission in the field;

(e) The Secretary-General should ensure that briefings consist of an objective assessment and analysis of the political, military, humanitarian and human rights situations, where appropriate;

(f) The Secretary-General should add value to the briefings by making them more user-friendly, including through the exploitation of information technology;

6. The following arrangements will be made to ensure timely and appropriate communication of the concerns and views of troop-contributing countries, as expressed at the consultation meetings, to the members of the Security Council so that these concerns and views can receive due consideration:

- The President of the Security Council will prepare, with the assistance of the Secretariat, and make available a summary of the content of such meetings;
- The summary of discussion will be distributed to Council members in advance of informal consultations or of the next meeting on the relevant peacekeeping operation, where appropriate;

C

Meetings between the Secretariat and troop-contributing countries

The Security Council supports the existing practice of meetings between the Secretariat and troop-contributing countries to discuss matters concerning specific peacekeeping operations, and also the participation at such meetings, where appropriate, of Special Representatives of the Secretary-General, Force Commanders and Civilian Police Commissioners.

Other forms of consultations

The Security Council notes that the forms of consultations mentioned herein are not exhaustive and that consultations may take a variety of other forms, including formal or informal communication between the President of the Council or its members, the Secretary-General and the troop-contributing countries and, as appropriate, with other countries especially affected, including countries from the region concerned.

United Nations A/55/985–S/2001/574

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
7 June 2001

Original: English

General Assembly
Fifty-fifth session
Agenda item 10
Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization

Security Council
Fifty-sixth year

Prevention of armed conflict

Report of the Secretary-General

Executive summary

Since assuming office, I have pledged to move the United Nations from a culture of reaction to a culture of prevention. In its presidential statement of 20 July 2000, the Security Council invited me to submit a report on the prevention of armed conflict, containing an analysis and recommendations on initiatives within the United Nations, taking into account previous experience and the views and considerations expressed by Member States. My first objective in the present report is to review the progress that has been achieved in developing the conflict prevention capacity of the United Nations, as called for by both the General Assembly and the Security Council. My second aim is to present specific recommendations on how the efforts of the United Nations system in this field could be further enhanced, with the cooperation and active involvement of Member States, who ultimately have the primary responsibility for conflict prevention.

In drafting the present report, I have endeavoured to take into account the many different views and considerations of Member States expressed in recent debates of the General Assembly and the Security Council on conflict prevention. It is axiomatic that the active support and cooperation of Member States will be needed for conflict prevention efforts to succeed. The specific contributions that can be made by the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the International Court of Justice and the Secretary-General are explored in the present report, as is the cooperation between the United Nations and outside actors, such as regional organizations, NGOs, civil society and the business community.

The work of the United Nations system in the field of conflict prevention is not new. Many of the development and other programmes and projects of the United Nations system already have preventive effects or at least preventive potential,

01-40464 (E) 140601

though they are often disparate and inchoate. My emphasis here is to show how the United Nations family of departments, programmes, offices and agencies (which have all contributed to the present report) interact in the furtherance of the prevention of armed conflict. Of particular importance are United Nations efforts for enhancing the capacity of Member States for conflict prevention. The challenge before us is how to mobilize the collective potential of the United Nations system with greater coherence and focus for conflict prevention, without necessarily requiring major new resources.

The basic premises of the present report are the following:

- Conflict prevention is one of the primary obligations of Member States set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, and United Nations efforts in conflict prevention must be in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter. Conflict prevention is also an activity best undertaken under Chapter VI of the Charter.

- The primary responsibility for conflict prevention rests with national Governments, with civil society playing an important role. The main role of the United Nations and the international community is to support national efforts for conflict prevention and assist in building national capacity in this field.

- Preventive action should be initiated at the earliest possible stage of a conflict cycle in order to be most effective. One of the principal aims of preventive action should be to address the deep-rooted socio-economic, cultural, environmental, institutional and other structural causes that often underlie the immediate political symptoms of conflicts.

- An effective preventive strategy requires a comprehensive approach that encompasses both short-term and long-term political, diplomatic, humanitarian, human rights, developmental, institutional and other measures taken by the international community, in cooperation with national and regional actors.

- Conflict prevention and sustainable and equitable development are mutually reinforcing activities. An investment in national and international efforts for conflict prevention must be seen as a simultaneous investment in sustainable development since the latter can best take place in an environment of sustainable peace.

- A successful preventive strategy depends on the cooperation of many United Nations actors, including the Secretary-General, the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the International Court of Justice and United Nations agencies, offices, funds and programmes, as well as the Bretton Woods institutions. The United Nations is not the only actor in prevention and may often not be the actor best suited to take the lead. Therefore, Member States, international, regional and subregional organizations the private sector, non-governmental organizations, and other civil society actors also have very important roles to play in this field.

I am under no illusion that preventive strategies will be easy to implement. The costs of prevention have to be paid in the present, while its benefits lie in the distant future. The main lesson to be drawn from past United Nations experiences in this regard is that the earlier the root causes of a potential conflict are identified and effectively addressed, the more likely it is that the parties to a conflict will be ready

to engage in a constructive dialogue, address the actual grievances that lie at the root of the potential conflict and refrain from the use of force to achieve their aims.

Governments that live up to their sovereign responsibility to resolve peacefully a situation that might deteriorate into a threat to international peace and security and call on the United Nations or other international actors for preventive assistance as early as needed, provide the best protection for their citizens against unwelcome outside interference. In this way, preventive action by the international community can contribute significantly to strengthening the national sovereignty of Member States.

In the present report, I have stressed that conflict prevention lies at the heart of the mandate of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security, and that a general consensus is emerging among Member States that comprehensive and coherent conflict prevention strategies offer the greatest potential for promoting lasting peace and creating an enabling environment for sustainable development. The imperative for effective conflict prevention goes beyond creating a culture, establishing mechanisms or summoning political will. The United Nations also has a moral responsibility to ensure that genocides such as that perpetrated in Rwanda are prevented from ever happening again.

The time has come to translate the rhetoric of conflict prevention into concrete action. It is my earnest hope that the United Nations system and Member States will be able to work together in developing a practical road map to implement the specific recommendations contained in the present report. It is axiomatic that effective preventive action will require sustained political will and a long-term commitment of resources by Member States and the United Nations system as a whole if a genuine culture of prevention is to take root in the international community. The present report marks a beginning in that direction.

Contents

		Paragraphs	Page
I.	Introduction	1–16	6
	Part one Mandate and role of the principal organs of the United Nations	17-60	9
II.	United Nations mandate for the prevention of armed conflict	17-24	9
	A. The Charter framework	17-20	9
	B. General Assembly and Security Council decisions and the views of Member States on conflict prevention	21-24	9
III.	Role of principal organs of the United Nations in the prevention of armed conflict	25-60	10
	A. Role of the General Assembly	25-32	10
	B. Role of the Security Council	33-39	11
	C. Role of the Economic and Social Council	40-45	12
	D. Role of the International Court of Justice	46-50	13
	E. Role of the Secretary-General	51-60	14
	Part two Role of the United Nations system and other international actors	61-170	17
IV.	Role and activities of United Nations departments, agencies and programmes in the prevention of armed conflict	61-136	17
	A. Overview	61-64	17
	B. Measures to promote coherence within the United Nations system	65-72	17
	C. Political action	73-80	19
	D. Peacekeeping operations	81-85	20
	E. Disarmament	86-93	21
	F. Human rights action	94-98	23
	G. Developmental assistance	99-107	24
	H. Humanitarian action	108-128	25
	1. General considerations	108-111	25
	2. Specific aspects	112-128	26
	(a) Food security and emergency food aid	113-118	26
	(b) Refugees	119-121	27
	(c) Health	122-123	27
	(d) Children	124-128	28
	I. Media and public information	129-131	29
	J. Gender equality	132-135	29

K. Drug control and crime prevention 136 30

V. Interaction between the United Nations and other international actors in the prevention of armed conflict 137-150 31

A. Regional arrangements 137-142 31

B. Non-governmental organizations and civil society 143-147 32

C. The private sector 148-150 32

VI. Enhancing capacity for the prevention of armed conflict 151-159 33

VII. Conclusion 160-170 35

A. Overcoming the obstacles to conflict prevention 160-168 35

B. Towards a culture of conflict prevention 169-170 36

I. Introduction

1. Perhaps the most pitiful lesson of the past decade has been that the prevention of violent conflict is far better and more cost-effective than cure. The challenge is to apply that lesson so that prevention exists not just at the rhetorical level but also practically. This is easier said than done; existing problems usually take precedence over potential ones and, while the benefits of prevention lie in the future and are difficult to quantify, the costs must be paid in the present. On the other hand, the costs of *not* preventing violence are enormous. The human costs of war include not only the visible and immediate — death, injury, destruction, displacement — but also the distant and indirect repercussion for families, communities, local and national institutions and economies, and neighbouring countries. They are counted not only in damage inflicted but also in opportunities lost.

2. The 1997 Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict found, for example, that the gross domestic product (GDP) in Lebanon in the early 1990s remained 50 per cent lower than it was before fighting broke out in 1974; that civil war and widespread use of landmines was widely blamed for the abandonment of an estimated 80 per cent of Angola's agricultural land; and that already inadequate food production in Burundi dropped 17 per cent during recent periods of conflict. We also need to factor in the costs to external actors who intervene to stem the violence. A Carnegie Commission study estimated that the international community spent about $200 billion on the seven major interventions of the 1990s, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, the Persian Gulf, Cambodia and El Salvador, exclusive of Kosovo and East Timor. The study calculated the cost differentials between these conflict management activities and potential preventive action, and concluded that a preventive approach would have saved the international community almost $130 billion.

3. Nowhere are these lessons more glaring than in the Great Lakes region of Africa, where the failure of the international community to invest in prevention in Rwanda has had profoundly destablizing regional repercussions. Subsequent reviews by the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and national legislatures of some troop-contributing countries have agreed that there was ample early warning and opportunity for response to the "preventable genocide" of April 1994. Estimates by the Force Commander at the time, General Romeo Dallaire, that a deployment of approximately 5,000 troops to Rwanda in April 1994 would have been sufficient to halt the genocide have been borne out in subsequent investigations. The Carnegie Commission study estimated that the total cost of the augmented peace operation would have been $500 million annually and that preventive action in Rwanda would probably have cost $1.3 billion; in the end, the overall assistance to Rwanda in the wake of the genocide had a price tag of $4.5 billion.

4. We have an obligation to the victims of violence in Rwanda and elsewhere to take seriously this challenge of prevention. I have pledged to move the United Nations from a culture of reaction to a culture of prevention. On 20 July 2000, the Security Council met to consider the role of the United Nations in the prevention of armed conflict. In a subsequent presidential statement, the Council invited me to submit, by May 2001, a report containing an analysis and recommendations on initiatives within the United Nations, taking into account previous experience and the views and considerations expressed by Member States, on the prevention of armed conflict. As the nature of preventive action is such that, in its widest sense, it involves the whole United Nations system, I am hereby submitting the present report to both the Security Council and the General Assembly, which itself has adopted a number of resolutions relating to conflict prevention.

5. My first objective in the present report is to review the progress that has been achieved in developing the conflict prevention capacity of the United Nations, as called for by both the General Assembly and the Security Council. My second aim is to present specific recommendations on how efforts of the United Nations system in this field could be further enhanced, with the cooperation and active involvement of Member States, who ultimately have the primary responsibility for conflict prevention.

Issues addressed by the report

6. My basic premise is that the primary responsibility for conflict prevention rests with national Governments and other local actors. Without a sense of national ownership in each case, prevention is unlikely to succeed. Preventing the emergence of armed conflict requires early action by national actors

and, where appropriate, by the international community. The earlier a dispute or inequity with the potential to lead to armed conflict can be identified and addressed successfully, the less likely it is that the situation will deteriorate into violence. Early action taken nationally to alleviate conditions that could lead to armed conflict, with international assistance, as appropriate, can help to strengthen the sovereignty of States.

7. For early prevention to be effective, the multidimensional root causes of conflict need to be identified and addressed. The proximate cause of conflict may be an outbreak of public disorder or a protest over a particular incident, but the root cause may be, for example, socio-economic inequities and inequalities, systematic ethnic discrimination, denial of human rights, disputes over political participation or long-standing grievances over land and other resource allocation. In many instances, the existence of such factors may lead groups to act violently in one society but not in another where appropriate and effective coping mechanisms exist, including well functioning governance and rule of law institutions. The need for reliable early-warning information and a deep and careful understanding of local circumstances and traditions is therefore of great importance, and the fundamental inequities need to be identified and addressed in development planning and programming.

8. The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict described strategies for prevention as falling into two categories: **operational prevention**, which refers to measures applicable in the face of immediate crisis, and **structural prevention,** which consists of measures to ensure that crises do not arise in the first place or, if they do, that they do not recur. The present report will consider the broad spectrum of assistance offered to States by the United Nations system in the realm of both short-term operational prevention and long-term structural prevention.

9. The Security Council has stressed the importance of responding to the root causes of conflict and the need to pursue long-term effective preventive strategies. The Council has further noted that a coherent peace-building strategy, encompassing political, developmental, humanitarian and human rights programmes, can play a key role in conflict prevention. In this regard, I would like to draw a clear distinction between regular developmental and humanitarian assistance programmes, on the one hand, and those implemented as a preventive or peace-building response to problems that could lead to the outbreak or recurrence of violent conflict, on the other.

10. An investment in long-term structural prevention is ultimately an investment in sustainable development: first, because it is obvious that sustainable development cannot take place in the midst of actual or potential conflict, and second, because armed conflict destroys the achievements of national development. In some cases, as we have recently witnessed, protracted conflicts have undermined the very existence of such States as Somalia and Afghanistan. Effective conflict prevention is a prerequisite for achieving and maintaining sustainable peace, which in turn is a pre-requisite for sustainable development. When sustainable development addresses the root causes of conflict, it plays an important role in preventing conflict and promoting peace.

11. In the current era of diminishing international development assistance, the donor community is increasingly reluctant to provide development support to States that are on the brink of or in the midst of conflict. Investing in conflict prevention offers the potential for multiple returns for national development over the long term. More effective prevention strategies would save not only hundreds of thousands of lives but also billions of dollars. Funds currently spent on military action could instead be available for poverty reduction and equitable sustainable development, which would further reduce the risks of war and disaster. Conflict prevention and sustainable development are mutually reinforcing.

12. The role of the United Nations is principally to assist national Governments and their local counterparts in finding solutions to their problems by offering support for the development of national and regional capacities for early warning, conflict prevention and long-term peace-building. Such assistance is premised on the principle of consent of the affected Member States. In practice, international cooperation in this domain is often by invitation of the State or States concerned.

13. The development and humanitarian agencies of the United Nations system, together with the Bretton Woods institutions, have a vital role to play in creating a peaceful environment, as well as addressing the root causes of conflicts at the early stages of prevention. The present report will examine how many of their

regular assistance programmes can — and do — contribute to conflict prevention efforts, and how their effectiveness can be improved through greater coordination both of their efforts and with their respective host Governments. The report will also examine the tools that are available to the United Nations at later stages of prevention, which might include preventive diplomacy, preventive deployment of military and civil police contingents, preventive disarmament and allied measures, and effective post-conflict peace-building strategies.

14. In drafting the present report, I have endeavoured to take into account the many different views and considerations of Member States expressed in recent debates of the General Assembly and the Security Council on conflict prevention. It is axiomatic that the active support and cooperation of Member States will be needed for conflict prevention efforts to succeed. The specific contributions that can be made by the Security Council, the General Assembly and the other principal organs of the United Nations will be explored in the present report, as will the cooperation between the United Nations and outside actors, such as regional organizations, NGOs, civil society and the business community.

15. The work of the United Nations system in the field of conflict prevention is not new. Many of the development and other programmes and projects of the United Nations system already have preventive effects or at least preventive potential, though they are often disparate and inchoate. Of particular importance are United Nations efforts to enhance the capacity of Member States for conflict prevention. The challenge before us is how to mobilize the collective potential of the United Nations system with greater coherence and focus for conflict prevention, without necessarily requiring major new resources.

16. I take this opportunity to reiterate that a shift from a culture of reaction to a culture of prevention would be a major step forward. In the present report, I describe the practical actions that have been and are being taken to that end, based on United Nations mandates, experience gained and lessons learned, and I offer a number of conclusions and recommendations for the future.

Part one
Mandate and role of the principal organs of the United Nations

II. United Nations mandate for the prevention of armed conflict

A. The Charter framework

17. The cardinal mission of the United Nations remains "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war". To that end, Member States have committed themselves "to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace ...", as set forth in Article 1, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the United Nations.

18. In my view, the Charter provides the United Nations with a strong mandate for preventing armed conflict. It also points to two defining elements of the philosophy underlying the collective security system: first, preventing armed conflict is a more desirable and cost-effective strategy to ensure lasting peace and security than trying to stop it or alleviate its symptoms; and second, armed international conflicts are best prevented by "peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security are not endangered", as provided for in Article 2, paragraph 3, of the Charter. It is from this shared conviction with the drafters of the Charter that I have suggested that conflict prevention be made the cornerstone of the collective security system of the United Nations in the twentieth century.

19. During much of the second half of the last century, collective security was largely pursued through reactive rather than preventive means, and was almost exclusively defined in military terms. That approach served some States well and remains valid. But, with the end of the cold war, a new understanding of the concept of peace and security has emerged. A broader focus on the nature of sustainable peace and its building-blocks, such as social and economic development, good governance and democratization, the rule of law and respect for human rights, is supplementing the traditional concept of collective security. In the twenty-first century, collective security should imply an obligation for all of us to strive to address tensions, grievances, inequality, injustice, intolerance and hostilities at the earliest stage possible, before peace and security are endangered. This, in my view, is the true core of a culture of prevention.

20. This approach brings the United Nations back to its roots. Article 55 of the Charter explicitly recognizes that solutions to international economic, social, health and related problems, international, cultural and educational cooperation and universal respect for human rights are all essential for "the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations". The Charter thus provides the foundation for a comprehensive and long-term approach to conflict prevention based on an expanded concept of peace and security.

B. General Assembly and Security Council decisions and the views of Member States on conflict prevention

21. Since the late 1980s, the General Assembly and the Security Council have strengthened the mandate of the United Nations for conflict prevention established in the Charter. The General Assembly, most notably in its resolution 47/120 A, entitled "An Agenda for Peace: preventive diplomacy and related matter", reaffirmed the important role of the Secretary-General in preventive diplomacy, and invited him to strengthen the capacity of the Secretariat for the collection of information and analysis and to set up an early warning mechanism. In its resolution 51/242, entitled "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace", the General Assembly further highlighted the importance of improving system-wide coordination of United Nations preventive measures.

22. The Security Council held open debates on conflict prevention in November 1999 and July 2000. During those debates, a large number of Member States expressed their overall support for prevention, albeit with different priorities for action. Some stressed the need to focus on the socio-economic root causes of conflict and called for an increase in development assistance to prevent conflict. Others identified the promotion of human rights, good governance, the rule of law and democratization as the most important areas for preventive action. A number of countries

emphasized that preventive action should mostly be limited to measures under Chapter VI of the Charter, but noted that enforcement action under Chapter VII must remain a legitimate means of last resort to prevent massive violations of fundamental human rights or other serious threats to the peace.

23. The presidential statements adopted at those two meetings underlined that early warning, preventive diplomacy, preventive deployment, preventive disarmament and post-conflict peace-building are interdependent and complementary components of a comprehensive conflict prevention strategy. That comprehensive approach to conflict prevention was further expressed in the Security Council's recent open debate on peace-building in February 2001, during which a large number of speakers emphasized that a well planned and coordinated peace-building strategy can play a significant role in conflict prevention.

24. Conflict prevention was also a prominent theme during the Millennium Summit of the United Nations, at which leaders from all parts of the world supported my call to move the international community from a culture of reaction to a culture of prevention. There was a broad consensus that the most promising approach was to develop long-term and integrated strategies, combining a wide range of political, economic, social and other measures aimed at reducing or eradicating the underlying causes of conflict. Both the United Nations Millennium Declaration adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 55/2 and resolution 1318 (2000) adopted by the Security Council at the level of heads of State and Government recognized the vital role of all parts of the United Nations system in conflict prevention and pledged to enhance the effectiveness of the United Nations in this field.

III. Role of principal organs of the United Nations in the prevention of armed conflict

A. Role of the General Assembly

25. Within the framework of Articles 10 and 11 of the Charter, the General Assembly has a broad authority to consider conflict prevention in all its aspects; develop recommendations, as appropriate; or call the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security. According to Article 14, the General Assembly may also recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations.

26. I recall the useful work that the Assembly accomplished in this area by adopting resolutions 47/120 A and B, entitled "An Agenda for Peace: preventive diplomacy and related matters", particularly section VII of resolution 47/120A, entitled "Role of the General Assembly in preventive diplomacy", and resolution 51/242, entitled "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace". Building on the precedents set in the past (e.g., South Tyrol in 1960; the Balkans in the Organization's first decade; and with regard to apartheid in South Africa), the General Assembly may wish to consider how it can make more frequent use of its powers under the Charter for the consideration of prevention issues in the future. To that end, the steps set out below could be considered.

Mechanisms for peaceful resolution of disputes

27. The active use by Member States of methods of peaceful dispute settlements, as elaborated in Chapter VI of the Charter, is one of the most effective ways of preventing conflicts. The General Assembly has contributed over the years to the promotion of such practices, such as in its resolution 268(11)d 1948, on the establishment of a panel for inquiry and conciliation, and in its decision 44/415 on the resort to a commission of good offices, mediation or conciliation within the United Nations. The General Assembly may wish to consider making further recommendations on the use of such mechanisms within the international community.

Declarations, norms and programmes and creation of political will for prevention

28. A more systematic attention by the General Assembly to conflict prevention would be instrumental in creating a truly global culture of conflict prevention through setting standards for accountability of Member States and contributing to the establishment of prevention practices at the local, national, regional and global levels. The Assembly has already worked actively in creating norms that have a bearing on the prevention of conflicts, such as in its resolution 43/51, which contains an annex entitled "Declaration on the Prevention and Removal of Disputes and Situations

Which May Threaten International Peace and Security and the Role of the United Nations in this Field".

29. In its resolution 53/243, the General Assembly adopted the Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace, in which it called on Member States, civil society and the whole United Nations system to promote activities related to conflict prevention. Within its wide area of responsibility, the General Assembly could also promote a culture of prevention in the multifaceted activities of the United Nations system. As in the case of its recent resolution on the Culture of Peace activities, the General Assembly could address the conflict prevention dimension of a number of items on its current agenda, such as disarmament, human rights, humanitarian assistance, democratization, environmental degradation, terrorism, acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) and international law.

Deliberative functions

30. General Assembly bodies, such as the United Nations Charter Committee, have already discussed issues related to conflict prevention and resolution. This kind of examination of new ideas and concepts by appropriate Assembly bodies should continue. The Assembly also receives reports from many United Nations bodies and agencies, which regularly include conflict prevention issues in their programmes. The United Nations University (UNU), the University for Peace and the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) submit their reports directly to the Assembly or through the Economic and Social Council and have programmes dealing with prevention issues. A discussion of these by the Assembly within a framework for elaborating a comprehensive prevention strategy would give them wider public attention and encourage more debate on prevention issues.

Interaction between the General Assembly and the Security Council on prevention

31. An important issue for the whole United Nations membership to consider is how to enhance the role of the General Assembly in conflict prevention as the Security Council strengthens its activities in this area. In the light of the Security Council debate that has emphasized the need to make peace-building part of a comprehensive conflict prevention strategy, preventive peace-building could be made a focus for a meaningful strategic interaction between the Council and the Assembly.

32. The Security Council deals mostly with potential conflict situations in countries which are not Council members. General Assembly members should have an opportunity for their views on conflict prevention issues to be heard more often in the Council. In order to bring about a more practical interaction between the Assembly and the Council, the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council could discuss prevention issues in their monthly meetings. In order to assist the President of the Assembly to raise such prevention cases, the establishment of an open-ended group of Member States to assist the General Assembly President could also be considered.

Recommendation 1

I recommend that the General Assembly consider a more active use of its powers, in accordance with Articles 10, 11 and 14 of the Charter of the United Nations, in the prevention of armed conflicts.

Recommendation 2

I urge the General Assembly to consider ways of enhancing its interaction with the Security Council on conflict prevention, particularly in developing long-term conflict prevention and peace-building strategies.

B. Role of the Security Council

33. As the United Nations organ with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the Security Council has a key role to play in the prevention of armed conflict. The basis for preventive action by the Security Council can be seen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations, which stresses the necessity to seek a solution to the continuance of a dispute or situation likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. According to Chapter VI, the Security Council may investigate any dispute or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute.

34. Although the Security Council has improved its transparency and working methods, its focus remains almost exclusively on crises and emergencies, normally

becoming involved only when violence has already occurred on a large scale. I propose several means by which the Council could more easily identify and capitalize on windows of opportunity for preventive action.

Periodic reporting

35. In its presidential statements on conflict prevention of November 1999 and July 2000, the Security Council invited the Secretary-General to present periodic reports on disputes threatening international peace and security, including early warning and proposals for preventive measures.

36. I believe that periodic reporting is most useful when done as an informal and flexible practice rather than a scheduled obligation. It would also be more beneficial if such reporting could be set in a wider context. My meetings with the heads of regional organizations on prevention and peace-building, held in July 1998 and February 2001, respectively, showed that a comprehensive approach drawing on regional preventive strategies is a valuable one which should be pursued with our regional partners and appropriate United Nations organs and agencies.

37. I intend, therefore, among other approaches, to initiate a practice of providing periodic regional or subregional reports to the Security Council on threats to international peace and security. In most instances, such reports would relate to regional aspects of the issues already on the agenda of the Council and would thus complement current reporting obligations. The focus would be on cross-border issues that constitute potential threats to international peace and security, such as flows of illicit arms, natural resources, refugees, mercenaries, irregular forces and the security implications of their interaction. The reporting would also suggest priorities for action for the Council by identifying and reacting to such regional threats to international peace and security.

Security Council fact-finding missions

38. In the past two years, there has been a welcome resumption in Council missions. While missions vary in their purpose and objective, they can have important preventive effects. After restarting the practice with one mission in 1999, there were five Council missions in the year 2000 — to Eritrea and Ethiopia, to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to Sierra Leone, to East Timor and Indonesia, and for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) on Kosovo — as well as the recent missions in 2001 to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and other countries in the region and to Kosovo. The Security Council may also wish to consider using multidisciplinary expert support in its fact-finding missions to potential conflict areas so that all substantive areas can be incorporated into the elaboration of a comprehensive prevention strategy.

New mechanisms for discussing prevention

39. As I proposed in my November 1999 statement to the Council, the Security Council could consider establishing an ad hoc informal working group, another subsidiary organ or other informal technical arrangement to discuss prevention cases on a more continuing basis. If established, early warning cases that I have proposed or cases suggested by the President or other Council members could be regularly referred to such a group before informal consultations or public meetings of the Council. When discussing cases on the agenda of the working group, its members could rely on the information received from individual members of the Council or information given by the Secretariat. The Security Council could also consider using the Arria formula or other similar arrangements for informal discussions outside the Council chambers for exchanging views on prevention.

Recommendation 3

I encourage the Security Council to consider innovative mechanisms, such as establishing a subsidiary organ, an ad hoc informal working group or other informal technical arrangement to discuss prevention cases on a continuing basis, particularly with regard to periodic regional or subregional reports that I intend to submit to the Council, as well as other early warning or prevention cases brought to its attention by Members States.

C. Role of the Economic and Social Council

40. The Economic and Social Council has started to work more closely with the Security Council and General Assembly because the international community has recognized the value of an integrated

approach to achieving peace, security, respect for human rights and sustainable development. A new phase began in 1998, when the Security Council invited the Council to contribute to designing a long-term programme of support for Haiti. Subsequently, it created the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Haiti in 1999, which undertook an assessment mission to the country. The involvement of the Economic and Social Council was also requested in February 2000, when the Security Council proposed that it convene a meeting to discuss the impact of human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) on peace and security in Africa.

41. More recently, in its resolution 55/217, the General Assembly requested the Economic and Social Council to consider the proposals of the Assembly's Open-ended Ad Hoc Working Group on the Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa, particularly on the creation of an ad hoc advisory group on countries emerging from conflict. An advisory group similar to that on Haiti has now been established for that purpose.

42. I propose a more active involvement of the Economic and Social Council in the prevention of armed conflict, particularly because of its critical role in addressing the root causes of conflicts in the areas that lie at the core of its mandate. Its future contribution to the prevention of armed conflict and peace-building could take place either on its own initiative or as requested by other principal organs of the United Nations.

Long-term strategies to address the root causes of conflicts

43. According to Article 62 of the Charter of the United Nations, the Economic and Social Council can initiate studies and reports in any area within its mandate. Such studies might be needed when it considers its specific involvement in the development of long-term strategies to address the root causes of conflict. The Economic and Social Council could use the various instruments at its disposal, including its subsidiary bodies, the Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC) and its inter-agency machinery to draw upon the capacities of the whole United Nations system to support the design and conduct of any such studies.

Regional perspective

44. The more active involvement of the Economic and Social Council could be beneficial when the Security Council sets up regional initiatives in the prevention of armed conflict. To that end, the Economic and Social Council should consider contributing to a comprehensive and multidisciplinary discussion on the prevention of armed conflict, particularly in a regional context. Since the Economic and Social Council is beginning to develop modalities to contribute to regional questions related to Africa in support of the work of the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Secretary-General in this area, that model could be extended to other regions.

High-level discussion on the root causes of conflicts

45. During the past years, the work of the Economic and Social Council has been greatly reinvigorated by the introduction of the high-level segment to its regular annual sessions. In the future, a high-level segment could be devoted to address the role of development, in particular of the Economic and Social Council, in preventing violence and conflict on a longer-term basis.

Recommendation 4

I suggest that a future high-level segment of the annual substantive session of the Economic and Social Council be devoted to the question of addressing the root causes of conflict and the role of development in promoting long-term conflict prevention.

D. Role of the International Court of Justice

46. The International Court of Justice, as an indispensable element of the system of peaceful settlement of disputes established by the Charter of the United Nations, has contributed over the years in a significant way to the solution of international disputes through peaceful means. The Court contributes to the peaceful settlement and resolution of disputes by delivering judgements in contentious proceedings between States. Conflict resolution is assisted when a dispute is submitted to the Court by special agreement or by an application by one State. Judicial proceedings can be suspended if the parties wish to pursue a

negotiated solution. In addition, the Court contributes to the prevention of armed conflicts by facilitating the process of preventive diplomacy through rendering of advisory opinions on legal issues, an authority entrusted to the Court under Article 96 of the Charter. Through its judgements and advisory opinions, the Court has made a substantial contribution to the progressive development of international law and the identification of new trends that have been taking place in international law. The Secretary-General urges that States avail themselves of the Court to settle disputes.

47. The International Court of Justice is more active today than ever in its history. Disputes from all corners of the world are brought before the Court. I urge Member States to make even greater use of the International Court of Justice in the future, inter alia, in the prevention of territorial and maritime disputes.

Compulsory jurisdiction of the Court

48. By the end of 2000, 60 Member States had made declarations accepting compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, albeit in many cases with reservations which tend to limit or narrow the effect of the compulsory jurisdiction clause. I would like to reiterate my appeal to Member States which have not yet done so to consider accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. I would also like to urge that States, when adopting multilateral treaties under United Nations auspices, adopt clauses providing for disputes to be referred to the Court. The more States that accept compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, the higher the chances that potential disputes can be expeditiously resolved through peaceful means. The Security Council should also consider recommending, pursuant to Article 36 of the Charter of the United Nations, that States submit disputes to the Court.

Advisory competence of the Court

49. In "An Agenda for Peace", (see A/47/277-S/24111), my predecessor recommended that the Secretary-General be authorized, pursuant to Article 96, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations, to take advantage of the advisory competence of the Court, and that other United Nations organs that already enjoy such authorization, turn to the Court more frequently for advisory opinions. However, the General Assembly did not act on these recommendations and the Security Council has not requested any advisory opinion from the Court since 1993. Therefore, I urge both the Assembly and the Security Council to give renewed attention to the above recommendations, which I fully support, and to also consider authorizing other United Nations organs to request advisory opinions from the Court.

50. I would also like to remind States of the availability of the Secretary-General's Trust Fund to Assist States in the Settlement of Disputes Through the International Court of Justice, pursuant to which financial assistance may be provided to States for expenses incurred in connection with disputes submitted to the Court by way of special agreement.

Recommendation 5

I urge Member States to resort to the International Court of Justice earlier and more often to settle their disputes in a peaceful manner and to promote the rule of law in international relations.

Recommendation 6

I urge Member States to accept the general jurisdiction of the Court. When domestic structures prevent this, States should agree bilaterally or multilaterally to a comprehensive list of matters they are willing to present to the Court.

Recommendation 7

I urge Member States, when adopting multilateral treaties under United Nations auspices, to adopt clauses providing for disputes to be referred to the Court.

Recommendation 8

I recommend that the General Assembly authorize the Secretary-General and other United Nations organs to take advantage of the advisory competence of the Court, and that other United Nations organs that already enjoy such authorization resort to the Court more frequently for advisory opinions.

E. Role of the Secretary-General

51. The Secretary-General has had a role in the prevention of armed conflict since the earliest days of the Organization, through "quiet diplomacy" or "good offices of the Secretary-General". The mandate for

prevention is derived from Article 99 of the Charter of the United Nations, which provides that the Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.

52. Preventive diplomacy is an important part of my responsibilities, pursued through persuasion, confidence-building and information-sharing to find solutions to difficult problems at a very early stage. I see the increasing demand for my engagement in this type of preventive action as recognition that the Secretary-General can do much quietly and discreetly outside the limelight of public attention, even though the results may not always be visible or easily assessed.

53. There are three possible ways to enhance the traditional preventive role of the Secretary-General: first, by increasing the use of fact-finding and confidence-building missions, as well as the appointment of high-level envoys and the establishment of further regional liaison offices; second, by initiating joint preventive action by the Secretary-General and the Security Council; and third, by improving the capacity and resource base for preventive action in the Secretariat, which will be discussed later in the report.

Fact-finding missions

54. The General Assembly and Security Council have encouraged the use of more fact-finding missions as part of preventive diplomacy. Fact-finding missions can provide an objective account of the interests of the parties to a potential conflict, with the goal of identifying the measures that the United Nations system and Member States might take to help reconcile or resolve their differences.

55. Recently, I sent two inter-agency missions to West Africa. The first mission visited the Gambia in November 2000 for discussions with Government officials, political party leaders, representatives of civil society and members of the United Nations country team in order to explore with Gambian interlocutors possibilities for concrete United Nations assistance in addressing the country's multiple challenges with a view to preventing threats to peace and security in the country. The second mission, in March 2001, visited 11 countries in West Africa to take stock of the region's priority needs and challenges in the areas of peace and security, regional cooperation, humanitarian affairs and economic and social development, including the inter-linkages between them. I intend to use such interdisciplinary technical assessment missions more frequently in the future for preventive purposes, based on the full cooperation of the Member States concerned.

Confidence-building missions

56. In "An Agenda for Peace", my predecessor indicated his desire to undertake periodic consultations on confidence-building measures with parties to potential, current or past disputes and with regional organizations, offering such advisory assistance as the Secretariat can provide. That approach was endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution 47/120. In order to explore the scope for implementing that measure under the joint auspices of the United Nations and regional organizations, small missions could be sent to the capitals of regional States concerned, as well as to the headquarters of the principal regional organizations, to solicit their views on initiating cooperation at the working level on confidence-building in those regions.

57. The dispatch of confidence-building missions could be a practical step towards the implementation of preventive diplomacy initiatives in a regional context, and to underscore the importance that I attach to the pre-emptive involvement of the United Nations in unstable regions. I intend to explore this option for preventive diplomacy in my future discussions with heads of regional organizations.

Informal network of eminent persons

58. I intend to identify, after appropriate consultations, eminent persons to serve as an informal network for advice and action in support of my efforts to prevent and resolve armed conflicts. At times, members of the group might also be asked by me to engage in preventive diplomacy to contain or help to de-escalate emerging tensions.

Regional presence

59. The establishment of the United Nations Liaison Office at OAU headquarters in Addis Ababa in 1998 constituted a first step in promoting cooperation, including on conflict prevention strategies, with regional or subregional organizations. I intend to

explore the possibility of developing this concept, building on the precedent set in Addis Ababa.

60. In October 2000, I established the Inter-Agency Task Force on West Africa, which is the first initiative by the United Nations to develop a coordinated and comprehensive approach to the prevention of conflict and to create the appropriate environment for peace-building in a particular subregion. The approach allowed for the examination of issues from both the national and subregional perspectives. The Task Force also sought to integrate the efforts of the United Nations with those of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which collaborated in the conception and execution of the initiative and will be the major partner of the United Nations in the implementation of its recommendations. Among its recommendations is the establishment of a United Nations office in West Africa, to be headed by my special representative, that would enhance the Organization's capacity in the area of early warning, prevention, peace-building, reporting and policy development, as well as for collaboration with ECOWAS and other organizations in the subregion. Lessons from the West Africa initiative could provide a useful guide to United Nations conflict prevention efforts in other parts of the world.

Recommendation 9

With the support of Member States, I intend to enhance the traditional preventive role of the Secretary-General in four ways: first, by increasing the use of United Nations interdisciplinary fact-finding and confidence-building missions to volatile regions; second, by developing regional prevention strategies with our regional partners and appropriate United Nations organs and agencies; third, by establishing an informal network of eminent persons for conflict prevention; and fourth, by improving the capacity and resource base for preventive action in the Secretariat.

Part Two
Role of the United Nations system and other international actors

IV. Role and activities of United Nations departments, agencies and programmes in the prevention of armed conflict

A. Overview

61. Since assuming office, I have launched a number of initiatives to foster a culture of conflict prevention in the day-to-day work of the Secretariat as well as the wider United Nations system, based on the premise that sustainable development and long-term conflict prevention are mutually reinforcing objectives. Over the past five years, almost every part of the United Nations system, including the Bretton Woods institutions, has started to show an active interest in prevention and peace-building activities within the framework of their own respective mandates.

62. Just as the root causes of armed conflict may vary widely, the nature of appropriate preventive actions and the resources needed to implement them cover a broad spectrum. The dimension of timing is also very significant: some preventive measures that may be practical if taken at an early stage may become inappropriate or even totally unacceptable as the dispute deepens and the outbreak of armed conflict grows more likely. Indeed, it could be argued that by the time the situation reaches the agenda of the Security Council it may be already a matter of late — rather than early — prevention.

63. Conflict prevention can be addressed by a variety of approaches to achieve greater security and stability among States, including measures aimed at building mutual confidence, reducing threat-perceptions, eliminating the risk of surprise attack, discouraging competitive arms accumulation and creating an enabling environment for arms limitation and reduction agreements as well as the reduction of military expenditures. Such confidence and security-building measures can be pursued at various levels, bilateral, subregional, regional and multilateral — even unilateral measures are conceivable — and can be applied flexibly to conform to the political and security characteristics and requirements of specific situations.

64. Looking at the United Nations system as a whole, the capability for preventive action is extensive. There remains, however, a clear need for introducing a more systematic conflict prevention perspective into the multifaceted programmes and activities of the United Nations system so that they can contribute to the prevention of conflict by design and not by default. This, in turn, requires greater coherence and coordination in the United Nations system, with a specific focus on conflict prevention. It also requires an enabling environment in which United Nations staff are encouraged to develop a proactive, preventive mind set, and in which incentives and accountability for preventive measures are put in place.

B. Measures to promote coherence within the United Nations system

65. Over the past several years, efforts to promote coherence within the United Nations system in general have increased. The ingrained habits of earlier years, whereby there was little exchange of information between departments and agencies, are increasingly being replaced by a readiness to share assessments and participate in joint efforts to identify and implement suitable and practicable preventive actions. My emphasis here is to show how the United Nations family of departments, programmes, offices and agencies interact in the furtherance of the prevention of armed conflict.

Administrative Committee on Coordination

66. ACC is the designated authority for promoting coherence within the United Nations system. The heads of 25 funds, programmes and specialized agencies, as well as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Bretton Woods institutions, participate under my chairmanship to promote coordination within the system. In 1997, ACC recognized the importance of reinforcing the system's overall capacity for early warning. It also agreed to the importance of peace-building as a broad-based approach to conflict prevention, and stressed the need to address the political, military, humanitarian, human rights, environmental, economic, social, cultural and

demographic root causes of conflicts. In that light, I intend to engage ACC in a focused dialogue on what practical measures the United Nations system needs to take to promote greater coherence in its conflict prevention activities.

Executive Committees

67. In 1997, as part of my programme for reform, I established a structure of four executive committees at the Under-Secretary-General level to act as internal decision-making mechanisms for the five main areas of concern: peace and security; economic and social affairs; development cooperation; humanitarian affairs; and human rights as a cross-cutting theme. Within this structure, the Executive Committee on Peace and Security is well suited to deal with issues of system-wide preventive action. The Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs is the appropriate body to consider preventive and preparedness measures of a humanitarian nature, while preventive actions of a developmental nature are the natural purview of the United Nations Development Group (UNDG). The Executive Committee on Economic and Social Affairs gives upstream attention to root causes of conflict in terms of macroeconomic and social issues, governance and sustainable development. While most of their work to date has addressed issues other than conflict prevention, I intend to promote their more proactive use for that purpose in the future.

Interdepartmental Framework for Coordination

68. Established in 1994 to strengthen planning and coordination among peacekeeping, humanitarian and political functions, the Interdepartmental Framework for Coordination has been reoriented towards early warning and preventive action since 1998. A Framework team, composed of senior representatives of 14 departments, agencies, programmes and offices, including the World Bank, meets monthly to exchange information from their respective areas of competence and to assess the potential for armed conflict, complex emergencies or other circumstances that may provide a prima facie case for United Nations involvement. The Framework has undergone constant development and improvement in accordance with General Assembly resolution 51/242, and is now becoming an important mechanism for early formulation of preventive strategies within the United Nations system.

Country-level coherence

69. At the country level, the United Nations country team, led by the United Nations resident coordinator and in close cooperation with Governments, participates in an interdisciplinary process to develop the common country assessment, which has been completed in 70 countries, with another 40 in progress. The common country assessment analyses the national developmental situation and identifies key issues as a basis for advocacy and policy dialogue among the United Nations system and addresses national priorities and challenges, as well as regional concerns and initiatives. The common country assessment process leads directly to the United Nations Developmental Assistance Framework (UNDAF), which comprises the planning framework for developing programmes that encompass a coherent United Nations strategy for development assistance at the country level. The processes allow for key risk factors and prevention issues to be taken into consideration at an early stage in the programme cycle to promote common objectives and strategies of cooperation.

70. Recognizing that one of the most serious threats to sustainable development is violent conflict, both the common country assessment and UNDAF offer a significant opportunity to identify and implement peace-building or conflict prevention strategies at the country level. The United Nations Development Group, therefore, should ensure that prevention and peace-building concerns are integrated into those processes, a critical step in laying the foundation for development programming that is carried out with a prevention lens, and that will enable United Nations country teams in partnership with national Governments and civil society, to address prevention concerns jointly at the country level.

71. The promotion of coherence for conflict prevention is also enhanced through the system-wide training programme for United Nations staff, entitled "Early warning and preventive measures: building United Nations capacity", which is conducted by the United Nations Staff College. This programme provides a forum for greater mutual exchange of views and coordination between United Nations agencies and offices dealing with both the policy and practical aspects of preventive action. These workshops complement the training being given to United Nations country teams on the common country assessment and UNDAF processes.

72. Coherence within the United Nations system needs to be complemented by a consistent approach of Member States in their policies towards the United Nations. Too often, departments, agencies and programmes have found that proposals, having received political endorsements from Member States in one forum, fail to win support from the same States in other — particularly financial — forums. When such disjunctures occur, institutional responsibility for activities can become blurred, complicating the efforts of the United Nations to develop effective approaches to conflict prevention. On the part of the Organization, to minimize miscommunication on this issue, I will work to ensure that the United Nations system makes as clear as possible a case for its resource needs.

Recommendation 10

I encourage the governing bodies and other intergovernmental bodies of the United Nations funds and programmes and specialized agencies to consider how they could best integrate a conflict prevention perspective into their different mandated activities.

C. Political action

73. Within the United Nations system, the Secretary-General's functions in the political area are supported by the Department of Political Affairs, which works closely with other departments, offices and United Nations agencies in many aspects of this work. One of the Department's key responsibilities is to follow political developments throughout the world and identify potential conflicts in which the United Nations could play a preventive role. It is also the focal point for prevention and peace-building in the United Nations system. To assist in this new role, the Policy Planning Unit in the Department was established three years ago. In 1998, it also established a new internal mechanism, the Conflict Prevention Team, which provides an intra-departmental forum for the development of preventive action options. In its capacity as Convener of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security, the Department also promotes discussion at the interdepartmental and interagency level and decisions on options for prevention.

74. The Department of Political Affairs has a mandate to identify potential or actual conflicts in whose resolution the United Nations could play a useful role. The four geographical divisions within DPA are each charged with identifying potential crisis areas and providing early warning to the Secretary-General on developments and situations affecting peace and security. To that end, desk officers of the four DPA geographical divisions develop country profiles on their respective countries and then monitor developments over time. By following what is the natural and normal course of political, social and economic life, they are then well placed to detect changes and developments that may lead to crisis. With modern communications and online database services, there is a vast amount of information freely available to desk officers, but the Department still needs to develop further its capacity to use such information effectively and propose preventive action accordingly.

75. If established, the new unit for United Nations-system-wide policy and analysis envisaged in the recent report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (see A/55/977, paras. 301-307) could contribute to enhancing the Department's capacity in this field through its function as the secretariat of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security.

76. Timely application of preventive diplomacy has been recognized by the General Assembly as the most desirable and efficient means for easing tensions before they result in conflict. To that end, the Department is endeavouring to develop more effective ways of undertaking preventive diplomacy. These include fact-finding missions, visits by special envoys to sensitive regions, the exercise of the Secretary-General's good offices and the establishment of groups of friends of the Secretary-General in different regions, composed of a few closely interested Member States.

77. A considerable part of the preventive work of the Department of Political Affairs is done in support of special representatives and envoys of the Secretary-General, as well as field-based missions and offices. There are Department-supported missions currently in Afghanistan, Angola, Papua New Guinea, Burundi, Guatemala, the Great Lakes Region, Lebanon, the Occupied Territories and Somalia. Moreover, the Department of Political Affairs has established peace-building support offices in the Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Tajikistan. These offices work closely with government ministries,

national assemblies, political parties, civil society and other local actors to support national peace-building efforts.

78. The United Nations peace-building support offices can be instrumental, in supporting and closely collaborating with the country teams and non-resident United Nations agencies/offices, in developing multifaceted programmes that address many root causes of conflicts. Examples of this include improving support for democratic principles such as a fair role for the opposition, equitable access to public media, security sector reform, promoting tolerance and respect for human rights and providing technical assistance for the constitution and national institutions. In the future, the role of such offices could be extended, with the concurrence of Member States, to conflict-prone regions and countries.

79. The work undertaken by the United Nations to support democracy in its Member States contributes significantly to conflict prevention. Such assistance encompasses the provision of comprehensive support in the area of governance and the rule of law, including electoral assistance. It has been proven to play an important role in preventing the breakdown of democratic institutions and processes, particularly in societies in transition, or in new or restored democracies. Since its establishment, the United Nations Electoral Assistance Division, for example, in cooperation with UNDP, has provided assistance in more than 150 electoral processes to enhance the administrative capacity of Member States to hold credible, transparent and fair elections, and to assist in the consolidation of democratic institutions. It is axiomatic that sustainable development can only be secured when people participate freely and effectively in decision-making processes.

80. The Department of Political Affairs is currently endeavouring to improve its early warning and analysis capacities; to improve the quality of its staff by training; to improve its coordination and cooperation with other departments, funds and agencies of the United Nations; to improve its cooperation with Governments and with regional organizations; to improve its outreach to research institutes and competent NGOs; to use the Trust Fund for Preventive Action to support the fact-finding and facilitation missions and other activities aimed at defusing potential conflicts and preventing existing disputes from escalating into conflicts. It is also strengthening its capacity to carry out its role as focal point for post-conflict peace-building in the United Nations system and to support the increasing number of United Nations peace-building operations, in partnership with other United Nations actors.

Recommendation 11

I urge the General Assembly to provide the Department of Political Affairs, in its capacity as focal point for conflict prevention, with adequate resources to carry out its responsibilities for conflict prevention and peace-building in the United Nations system.

D. Peacekeeping operations

81. While all peacekeeping operations could be said to have a preventive function in that they are intended to avert the outbreak or recurrence of conflict, their preventive role has been particularly clear where they have been deployed before the beginning of an armed internal or international conflict. This has taken place three times over the past decade, with the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) and a succession of operations in Haiti. Apart from the shared feature that their host countries were not involved in a violent internal or international conflict, the common features included the possibility, or even the likelihood, of armed conflict, consent of the States concerned to the peacekeeping operations as the form of prevention, and the authorization of the operation by the Security Council.

82. The rarity of preventive deployment suggests that the international community has been reluctant to expend the political and financial capital required for a peace operation without the clear case for deployment that is made by open conflict. However, while success in a preventive mission is by definition hard to measure with precision, it is clear that there are circumstances in which preventive deployment of a peacekeeping operation can save lives and promote stability. The fact that conflict did not erupt within the host country during the above deployments strongly suggests that a United Nations preventive deployment operation, as a symbol of the international community's interest and as

a source of leverage to promote its aims, may make a crucial contribution.

83. Such experience shows that it may be necessary to maintain a preventive deployment for an extended period where the threats to security are ongoing, and that the achievements of these operations may need to be supported through longer-term follow-up peace-building action by the international community. In preventive deployment as in other forms of peacekeeping, a multidimensional approach will be required to address the root causes of conflict. The reform and restructuring of local law enforcement services; the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants; mine awareness and mine clearance; and the development of human-rights and democratic institutions may all be essential parts of these efforts. It is also clear that, as with all peacekeeping, the ability of preventive deployment operations to contribute to lasting peace depends ultimately upon the readiness of the parties to take advantage of the opportunity before them.

84. In the light of the close interrelationship between peacekeeping and peace-building, I welcome the recent presidential statement of the Security Council which reiterates the value of including, as appropriate, peace-building elements in the mandates of peacekeeping operations. In the light of the civil conflicts typical of the post-cold war world, particular emphasis needs to be given in this regard to civilian police, who have played an increasingly important preventive role in United Nations peacekeeping. Their contribution has been to restore public support to the local forces of law and order, whether by training the local police, monitoring their performance or assisting with the restructuring and reform of police institutions.

85. In this context, some steps have already been taken by the international community to strengthen the foundations for civilian police engagement in peacekeeping. In 2000, the General Assembly provided some additional resources for support structures at Headquarters, while the Secretariat has sought to strengthen the policy framework for these efforts with the preparation of principles and guidelines for United Nations civilian police operations. However, further efforts are required in a number of areas which are the subject of detailed analysis in my current report on the implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/977).

Recommendation 12

I encourage Member States and the Security Council to make more active use of preventive deployments before the onset of conflict, as appropriate.

Recommendation 13

I urge the Security Council to support peace-building components within peacekeeping operations, as relevant, and to strengthen Secretariat capacity in this regard, inter alia, through the measures outlined in my report on the implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/977).

E. Disarmament

86. The evolution of disarmament norms is a continuous process, and there are still some areas, such as missile development and small arms, which lack an international normative framework. Disarmament treaties and conventions contribute to the prevention of armed conflict through the promotion of the rule of international law. Wider accession to such multilateral treaties and their implementation with verification is essential for nations to feel confident that their security is assured.

87. Exchange of information and other forms of transparency in armaments and on military matters in general can help minimize the risk of misunderstanding or miscalculation, and can thereby contribute to greater trust and more stable relations among States. They can also serve as early warning mechanisms as well as encourage or lead to restraints in weapons acquisition by helping to identify the excessive or destabilizing accumulation of armaments. The Department for Disarmament Affairs operates and maintains two global transparency instruments: the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and the United Nations standardized instrument for reporting military expenditures.

88. I have stated in my Millennium Report (A/54/2000) that small arms proliferation is not merely a security issue; it is also an issue of human rights and of development. The proliferation of small arms sustains and exacerbates armed conflicts, endangers

peacekeepers and humanitarian workers, undermines respect for international humanitarian law, threatens legitimate but weak Governments, and benefits terrorists and the perpetrators of organized crime. Measures to prevent the misuse and illicit transfers of small arms and to address the root causes of the demand for small arms would greatly contribute to the prevention of conflict.

89. Practical disarmament measures have gained wide recognition, particularly "weapons for development" projects aimed at the retrieval and collection of illegal weapons in exchange for community-based development incentives. In addition to the retrieval of illicit arms from the civilian population, as well as of weapons in possession of former combatants, the destruction and disposal of such stocks can help to prevent conflict or its recurrence by reducing the volume in circulation and the easy availability of such arms, which are often recycled from one conflict to another.

90. In the field of practical disarmament measures, the Department for Disarmament Affairs works with the Group of Interested States, which was established in March 1998 on the basis of a General Assembly resolution to promote practical disarmament measures, particularly to support peace-building efforts in post-conflict situations, while UNDP has worked since 1998 to design and support weapons collection, management and destruction projects through the UNDP Trust Fund on Small Arms. As a basis for these activities, fact-finding missions are undertaken by the Department, normally with the support of the Department of Political Affairs, UNDP and others, before project proposals are finalized. Field-level small arms assessments, which help to develop local and donor strategies and project level interventions, are also continuously carried out by UNDP within the development context.

91. The Department for Disarmament Affairs and UNDP are engaged in assisting Member States, upon their request, to address the problems posed by the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, particularly in the context of peace-building in post-conflict situations. In June 1998, I established a mechanism, Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA), to harmonize all actions on small arms within the United Nations system, designating the Department as the focal point of the mechanism. CASA includes all departments and agencies with an interest in one or more aspects of the multidimensional threat posed by the proliferation of small arms and their misuse. The Department is also providing substantive support for the first United Nations Conference on Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects to be held at United Nations Headquarters in July 2001, aimed at establishing a programme of action to curb the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons.

92. The Department for Disarmament Affairs, together with UNDP, played a lead role in designing a "weapons for development" project, in cooperation with UNDP, for implementation in the district of Gramsch, Albania, following a request from the Albanian Government for assistance in retrieving small arms and light weapons illegally acquired by the civil population during disturbances in 1997. Similar projects have since been initiated in other districts of Albania. The concept of "weapons for development" has also attracted attention and interest in other regions. The de-weaponization of conflict-prone societies is therefore an important conflict prevention exercise.

93. In addition to conflict-prone societies, the de-weaponization of post-conflict societies is equally important to prevent a relapse into conflict. It is important in this respect that the international community assist with adequate resources in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration efforts. The World Bank is playing an important role in this field, by providing technical assistance on the preparation of comprehensive disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, assisting with the reintegration of ex-combatants into civil society and advising on governance and public expenditure issues. Humanitarian partners also play a key role in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration exercises. For instance, since the early 1990s the World Food Programme (WFP) has been a primary partner in United Nations supported demobilization programmes (in Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Eritrea). Experience demonstrates the importance of an early involvement by humanitarian partners in the planning of demobilization and reintegration programmes, given the importance of humanitarian and rehabilitation assistance during the implementation of demobilization and reintegration programmes and their aftermath. Experience in Liberia and Sierra Leone offered a sobering example of how failure to provide adequate

resources for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration efforts can contribute to the renewal of violence.

Recommendation 14

I encourage greater transparency by Member States on military matters, including broader participation in the United Nations instruments relating to arms transparency and military expenditure. I also call on the General Assembly and other United Nations disarmament bodies to strengthen existing disarmament-related early warning and transparency mechanisms, particularly with regard to small arms and light weapons.

Recommendation 15

In order to prevent the recurrence of conflict, I encourage the Security Council to include, as appropriate, a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration component in the mandates of United Nations peacekeeping and peace-building operations.

F. Human rights action

94. Sustainable and long-term prevention of armed conflict must include a focus on strengthening respect for human rights and addressing core issues of human rights violations, wherever these occur. Efforts to prevent armed conflict should promote a broad range of human rights, including not only civil and political rights but also economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development.

95. In its resolution 48/141, the General Assembly requested the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to play an active role in preventing the continuation of human rights violations throughout the world. The report of the High Commissioner to the Commission on Human Rights at its fifty-sixth session (E/CN.4/2000/12) stressed the importance of strengthening preventive strategies in many different areas of human rights.

96. In an effort to strengthen human rights protection capacities and thus contribute to conflict prevention, OHCHR is implementing over 50 technical cooperation projects, in collaboration with States, United Nations agencies and regional partners, to help Governments, national institutions and NGOs enhance their capacity in the area of human rights. These activities and education programmes strengthen the rule of law and build the human rights capacity of Member States. Information from human rights special procedures and treaty bodies, as well as information from OHCHR field presences, should be better integrated in the development of preventive strategies. Field offices of OHCHR also have a role to play in preventive processes.

97. The International Criminal Court (ICC) will have a vital role to play in deterring the most flagrant violations of human rights through the enforcement of international criminal responsibility. Pending the establishment of the court, judicial bodies, such as the international tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, as well as jurisdiction established under human rights treaties, can also contribute to conflict prevention by enforcing individual accountability for such crimes and deterring future violations. Of particular importance in this regard are the ratification and implementation of human rights treaties by Member States and the ratification of or accession to the statute of the International Criminal Court.

98. From 31 August to 7 September 2001, the World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance will discuss many of the issues linked to racial and ethnic conflicts, and I hope that it will make concrete recommendations, including on early warning systems, confidence-building measures and structural and institutional support mechanisms to prevent the deterioration of ethnic tensions into armed conflict.

Recommendation 16

I call on the Security Council and the General Assembly to make full use of information and analyses emanating from United Nations human rights mechanisms and bodies in its efforts to prevent armed conflicts.

Recommendation 17

I urge Member States to ratify or accede to human rights treaties and the statute of the International Criminal Court, if they have not already done so.

G. Developmental assistance

99. Development assistance cannot by itself prevent or end conflict. It can, however, facilitate the creation of opportunities and the political, economic and social spaces within which indigenous actors can identify, develop and use the resources necessary to build a peaceful, equitable and just society. Experience also shows that development will be sustainable only if development strategies incorporate concern for their impact on tensions that could lead to violence and promote measures to counteract such tensions. Wars and conflicts inflict loss of life and destruction, and put the affected countries further behind in their development, marginalizing them from the global economy.

100. Development assistance provided by the United Nations system needs to focus on decreasing the key structural risk factors that fuel violent conflict, such as inequity — by addressing disparities among identity groups; inequality — by addressing policies and practices that institutionalize discrimination; justice — by promoting the rule of law, effective and fair law enforcement and administration of justice, and, as appropriate, equitable representation in the institutions that serve the rule of law; and insecurity — by strengthening accountable and transparent governance and human security. In that light, there is value in United Nations resident coordinators exploring, where appropriate, and in cooperation with Governments, the setting up of a conflict prevention theme group mechanism at the country level to ensure the joint development and coherence of development strategies to address key risk factors.

101. In addition, United Nations development cooperation should aim to strengthen society's capacity for coping, managing and resolving tensions before violent conflict erupts. This includes providing assistance in strengthening governance in areas undergoing development that will help to address unstable situations, the judiciary, traditional conflict resolution mechanisms, the cultivation of political will and leadership for peaceful resolution of disputes, the development of conflict resolution skills and practices, consensus-building and public policy dialogue, and the promotion of participatory and inclusive decision-making on central economic, social and political issues. All development policies, programmes and projects need to be looked at through a conflict prevention lens so that socio-economic inequities and inequalities do not give rise to violent conflict. The conflict prevention lens approach needs to be incorporated into the common country assessment/UNDAF process.

102. At the request of Governments, the UNDP portfolio for governance and rule of law activities in countries prone to conflict now comprise more than half of UNDP programmes and activities, with an annual budget exceeding US$ 1.2 billion. In addition, a number of UNDP programmes support regional cooperation on cross-border issues (e.g., in the Tumen River Basin in East Asia) that have a clear conflict prevention impact. In post-conflict situations, UNDP area development programmes (e.g., Cambodia and Guatemala), small arms (e.g., Mali, El Salvador, Albania) and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes (e.g., Mozambique, Guatemala) are aimed at preventing the reoccurrence of armed conflict.

103. A new generation of development projects is specifically focused on conflict prevention. For example, several UNDP-led projects in Romania, Bulgaria, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Yugoslavia and Ukraine aim to create and strengthen early warning, conflict analysis and resolution capacities within government and civil society at the national and regional levels. The UNDP project entitled "Preventive development in the south of Kyrgyzstan" is another pilot project which seeks to enhance government capacities to undertake preventive measures as part of the process of nation-building, and identifies the importance of a regional approach to successfully effect preventive development. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)-led Horn of Africa Task Force strongly recommends the creation of capacity in the region for early warning, conflict prevention and resolution, under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and OAU, as part of its Regional Food Security Programme. The UNDP project entitled "Capacity-building for the OAU mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution" is another example that addresses the issue from a regional perspective.

104. UNDP and the Department of Economic and Social Affairs are also collaborating with over 10 African conflict resolution institutions and practitioners to develop training material in four areas: conflict

analysis and early response development, skills development for conflict transformation, conflict-sensitive approaches to development and national capacity-building in conflict management.

105. In recent years, there has been increased cooperation between the United Nations system and the Bretton Woods institutions, which have openly acknowledged that conflict seriously affects their development goals, and that understanding and working to prevent conflict should be considered a part of their mandates. This new approach has manifested itself in the establishment of a post-conflict unit in the World Bank and the new Operational Policy on Development Cooperation and Conflict adopted by the World Bank in January of this year. The World Bank's economic research on civil war is another area which has yielded important operational recommendations, which if implemented could reduce the risks of conflict.

106. As each organization increases its activities in post-conflict peace-building, which is an aspect of conflict prevention, the relationship has deepened. Examples of such cooperation can be found in East Timor and Haiti, among other places. However, contacts between the respective headquarters in this field have been limited and are only beginning to develop. Such contacts, especially at the working level, can assist both organizations in increasing their understanding of the situations they are both monitoring. Within their mandates and as appropriate, each organization should participate in the prevention structures of the other organizations. The World Bank's acceptance of the United Nations offer to participate in the Executive Committee on Peace and Security is a good example of this.

107. Contacts between the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which are at a more preliminary stage, need to be developed further. For example, the United Nations and IMF could work together to ensure that lending policies do not exacerbate social tensions and contribute to the eruption of violent conflicts. Several areas in which IMF plays a central role — particularly public spending — can affect the political situation in a positive or negative manner in the context of broader efforts for conflict prevention. In order to enhance coordination and interaction between the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions in conflict prevention and peace-building, the establishment of a consultative mechanism at the Headquarters level should be considered.

Recommendation 18

I urge Member States to avail themselves of the advisory services and technical assistance offered by UNDP and other United Nations development actors that aim to strengthen national capacities for addressing structural risk factors.

Recommendation 19

I call on donor countries to provide additional resources to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations Development Group to respond effectively to requests for assistance by Member States, to strengthen structural conflict prevention capacities and to facilitate South-South cooperation in this field.

H. Humanitarian action

1. General considerations

108. While humanitarian action clearly plays a critical role in alleviating the plight of affected civilian populations in crises, humanitarian actors can also contribute to conflict prevention by implementing targeted projects to avert recurrence of conflicts. In countries and regions where there is a risk of persecution, violence and forced displacement, humanitarian agencies have a responsibility to develop an effective capacity for data collection and analysis so as to identify those countries that are at risk of being affected by humanitarian crises.

109. Preventing the internal displacement of civilians can play an important and at times pivotal role in the prevention of conflict. Unemployed and disaffected men and youth who are internally displaced, in particular those in internally displaced persons camps, are very vulnerable to recruitments (often forcible) by belligerents. By ensuring that civilians are able to remain at home and continue with their livelihoods and education, we can reduce the risk that they would become pawns in military action, thereby contributing to further conflict. Advocacy for the protection of civilians should be directed not only at the belligerents but also at members of the international community to take appropriate preventive action.

110. In ongoing humanitarian crises, advocacy and public information services conducted by the humanitarian community, along with consolidated appeals, are the primary examples of humanitarian action to raise awareness of a particular conflict and its consequences. Often, humanitarian activities create the only forum for divided groups to meet and to communicate — in itself a useful process for any future reconciliation. Humanitarian agencies have negotiated the creation of humanitarian spaces, routes or zones that have brought about a limited ceasefire to allow humanitarian assistance to reach vulnerable groups.

111. The support of Member States in the provision of protection to United Nations personnel working in insecure environments is of high importance. In this regard, the ratification of the 1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel should be a matter of priority to all Member States that have not yet done so. It is also worth noting that humanitarian actors are often present in the field throughout the sequence of situations leading up to a crisis. This field-based presence gives them the unique benefit of first-hand information and analysis, which should be brought to the attention of the Security Council to take advantage of the opportunity for early preventive action.

Recommendation 20

I call on the Security Council to invite the Office of the United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator to brief its members regularly on situations where there is a substantial risk of a humanitarian emergency. I also urge the Council to call for and support the implementation of preventive protection and assistance activities by United Nations agencies in situations where there is a risk of a humanitarian crisis. I request United Nations humanitarian agencies to integrate such preventive activities increasingly into their work in pre-crisis situations. In this regard, I call on Member States to provide increased resources for the work of these agencies in this field.

2. Specific aspects

112. The role of United Nations agencies and programmes in preventing conflict falls within their work in the four areas of food security, refugees, health and children, as described below.

(a) Food security and emergency food aid

113. Hunger and conflict are closely linked, in that in both internal and intra-state wars the control or disruption of food sources and supplies is often used as a means of waging war and/or as a means of starving out civilians from the opposing groups (e.g., Angola, Sudan, Mozambique, Sierra Leone). Food production and supplies are among the first casualties of a conflict situation. In addition, displacement prevents people from engaging in normal food production/acquisition activities.

114. When there is conflict there is an immediate increase in food insecurity, which makes the task of overcoming the root causes of conflict more difficult. Recent conflicts and farm invasions in southern African countries and the struggles between pastoralists and sedentary farmers in eastern Africa underline the importance of access to land-based resources by the poor as a basis for peace and sustainable development. Similarly, land concentration, coupled with poverty in Latin America, is one of the key issues underlying long-term conflict in that region. Where the need to meet family food requirements forces people to deplete natural resources or rely on degraded natural resources, WFP is seeking ways to provide food aid to support natural resource development activities and other land and resource management interventions. This can help prevent conflicts that are based on or related to tensions over limited natural resources.

115. Transboundary water supply could be a point of conflict or an opportunity for cooperation. There is evidence to suggest that good information on hydrology, among other things, has a role to play in the prevention of conflicts over water resources. FAO is currently assisting an extensive range of international basin organizations and regional organizations, such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), in the formulation and implementation of joint water resource management strategies. Examples include the Nile Basin Initiative, the Lake Chad Basin Commission and Niger Basin Authority. FAO also assists in the development of institutions for the management of common pool natural resources oriented towards reconciling conflicting interests in watersheds between upstream and downstream water

users or in fish-producing areas between artisanal and commercial fishermen.

116. Although not always highlighted as direct objectives in WFP programming, preventive aspects are inherent in WFP work both in relief and development. WFP emergency programmes contribute to (a) (re-)establishing dialogue among (potentially) conflicting groups/parties; and (b) (re-)establishing a climate of confidence and trust among parties and towards the international humanitarian community. Road opening and transport infrastructure rehabilitation, at times accompanied by humanitarian mine action, may also have lasting positive effects by facilitating the free circulation of people and goods, the reopening of markets and contacts among separated communities across conflict lines.

117. By ensuring that its resources are targeted at vulnerable and marginalized groups and areas and by meeting their basic food needs, WFP can make an important contribution to social and political stability. Food aid can also be a catalyst for rehabilitation and development.

118. WFP and FAO are also important actors in the collection, analysis and dissemination of data and information concerning food insecurity and the related potential threats to vulnerable people and groups. The FAO *State of Food Insecurity* presents the numbers and proportions of the food insecure at the global and country levels. The Inter-Agency Working Group on Food Insecurity and Vulnerability Information and Mapping Systems seeks to improve the quality of information on the incidence, nature and causes of chronic food insecurity and vulnerability. The Global Information and Early Warning System assesses and reports the food supply situation and outlook (FAO) and the food relief needs (WFP) at the country level. The analysis of these indicators allows WFP and FAO to develop strategies that enable them to target the most vulnerable. Since 1999, WFP and FAO have been increasingly engaged in a process of sharing information with other partners, in particular through the United Nations Interdepartmental Framework for Coordination. An early warning function is normally in existence in all countries where WFP operates, often in association with Governments, United Nations agencies and other partners.

(b) Refugees

119. The interest and involvement of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in prevention have been recognized in resolutions of the General Assembly, which has welcomed the commitment of the High Commissioner to explore and undertake activities aimed at preventing conditions that give rise to refugee outflows. The General Assembly has also called upon the High Commissioner to actively explore new options for preventive strategies that are consistent with protection principles.

120. Experience has demonstrated that the presence of UNHCR in zones of armed conflict has, in some situations, enabled the organization to intercede on behalf of people whose lives and liberty are at risk, to curb the worst excesses of the warring parties and to encourage other members of the international community to take appropriate political action. A vigorous public information, media relations and advocacy strategy, combined with more discrete diplomatic representations, can assist UNHCR in maximizing its preventative impact in such situations. In countries of asylum, the separation of armed elements from bona fide refugees and the effective maintenance of public order in refugee-populated areas also have an important role to play in preventing armed conflicts from arising and escalating.

121. It has become increasingly clear that the comparative advantage of UNHCR with regard to the prevention of refugee-producing situations is to be found in situations where armed conflicts have come to an end or diminished in intensity. Since the return of large numbers of refugees and internally displaced people to post-conflict situations can often act as a destabilizing factor, particularly when such returns take place rapidly, in large numbers and under duress, UNHCR efforts to consolidate the durable solution of repatriation by linking humanitarian assistance to longer-term development can greatly contribute to the averting of armed conflict. The potential for lasting political solutions will always be greater when returnees and others are able to become productive members of their own society.

(c) Health

122. The universal relevance of the issue of health care gives it salience as a means for preventive action. Health interventions, such as national immunization

days, have opened avenues for dialogue and reconciliation, and their relevance should be considered not only in war-affected countries but also in conflict-prone zones. In Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, the Sudan, Afghanistan and Tajikistan, ceasefires and days of tranquility, negotiated between United Nations agencies and all parties in conflict, are key to polio eradication. For example, with the support of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the World Health Organization (WHO), in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a breakthrough was achieved in 1999, when campaigns against polio vaccinated 8.2 million of the country's 10 million children under five. Following widely publicized appeals by the Secretary-General, fighting stopped in nine tenths of the country. Such immunization campaigns in United Nations negotiated days of tranquility can open windows of opportunity to dialogue between the different sides, and at critical moments can help to prevent the outbreak or escalation of armed conflict.

123. In sub-Saharan Africa, HIV/AIDS poses a particularly grave threat to economic, social and political stability. It threatens not only individual citizens but the institutions that define and defend the character of a society. There exists a potential risk for a rapid expansion of the HIV/AIDS epidemic throughout other parts of the world. During 2000, the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council have all given this issue close attention. The forthcoming special session of the General Assembly on HIV/AIDS offers a particularly important opportunity to mobilize the international community towards more effective strategy for the prevention of HIV/AIDS and its potential destabilizing effects.

Recommendation 21

I urge the General Assembly at its forthcoming special session on HIV/AIDS to examine how strategies for the prevention of HIV/AIDS can be broadened to take into account the important contribution that they can make to conflict prevention, particularly in seriously affected regions, such as sub-Saharan Africa.

(d) Children

124. Young people with limited education and few employment opportunities often provide fertile recruiting ground for parties to a conflict. Their lack of hope for the future can fuel disaffection with society and make them susceptible to the blandishments of those who advocate armed conflict. This problem can be especially acute in countries that have a "youth bulge", a population comprised of a large number of youth compared to other age groups. Such countries have often experienced higher amounts of political unrest, including violent conflict. Addressing the needs and aspirations of adolescence is therefore an important aspect of long-term prevention strategy. In addition, youth can also be an important resource for peace and conflict prevention, e.g. youth movements for peace and meetings of adolescents across perceived ethnic boundaries. UNICEF utilizes education in its programmes as a key strategy for preventing conflict and intolerance and securing conditions conducive to peace. Access by marginalized groups to education is another priority. Through programmes of education for peace, UNICEF seeks to foster a culture of peace, based on respect for human rights, tolerance, participation and solidarity.

125. Among factors that undermine a country's capacity to prevent disputes from turning into violent conflict are the scars left from previous bouts of violent conflict. The most poignant of these scars are those inflicted on children. The violence against — and witnessed by — children can incline entire generations towards the violent settlement of disputes. The cycles of violence generated by such abuses can also undermine whatever political will or leadership might exist for the peaceful settlement of disputes and steeply increase the cost to the international community of settling disputes.

126. My Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, UNHCR, UNICEF, OHCHR and many other intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations are working to alleviate the plight of children affected by armed conflict and to ensure their sustainable rehabilitation, which can contribute significantly towards a country's capacity for preventing the recurrence of violent conflict.

127. War-affected children should always be an explicit priority in efforts to prevent the initial occurrence of conflict as well as its recurrence, including in mechanisms to provide justice and reconciliation in the aftermath of conflicts. Through such means as the recently deployed child protection advisers, peacekeeping operations can also assist in the

rehabilitation of children and thus in preventing the recurrence of conflict. The experience of UNICEF in the social and economic reintegration of demobilized child soldiers, such as in the Sudan, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, demonstrates that such activities are critical for preventing the recurrence of conflicts.

128. At its special session on children to be held in New York from 19 to 21 September 2001, the General Assembly will discuss issues related to children in situations of potential and actual armed conflict, and will outline appropriate strategies and actions for their protection.

Recommendation 22

I urge Member States to support policies and resources that target the needs of children and adolescents in situations of potential conflict, since this is an important aspect of long-term conflict prevention strategy.

I. Media and public information

129. Mass media has the power to shape and mobilize public opinion and is often manipulated by the conflicting parties to incite violence and to provoke armed conflicts. Control over mass media and the flow of information can be a decisive factor in shaping the outcome of a conflict. If the media is to be a restraining factor for the prevention of armed conflicts, an environment must exist that allows competing views to appear. Respect for the freedom of expression and the press is an important element of prevention.

130. The United Nations is often in a position to draw the attention of the international community to emerging conflicts through press statements, radio and television broadcasts, the Internet and public outreach activities, as long as this does not hinder efforts at quiet diplomacy. In particular, the direct and mission-based broadcasts of the United Nations, in concert with those of relevant international, regional and national broadcasters, can be used to counter hate messages in certain crisis situations and to reach target audiences in conflict-prone countries. There is also a need to promote "preventive journalism". Journalists and media organizations could be helpful in trying to identify specific situations before they erupt into armed conflict. United Nations departments and agencies should therefore incorporate public information into the prevention strategies being developed in their respective areas of competence. The public information activities of the United Nations should also incorporate preventive action into their programmes.

131. Most United Nations peacekeeping and political missions have some degree of public information capacity, and some of them have full-fledged information offices and media outlets to disseminate public information and respond to egregious media distortions and public misunderstanding of their operations. The presence of the United Nations may have a moderating role in the sense that it provides impartial information to the local population, and may help to reduce tension between the conflicting parties and prevent the resumption of armed conflicts.

Recommendation 23

I urge the General Assembly to provide additional resources for United Nations direct and mission-based broadcasts to counter hate messages and to promote media development in conflict-prone situations. I intend to reflect this priority in future budgetary submissions, as appropriate.

J. Gender equality

132. Ever since the First World Conference on Women, held in Mexico in 1975, there has been recognition that women have an important role to play in the promotion of peace. The Platform of Action adopted by the Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing in 1995, and the agreed conclusions of the Commission on the Status of Women of 1998 further called on Governments and international organizations to protect women in armed conflict and support their participation in all aspects of peace support, including conflict prevention and post-conflict resolution and reconstruction. An essential aspect of conflict prevention is the strengthening of the rule of law, and within that the protection of women's human rights achieved through a focus on gender equality in constitutional, legislative, judicial and electoral reform.

133. In its resolution 1325 (2000), the Security Council recognized the differential impact of armed conflict on women and the need for effective institutional arrangements to guarantee their protection. The Council further recognized that the full participation of women in peace processes can

contribute significantly to the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security. It also expressed its willingness to incorporate a gender perspective into peace operations, and called for measures that ensure the protection of and respect for human rights of women and girls, particularly as they relate to the constitution, the electoral system, the police and the judiciary. The resolution also called on me to expand the role of women in peace operations, to ensure that there be a gender component in field operations, and to provide Member States with training guidelines on the protection, rights and particular needs of women and on HIV/AIDS awareness in their national training programmes for military and civilian police.

134. The work programme of my Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women and of the Division for the Advancement of Women has contributed to findings and research in the area of women's role in peace-making. The threats to all citizens, especially women, in conflict situations have underscored the need to incorporate gender analysis into early warning activities and the opportunity for preventive measures to strengthen women's protection. For a number of years, the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Political Affairs, UNICEF, UNHCR, UNDP and the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) have supported the incorporation of gender perspectives in peace support operations, through encouraging the participation of women in conflict prevention actions and providing assistance to women in conflict and post-conflict situations.

135. In order to ensure collaboration and coordination throughout the United Nations system in the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), I have established a task force on women, peace and security. The task force, which is comprised of representatives from 15 United Nations entities, is in the process of developing an action plan on the implementation of the Security Council resolution. The action plan will outline initiatives to be taken by different parts of the United Nations system in relation to each of the operational paragraphs in the Security Council resolution. The invitation in the Security Council resolution to carry out a study on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, the role of women in peace-building and the gender dimensions of peace processes and conflict resolution provides a particularly important opportunity for me to deepen the understanding of gender perspectives in conflict prevention and provide concrete recommendations for moving forward. In this context, Member States need to provide greater support to the efforts of the United Nations system to assist local women's peace initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict prevention, and to involve women in peace-building efforts, in accordance with Security Council resolution 1325 (2000).

Recommendation 24

I encourage the Security Council, in accordance with its resolution 1325 (2000), to give greater attention to gender perspectives in its conflict prevention and peace-building efforts.

K. Drug control and crime prevention

136. There is a need to address illegal business activities that fuel the fires of conflict. The United Nations needs to mobilize its considerable field presence in identifying and stemming the tide of illegal business activity. The activities of the Office of Drug Control and Crime Prevention could contribute to the prevention of armed conflict in two main areas: first, activities to counter transnational crime, particularly the illicit trafficking of drugs and money-laundering, diminish the fund-raising capacities of potential insurgents/aggressors; second, activities to curtail illicit trafficking in firearms reduce the availability of such weapons and thereby the readiness of antagonists to engage in armed conflict. In their work at the field level, United Nations country teams should give greater attention to the prevention of crime, drug trafficking and illicit trade in small arms. It is particularly important that as many Member States as possible should ratify the Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocols, including the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children.

Recommendation 25

I call on the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and other relevant United Nations bodies to provide increased resources for the activities of the Office of Drug Control and Crime Prevention, particularly in the

prevention of transnational crime, drug trafficking and illicit trade in small arms.

V. Interaction between the United Nations and other international actors in the prevention of armed conflict

A. Regional arrangements

137. Regional organizations can contribute to conflict prevention in a number of specific ways. Such organizations build trust among States through the frequency of interaction, and have a greater grasp of the historical background of a conflict. Because of their proximity, regional organizations could, for example, provide a local forum for efforts to decrease tensions and promote and facilitate a comprehensive regional approach to cross-border issues.

138. Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations provides a broad mandate for interaction between the United Nations and regional organizations in conflict prevention. To promote cooperation within this framework, since 1994 the United Nations and regional organizations have instituted a practice of holding biennial meetings.

139. In 1998, the Third High-level United Nations-Regional Organizations Meeting focused on the theme "Cooperation for conflict prevention". For the first time, we agreed on a framework for cooperation in conflict prevention based on 13 modalities. Over the past two years, meaningful progress has taken place with regard to coordination and consultation, better flows of information, visits of staff at the working level between the different headquarters, joint training of staff and joint experts meeting on specific cases for conflict prevention.

140. The Fourth High-level United Nations-Regional Organizations Meeting, held in February 2001, focused attention on the complementary theme "Cooperation for peace-building" in both a pre-conflict and a post-conflict environment. The Meeting adopted a document entitled "Framework for cooperation in peace-building" (S/2001/138, annex I), in which the United Nations and regional organizations agreed on guiding principles for cooperation in this field as well as on possible cooperative activities, such as establishing peace-building units, sending joint assessment missions to the field, developing repertories of best practices and lessons learned and the joint holding of pledging conferences. In its recent open debate on peace-building, the Security Council welcomed the results of the Meeting.

141. In recent years, a number of regional organizations have created innovative institutional capacities for early warning and conflict prevention. In 1993, OAU created the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. In 1999, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) established a similar mechanism. The Organization of American States (OAS) designs long-term conflict prevention strategies through its Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, while the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit of the European Union (EU) serves as its focal point for conflict prevention and peace-building. The EU is also in the process of developing a European programme for conflict prevention that will be considered by the European Council at Göteborg in June 2001. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), through its Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities and its Conflict Prevention Centre, also has an important capacity in the field. Other organizations are in the process of developing similar institutional capacities.

142. In addition, a number of cooperative arrangements ensure coordination and cooperation between the United Nations system and regional organizations and could be used for conflict prevention in a more targeted fashion in the future. The United Nations Office at Geneva, the Council of Europe, the EU and OSCE, for example, have established the practice of holding annual meetings to exchange views and coordinate efforts between them on matters related to their region. Another such example is the establishment of the United Nations liaison office at OAU headquarters in Addis Ababa in 1998.

Recommendation 26

I call on Member States to support the follow-up processes launched by the Third and Fourth High-level United Nations-Regional Organizations Meetings in the field of conflict prevention and peace-building, and to provide increased resources for the development of regional capacities in these fields.

B. Non-governmental organizations and civil society

143. Article 71 of the Charter of the United Nations recognizes the contributions that non-governmental organizations can provide to the goals of the United Nations. NGOs can contribute to the maintenance of peace and security by offering non-violent avenues for addressing the root causes of conflict at an early stage. Moreover, NGOs can be an important means of conducting track II diplomacy when Governments and international organizations are unable to do so. Such was the case in Mozambique and Burundi, where the Community of Sant'Egidio offered an impartial environment for divided groups to communicate and negotiate. International NGOs also provide studies of early warning and response opportunities, and can act as advocates in raising the international consciousness of particular situations and in helping to shape public opinion.

144. In recent years, academic and research institutes around the world, together with United Nations research arms, such as UNU, the University for Peace and UNITAR, have significantly increased their interest in early warning and prevention issues. I urge them to continue their endeavours and to bring their research results more effectively to the attention of United Nations practitioners and the political community. In this regard, United Nations field presences and field agencies in particular need to be more aware of the strengths and limitations of civil society actors in the area of conflict prevention and resolution.

145. A number of United Nations bodies have begun to develop programmes of collaboration with NGOs in the field of peace and security. UNIFEM, for example, has raised the profile of women by providing conflict resolution capacity-building to gender-based NGOs in the Sudan, Somalia and Burundi. Similarly, the Department for Disarmament Affairs maintains a broad relationship with NGOs in the field of small arms. NGOs were significant in the adoption of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction in Ottawa in December 1997, and continue to play a major role in mobilizing local and international support for humanitarian mine action and for combating the proliferation and misuse of small arms.

146. An encouraging development during the past few years has been the growth of international and regional networks and directories of NGOs that deal with conflict prevention and resolution issues. In addition, an international networking capacity in the field of conflict prevention is currently being developed to systematically link academic experts, NGOs and other sectors of civil society to the United Nations and various other international and regional organizations. Another recently established initiative provides for online conferencing to facilitate exchange between scholars and practitioners for conflict prevention in a specific situation or region. It should also be noted that in May 2000, the NGO Millennium Forum urged the United Nations to involve a broad coalition of civil society organizations in more proactive conflict prevention efforts.

147. Religious organizations can play a role in preventing armed conflict because of the moral authority that they carry in many communities. In some cases, religious groups and leaders possess a culturally based comparative advantage in conflict prevention, and as such are most effective when they emphasize the common humanity of all parties to a conflict while refusing to identify with any single party. In addition, religious groups could mobilize non-violent alternative ways of expressing dissent prior to the outbreak of armed conflict.

Recommendation 27

I urge NGOs with an interest in conflict prevention to organize an international conference of local, national and international NGOs on their role in conflict prevention and future interaction with the United Nations in this field.

C. The private sector

148. The era of globalization has intensified the understanding that business is an integral part of the economic and political life of society. Along with this understanding, there is a growing recognition among international actors of the potentially important role that business can play in helping to avoid or overcome conflict.

149. I stress the need for transnational businesses to act with a social conscience in all their business activities. To that end, at the World Economic Forum in

Davos in 1999, I launched the Global Compact initiative, a programme for establishing the business sector as a partner in peace by addressing the social consciousness of the international business community. The Compact calls upon business leaders to promote nine principles, both in their individual corporate practices and in supporting public policy in the field of human rights, labour and environment. Based on the assumption that societal stability and peace is good for business, in 2001 the Compact convened a series of dialogues on the role of business in zones of armed conflict in order to identify how businesses can strengthen human security within their sphere of influence.

150. It is also important that businesses should not contribute to economies that support conflict. In that context, I welcome the General Assembly's call on Member States in its resolution 55/56 to implement measures targeting the links between the trade in conflict diamonds and the supply to rebel movements of weapons, fuel or other prohibited material. Similarly, in its resolution 1343 (2001), the Security Council called upon all Member States to take appropriate measures to ensure that individuals and companies in their jurisdiction act in conformity with United Nations embargoes. I also welcome recent Security Council resolutions that have established panels of experts to "name and shame" individuals and businesses that break sanctions or contribute to conflicts.

Recommendation 28

I encourage Member States and the private sector to support the Global Compact in the context of United Nations conflict prevention efforts. In particular, I encourage the business community to adopt socially responsible practices that foster a climate of peace in conflict prone societies, help prevent and mitigate crisis situations, and contribute to reconstruction and reconciliation.

VI. Enhancing capacity for the prevention of armed conflict

151. Building and strengthening national capacity are essential in preventing armed conflict. In the present report, I have made a number of proposals for how the United Nations system could assist Member States in building such national capacity in more effective ways. The success of these recommended measures, if implemented, will depend to a large degree on whether they are backed by appropriate capacities and resources within the United Nations system as well as Member States. In that regard, I believe the areas described below need the attention of the international community for the strengthening of capacity in the field of conflict prevention.

Increase of official development assistance

152. Experience has demonstrated that equitable and sustainable development plays an important role in averting armed conflict. Although poverty by itself is not a root cause of violent conflict, the fact is that some of the poorest societies are either on the precipice or embroiled in armed conflict. Progress in the eradication of poverty and addressing, in particular, inequality, justice and human security issues in developing countries would greatly contribute to conflict prevention in the long term. For that reason, it is important that currently declining levels of official development assistance (ODA) be reversed as a matter of urgency. In that context, the recommendations of the High-level Panel on Financing for Development will have an important bearing on our future efforts in conflict prevention.

Enhancing capacity of Member States for conflict prevention

153. Arising from its successful staff training project, the United Nations Staff College is offering a new programme of country-specific workshops in conflict prevention for the benefit of Member States. The workshops aim to develop "home-grown" strategies for conflict prevention and to offer tools and techniques specifically designed to meet the needs of Member States. Participants include national government officials, members of civil society and representatives of United Nations country teams and their implementing partners. Other capacity-building activities of the United Nations system, such as UNDP activities aimed at strengthening governance and the rule of law, are also a good investment in developing national capacities, institutions and mechanisms for conflict prevention.

Enhancing the capacity of the United Nations system for conflict prevention

154. In the past two or three years, the United Nations system has made a promising start in engendering a culture of prevention in its day-to-day activities. Yet, within the Secretariat, an adequate capacity for conflict prevention is still lacking, despite calls for this in a number of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions and statements (see General Assembly resolution 47/120 A; Security Council resolution 1327 (2000); S/PRST/1999/34; S/PRST/2000/25; and S/PRST/2001/5), as well as in independent studies, such as the independent inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (see S/1999/1257 and A/55/305-S/2000/809).

155. As demands for various peacekeeping, peacemaking and back-stopping functions have increased in the Secretariat, the preventive function has clearly suffered. The Secretariat has no specialized staff in the regional divisions of the Department of Political Affairs or other units tasked to focus on conflict prevention activities on a full-time basis. As the culture of prevention gradually becomes more accepted, it is essential that the Secretariat be given an effective capacity for conflict prevention, including the capacity to systematically analyse successful and unsuccessful preventive efforts and apply them to the design of our future prevention strategies.

156. Similarly, the capacity of other relevant parts of the United Nations system for conflict prevention also needs to be strengthened. In that regard, the training course entitled "Early warning and preventive measures: building United Nations capacity" aims to improve the professional and analytical skills and awareness of United Nations staff and its implementing partners in the area of early warning and preventive action. Most of the courses have been held in the field, and United Nations participants have been drawn from 29 United Nations departments, programmes, offices, funds and agencies. Since 1999, some 750 United Nations headquarters and field staff, participating non-governmental organization partners and nationals of Member States have benefited from this training. There is a need to expand this programme further in the future.

Inter-agency coordinating mechanisms

157. As discussed earlier in the present report, I have recently instituted inter-agency and interdepartmental coordination mechanisms in the field of conflict prevention that have started to show promise after an initial period of experimentation. Yet the Inter-Agency Framework for Coordination still suffers from a lack of effective follow-up and coordination due to resource constraints both at Headquarters and in the field.

Financial resources for Security Council missions

158. As noted in section III.B above, the Security Council has recently made increasing use of missions to areas of tension or ongoing conflict. Yet the United Nations Secretariat has regularly encountered difficulties in securing financial and human resources in a timely fashion to support such missions.

Change of funding to the regular budget

159. While most of the recommendations contained in the present report will not require any new resources, there is a need for United Nations conflict prevention activities to be placed on a more stable and predictable financial basis. Although the generous contributions from Member States to the Trust Fund for Preventive Action are greatly appreciated, the General Assembly should consider whether activities related to preventive action should, as a rule, be funded from the regular budget rather than from extrabudgetary resources. In the coming months, I therefore intend to engage Member States in a dialogue on how conflict prevention could be made a regular component of the United Nations budget.

Recommendation 29

In the context of the long-term prevention efforts of the United Nations, I renew my appeal to the international donor community to increase the flow of development assistance to developing countries. I particularly urge Member States to give serious consideration to the recommendations of the High-level Panel on Financing for Development.

VII. Conclusion

A. Overcoming the obstacles to conflict prevention

160. In the present report, I have stressed that conflict prevention lies at the heart of the mandate of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security, and that a general consensus has emerged among Member States that comprehensive and coherent conflict prevention strategies offer the greatest potential for promoting lasting peace and creating an enabling environment for sustainable development. Moreover, it bears underlining that successful conflict prevention is also sound protection of development investment. I have demonstrated that both the principal United Nations organs and the United Nations system, through its broad range of departments, agencies, offices, funds and programmes, have increased their contribution to the prevention of armed conflict around the world.

161. The imperative for effective conflict prevention goes beyond creating a culture, establishing mechanisms or summoning political will. The United Nations also has a moral responsibility to ensure that vulnerable peoples are protected and that genocides never occur again. Yet, on two occasions in the recent past, in Rwanda and former Yugoslavia, the international community and the United Nations failed to live up to this responsibility. We have learned from those experiences that the very first step in preventing genocides is to address the conditions that permit them to occur. Two major reports that I commissioned on Rwanda and Srebrenica provide a compelling rationale for fully embracing a comprehensive programme of conflict prevention.

162. Yet we still fall far short. We are still far removed from a culture of conflict prevention in which States would seek the advice and assistance of the international community to help identify and address the root causes of conflict, whenever needed and at the earliest possible stage. Thus, the question remains: why is conflict prevention still so seldom practised, and why do we so often fail when there is a clear potential for a preventive strategy to succeed?

163. In my view, past experience offers two lessons in this regard. First, if the Government concerned refuses to admit that it has a problem that could lead to violent conflict and rejects offers for assistance, there is very little outside actors, including the United Nations, can do. To be successful, the United Nations must have the consent and support of the Government concerned and other key national actors for the implementation of a preventive strategy. Second, if important neighbours, regional allies or other Member States who would be well placed to support United Nations efforts lack the political will to lend their support, preventive action is again not likely to succeed.

164. It is clear that such attitudes alone are not the only obstacle to effective preventive action. No less significant are the ways in which the Member States of the United Nations define their national interest in any given crisis. Of course, the traditional pursuit of national interest is a permanent feature of international relations and of the life and work of the United Nations. But as the world has changed in profound ways since the end of the cold war, our conceptions of national interest have largely failed to follow suit. A new, more broadly defined, more widely conceived definition of national interest in the new century would induce States to find far greater unity in the pursuit of the fundamental goals of the Charter of the United Nations. A global era requires global engagement. Indeed, in an era of a growing number of challenges facing humanity, the collective interest *is* the national interest.

165. Of course there are constraints to a practical implementation of the collective interest. But what are the alternatives? The question is not simply one of academic interest. Most of the factors that stopped the United Nations intervening to prevent genocide in Rwanda remain present today. Yet if we do nothing — if we are quiescent in the face of war crimes and ethnic cleansing — we will not only risk being pushed to the margins of global politics but we will also betray the many millions who look to the United Nations for the implementation of the high ideals of the Charter.

166. Of course, as realists we must also recognize that in some cases the sheer intractability of conflicts and the obduracy of the warring parties will make our efforts unlikely to succeed. Moreover, in too many instances there are local warlords and other non-state actors who do not consider themselves constrained by decisions of the Security Council and the wishes of the international community. But even wars that cannot be stopped once started might have been avoided with effective preventive policies. I am under no illusion that preventive strategies will be easy to implement.

The costs of prevention have to be paid in the present, while its benefits lie in the distant future. In addition, the benefits are often not tangible: when prevention succeeds, little happens that is visible, but the nurturing of societal stability, tolerance and sound institutions can be the foundations of sustainable peace.

167. The most promising approach for promoting the peaceful and just international order envisaged in the Charter is, as I have tried to demonstrate in the present report, to build national and international capacity for long-term action to prevent armed conflict. The main lesson to be drawn from past United Nations experience in this regard is that the earlier the root causes of a potential conflict are identified and effectively addressed, the more likely it is that the parties to a conflict will be ready to engage in a constructive dialogue, address the actual grievances that lie at the root of the potential conflict and refrain from the use of force to achieve their aims.

168. Governments that live up to their sovereign responsibility to peacefully resolve a situation that might deteriorate into a threat to international peace and security and that call on the United Nations or other international actors for preventive assistance as early as needed provide the best protection for their citizens against unwelcome outside interference. In this way, preventive action by the international community can contribute significantly to strengthening the national sovereignty of Member States.

B. Towards a culture of conflict prevention

169. The present report provides ample testimony to the fact that the time has come to intensify our efforts to move from a culture of reaction to a culture of prevention. Based on the lessons learned and analysis presented in the present report, I propose the following 10 principles, which in my view should guide the future approach of the United Nations to conflict prevention:

- Conflict prevention is one of the primary obligations of Member States set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, and United Nations efforts in conflict prevention must be in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter.
- Conflict prevention must have national ownership. The primary responsibility for conflict prevention rests with national Governments, with civil society playing an important role. The United Nations and the international community should support national efforts for conflict prevention and should assist in building national capacity in this field. Conflict prevention activities of the United Nations can therefore help to support the sovereignty of Member States.
- Conflict prevention is an activity best undertaken under Chapter VI of the Charter. In this regard, the means described in the Charter, for the peaceful settlement of disputes are an important instrument for conflict prevention, including such means as negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or other peaceful means, as set forth in Article 33 of the Charter. It must also be recognized that certain measures under Chapter VII of the Charter such as sanctions, can have an important deterrent effect.
- Preventive action should be initiated at the earliest possible stage of a conflict cycle in order to be most effective.
- The primary focus of preventive action should be in addressing the deep-rooted socio-economic, cultural, environmental, institutional, political and other structural causes that often underlie the immediate symptoms of conflicts.
- An effective preventive strategy requires a comprehensive approach that encompasses both short-term and long-term political, diplomatic, humanitarian, human rights, developmental, institutional and other measures taken by the international community, in cooperation with national and regional actors. It also requires a strong focus on gender equality and the situation of children.
- Conflict prevention and sustainable and equitable development are mutually reinforcing activities. An investment in national and international efforts for conflict prevention must be seen as a simultaneous investment in sustainable development since the latter can best take place in an environment of sustainable peace.

- The preceding suggests that there is a clear need for introducing a conflict prevention element into the United Nations system's multifaceted development programmes and activities so that they contribute to the prevention of conflict by design and not by default. This, in turn, requires greater coherence and coordination in the United Nations system, with a specific focus on conflict prevention.

- A successful preventive strategy depends upon the cooperation of many United Nations actors, including the Secretary-General, the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the International Court of Justice and United Nations agencies, offices, funds and programmes, as well as the Bretton Woods institutions. However, the United Nations is not the only actor in prevention and may often not be the actor best suited to take the lead. Therefore, Member States, international, regional and subregional organizations, the private sector, non-governmental organizations, and other civil society actors also have very important roles to play in this field.

- Effective preventive action by the United Nations requires sustained political will on the part of Member States. First and foremost, this includes a readiness by the membership as a whole to provide the United Nations with the necessary political support and resources for undertaking effective preventive action in specific situations.

170. It is high time that we translate the promise of prevention into concrete action. Let us make this endeavour a testament to future generations that our generation had the political vision and will to transform our perception of a just international order from a vision of the absence of war to a vision of sustainable peace and development for all.

Notes

[1] See *Preventing Deadly Conflict*, final report of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict.